Stonewall Jackson.
493. Stonewall Jackson’s Movements.—The slowness of McClellan’s advance up the Peninsula not only relieved the Confederate government of any fear for the safety of its capital, Richmond, but also showed that General Thomas J. Jackson’s corps could safely be spared for operations against the Federals in the North. In order to defeat the larger forces of McDowell, Banks, and Frémont, Jackson[[219]] decided first to strike the central army of the Union troops, and then to destroy the two wings in turn before they could unite. Advancing with Napoleonic rapidity from Staunton, he fell upon Banks near Winchester, Virginia, and not only routed him, May 25, but drove him across the Potomac into Maryland. Then retracing his steps, he turned his face westward, and in a similar manner overwhelmed the army of Frémont at Cross Keys, June 8. Meanwhile, General Shields of McDowell’s army, who, with a force about the size of Jackson’s, had crossed the Blue Ridge in order to assist Frémont, found, on his arrival in the Valley, that Frémont’s army had been broken up and practically dispersed. Jackson had no difficulty in defeating Shields, at Port Republic, as he had defeated the others. Thus, in thirty-five days, Jackson’s army had marched two hundred and forty-five miles, had fought three important battles, besides two minor ones, winning them all, and had practically destroyed three Union armies. He had also kept forty thousand men under McDowell from joining McClellan. Leaving a portion of his troops to keep up an appearance of activity, he now turned swiftly to the south with the major part of his force, and within a week was ready to coöperate with Lee against McClellan. His movements had been so rapid and mysterious that his departure was not detected at Washington, and McDowell was needlessly kept in his place for the defense of the capital.
494. McClellan’s Slow Advance.—While Jackson was causing havoc near Washington, McClellan was slowly making his way toward Richmond. On the 11th of May, he learned that the Confederates had evacuated Norfolk and destroyed the ironclad Merrimac, thus leaving the James open for the Federal fleet. The Monitor, with its attending vessels, came up the James River, and advanced as far as Drury’s Bluff, almost within gunshot of Richmond. Had McClellan pushed rapidly on, with the help of the fleet he could, in the opinion of many military critics, have taken the city. Richmond was thrown into consternation. But McClellan’s movements continued to be so incredibly slow that all fear was soon dispelled. Instead of keeping along the James, as he should have done as soon as he learned of the movements of the Monitor, he divided his army, putting part of his forces north of the Chickahominy and part south of it. The bridges were greatly weakened by floods, and the two divisions of the army, thus separated, were in serious danger of not being able to coöperate in case they should be attacked.
495. Confederate Attacks.—McClellan’s headquarters were at Gaines’s Mill on the north side. Johnston, on May 31, decided to attack the corps that confronted him at Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, on the south. The beginning of the battle was favorable to the Confederates, and the Federals were saved from complete rout only by the opportune arrival of Sumner’s corps, which came over “swaying and tossing bridges” from the north. But the serious wounding of Johnston and the arrival of Sumner turned the tide, and at night the Unionists had the advantage.[[220]] Johnston, on account of his wound, was obliged to retire from the command. In the morning, a new bridge constructed in the night enabled reënforcements to be transferred from the north side; but McClellan, who arrived on the field only late in the day, instead of ordering an immediate pursuit, expressed himself as satisfied and recalled his army to the ground it had occupied before the battle. A Federal corps at one time was within four miles of Richmond, and it is probable that, if a prompt advance had taken place, like that of Grant on the second day at Shiloh (§ [478]), the city would have fallen, for the fortifications which later made Richmond impregnable from this direction had not yet been constructed.
General R. E. Lee.
496. General Robert E. Lee.[[221]]—General Lee, who up to this time was Davis’s chief of staff, now succeeded Johnston as general in command. He immediately gathered the reins into his hands, and quickly showed that genius for organization and action for which he soon became so celebrated. Directing Longstreet to be prepared for an attack at any moment on his right, he devoted the major part of his energies to the construction of works which should make his lines impregnable. Though McClellan’s force was nearly twice that of Lee, the industrious Confederates were not interfered with. At length, near the last of June, Lee completed arrangements for an offensive movement. As Jackson had now finished his destructive work in the vicinity of Washington, Lee ordered him to move rapidly to the south, so as to be ready for an attack on McClellan’s flank and rear. The united forces of Lee and Jackson, amounting to fifty-five thousand, were now ready to fall upon the Federals north of the Chickahominy, just as McClellan, with the larger part of his force, was preparing to advance south of it.
497. The First of the Seven Days’ Battles.—The arrival of Jackson was half a day later than had been expected, and consequently the first Confederate attack was repulsed. But the next day, June 27, with Lee in command, the Confederates, fifty-five thousand strong, led by Jackson, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and A. P. Hill, at Gaines’s Mill assaulted the Federals, thirty-one thousand strong, under the command of General Fitz John Porter. A stubborn and magnificent resistance was made, but it was only partially successful. Porter, however, with the help of reënforcements from Sumner, was able to withdraw in good order to the south side of the river. While the battle on the north side of the Chickahominy was going on, there were only about twenty-five thousand Confederates on the south side, under Magruder, between Richmond and the seventy thousand under McClellan. Again, however, no attempt was made to take the capital.
498. McClellan’s Change of Base.—McClellan believed that he was confronted by about one hundred and eighty thousand men, and for safety determined to change his base of supplies and transfer his army to the James River. In this move he completely deceived Lee, and, after destroying a large part of his stores, brought his army together in an orderly retreat. The Confederates pursued, and severe battles took place at Savage’s Station, Frayser’s Farm, and Glendale. The attacks of the Confederates were, however, repulsed. Finally, Lee, in opposition to the advice of his generals, determined on a desperate assault upon Malvern Hill, where McClellan was very strongly posted. The Confederates were defeated with great slaughter, July 1.[[222]] Then McClellan, who had won the majority of the battles, but had lost the campaign, withdrew his army to Harrison’s Landing on the James River.