General Daniel Morgan.
226. Morgan’s Race with Cornwallis.—Morgan, having now destroyed Tarleton’s force, at once set out to rejoin Greene, but, in order to do so, he had to run a race with Cornwallis for the fords of the Catawba River. Though the British commander had the shorter course, Morgan pushed on with so much greater speed that he was the first to cross and thus was able to rejoin the main army.
227. Battle of Guilford Court House.—Greene now determined, before fighting a decisive battle, to draw his enemies as far as possible away from their supplies. Sending on a part of his force in advance and placing himself in command of the rear, he kept near enough to Cornwallis to lure him on without giving him an opportunity for a decisive battle. At length, on February 9, the American forces united at Guilford Court House, only about thirty miles south of the Virginia border, and here Greene, after a delay of about one month, during which he received reënforcements, selected ground for a battle. Though the British had a smaller force, they were veterans, while the larger part of Greene’s army was composed of recent recruits. In the battle which occurred on the 15th of March, the British had the advantage, but they lost so heavily that Cornwallis did not dare to pursue the defeated army. In order to reëstablish his communications with supplies, he moved southeast for the port at Wilmington.
228. Greene’s Recovery of the South.—Greene followed him rapidly until they were near the coast. Then Greene struck into the South for the purpose of reëstablishing his authority throughout the Carolinas. His march was not resisted with any success. September 8, after a masterly campaign extending over six months, he fought and won the last battle of the series, at Eutaw Springs, about fifty miles from Charleston. Thus, within little more than a year after the disastrous defeat of Gates at Camden, the brilliant campaign of Greene drove Cornwallis into Wilmington and the remaining British forces in the South into Charleston, and had practically cleared the intervening country of the enemy.
THE CLOSE OF THE WAR.
229. Movement of Cornwallis from Wilmington.—Cornwallis, however, did not long remain on the coast. As soon as he had refreshed his army, he attempted, with the help of Arnold, to overrun Virginia. Reaching Petersburg on the 20th of May, he was able, within a short time, to take and pillage the more important towns of Virginia, including Petersburg, Richmond, Charlottesville, Portsmouth, and Williamsburg. To meet these raiders, Washington sent Lafayette with an army of Americans and French, amounting to about five thousand men. The French commander, though only twenty-three years of age, had learned from Washington the art of harassing the enemy without bringing on a general engagement. Cornwallis now had a little more than seven thousand men. After trying in vain to bring Lafayette to battle, and to get reënforcements from Clinton, he followed Clinton’s instructions by withdrawing his force to Yorktown, in order to put himself in communication with the British fleet. This was the fatal move that resulted in the loss of the British cause.
230. Plans of Washington and Rochambeau.—Two days after the British reached Petersburg, Washington had an important conference with Rochambeau at Wethersfield, Connecticut. There, it was decided to send to the West Indies for Commodore de Grasse and such ships of the French fleet as could be spared from that region. The purpose was to combine the French and Americans, either to make a joint attack upon New York, or, by a sudden movement toward the South, to overwhelm Cornwallis. De Grasse was to choose and to report whether he would go to New York, or would stop at the Chesapeake.
Operations at Yorktown
231. Plan of the Yorktown Campaign.—In due time, Washington learned that De Grasse had chosen the Southern destination, and accordingly he began at once to maneuver his force so as to lead Clinton to suppose that the purpose was a general attack on New York. He ordered all preparations to be made in New Jersey as though he intended a siege, even sending misleading dispatches, which he planned to have the British capture. So skillfully was this done, that even when the army began to move from the Hudson, the British believed it was for the purpose of a general attack upon the city from New Jersey and Staten Island. The secret of the movement was confined to the French and American commanders. Washington evidently believed with Franklin, that three persons can keep a secret only when one of them is dead. On the 19th of August, leaving a strong guard along the front line, the French and American armies commenced their Southern march. So skillfully had all plans been arranged, that Clinton learned of the movement only after the Americans had reached Philadelphia, nearly a hundred miles away. He attempted a diversion by an attack upon Connecticut, but it was impossible to retard the march, or distract the attention of Washington. The British could not follow without abandoning New York to Heath, who had been left with four thousand men on the Hudson.