A History of the United States

by Charles Kendall Adams; William P. Trent

232. Movement of De Grasse.—De Grasse, with a larger fleet even than had been anticipated, reached the Chesapeake on the day when Washington reached Philadelphia. The French admiral at once landed three thousand troops and turned them over to Lafayette, whose army was thus increased to about eight thousand men. The French general, knowing that Washington was not far away, threw his lines boldly across the peninsula, September 7, thus shutting Cornwallis completely in. The British now saw the James on the one side, the York River on the other, with De Grasse in the rear, and Lafayette in front. Their condition was hopeless.

233. Surrender of Cornwallis.—Though a few British ships reached the scene from the north, they were too weak to cope with the fleet of De Grasse, and there was, therefore, no possible escape. To break through the American lines was impossible, as Cornwallis was now confronted by an army more than twice the size of his own. The siege and bombardment began at once. The cannonade was continued for some days with terrific energy, till the British ammunition began to fail. The outworks were carried by an assault in two divisions,—one of Americans and the other of Frenchmen. The Americans, led by Alexander Hamilton, were the first to cross the British ramparts. This was on the 14th of October. On the 17th, just four years after the surrender of Burgoyne, Cornwallis hoisted the white flag. As soon as the preliminaries could be settled, seven thousand two hundred and forty-seven soldiers became prisoners of war.

234. Influence of the Surrender on the British Government.—The surrender of Cornwallis was virtually the end of this long and memorable contest, for it put enthusiastic life into the Americans, while it overwhelmed the British government with confusion. Those English statesmen who had opposed the war from the first so strengthened their following that they were able to sweep the king’s friends out of power and bring in a government that sympathized with their views. The king himself, though driven almost to despair by this stupendous event, was the last to recognize its real significance; but at length even George III. saw that with a war on his hands against France, Spain, and Holland, his American project, so dear to his heart, must now be given up. A new ministry, with Lord Rockingham at its head, was brought in to negotiate terms of peace.

235. Difficulties in making Peace.—There were long delays and many difficulties in arranging terms. These were greatly complicated by the fact that America had France as an ally, and France had to be consulted in regard to all the conditions. Congress had no money with which to pay off the soldiers, and no power to raise money in the individual states. Discontent among the rank and file threatened to end in the most serious revolts. Nothing but the infallible tact and skill of Washington prevented mutiny. The commander in chief, however, was inflexible in his determination that the forces should be kept up until the treaty was finally adopted. That painful period of distress and waiting at length came to an end, but it was not until September 3, 1783, nearly two years after the surrender at Yorktown, that the treaty was signed at Paris. By that act Great Britain acknowledged the independence of the country from Canada to the Floridas, and from the Atlantic to the Mississippi. The conquest of the West was thus admitted, but the northern boundary was left rather vague, owing to defective knowledge of the region.

236. Treatment of Tories.—The Americans made the mistake of refusing to grant amnesty to the adherents of the defeated party, as should always be done in civil war. The patriots, or Whigs, as they were often called, continued to persecute the Tories. Many were put to death, and thousands were obliged to flee into Canada and Nova Scotia, where their descendants still remember with bitterness the treatment of their ancestors.

237. Causes of Success.—The success of the Revolutionary War was mainly due to five causes:—

1. The unfailing courage, wisdom, and ability of Washington. Even in the darkest hours his confidence in the final issue never faltered. By the wisdom and persuasiveness of the letters which he sent to governors, members of Congress, and prominent men in all parts of the country, he inspired others with something of his own confidence and multiplied the friends of independence. His extraordinary military skill in knowing when to fight and when not to fight, enabled him to take advantage of the mistakes of the enemy and to strike a blow whenever he could hurt the cause of the British or inspire his own army with new courage.

2. The alliance and support of the French. Until the Yorktown campaign the active assistance of the French in the field was very slight, but the moral support was most important. While it inspired the Americans with new courage, it had a corresponding effect in disheartening the British, who had to fight the French in other parts of the world. But for De Grasse, the Yorktown campaign would probably not have been attempted; for, if attempted, Cornwallis could easily have been supported and relieved by the British fleet.

3. The weakness of the British commanders in the field. Gage, Howe, Burgoyne, Clinton, and Cornwallis were all greatly inferior to Washington and Greene.

4. The British, toward the end of the conflict, had four very important wars on their hands, so that they found it impossible to send large reënforcements to their armies in America.