324. The Acquisition of Florida.—Diplomacy with Spain was more definitely successful. Ever since the purchase of Louisiana the United States had claimed that it was entitled to the strip of land along the Gulf known as West Florida; but Spain had refused to admit this, or to sell the territory, in spite of persistent offers to purchase made by Jefferson. In 1810 Madison took possession of the region by proclamation, although it now seems certain that the nation had better claims on Texas. His action, and the invasion of Florida by General Andrew Jackson while he was in pursuit of Indians convinced Spain, however, that she would do well to sell while she could the outlying peninsula of East Florida. Accordingly, on February 22, 1819, Adams negotiated a treaty by which the Floridas were ceded,[[140]] and the western boundary of Louisiana was settled along the Sabine, Red, and Arkansas rivers to the forty-second parallel, and then along that to the Pacific. This treaty strengthened American claims to the Oregon region, and also helped to settle various Indian and slave troubles connected with East Florida, which had served as a place of refuge for runaway negroes and other bad characters. So much disturbance had indeed been caused by these marauders and by the Seminole Indians, that in 1818 General Andrew Jackson had had to invade Florida, and had actually taken two towns and done other rather high-handed acts which nearly led to his being court-martialed.[[141]] Spain for two years delayed ratifying the treaty, but finally yielded to the inevitable.

325. The Occasion of the Monroe Doctrine.—A few years later relations with Spain again became important. Revolutionary principles had spread in the Spanish colonies to the south, and by 1822 Spain had lost all her provinces on the mainland. But the so-called “Holy Alliance,” formed by the principal sovereigns of continental Europe after the fall of Napoleon, had for its chief object the repression of revolutionary doctrines and outbreaks, and it seemed not unlikely that a concerted effort might be made by Europe, not to restore her colonies to Spain, but to distribute them among the great powers. This was naturally not to the liking of a people who had themselves revolted, nor was Great Britain anxious to allow the Alliance to gain too much headway. Besides, Russia was endeavoring to establish a colony on the North Pacific, and she and other powers might easily find pretexts to seize upon territory nearer to the United States—perhaps upon California. Hence, while overtures for a joint protest, made by the British statesman, George Canning, to our Minister to England, Richard Rush, were declined, the administration soon found it necessary to take a stand in the matter.

326. The Monroe Doctrine.—Accordingly, Monroe sent in a message to Congress in December, 1823, in which he outlined the policy since known as the “Monroe Doctrine.” This doctrine was none the less important from the fact that it was addressed to Congress instead of to the European powers. Its gist was contained in two assertions: first, that the American continents were not henceforth to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power; second, that efforts to coerce the newly established governments would be regarded as proofs of “an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.” These firm utterances, for which Monroe was indebted chiefly to John Quincy Adams, but also to the policy of Washington and other statesmen and to the advice of Jefferson, put an end to all fear of European aggression and rendered Russia reasonable with regard to Alaska. The policy thus outlined has since been effectively maintained, and it may now be regarded as beyond the reach of party action. In fact, it has been extended so as to include more of a guardianship over other American powers than was contemplated by Monroe. It is plain from John Quincy Adams’s attitude in the matter of the Panama Congress (§ [337]), that the original “Doctrine” contemplated that each power should guard by its own means against European aggressions.

SLAVERY COMES TO THE FRONT.

Areas of Freedom and Slavery
as established by the Missouri Compromise of 1820

327. The Slavery Question.—Turning now to domestic matters, we find that during Monroe’s two terms, Chief Justice Marshall delivered many of his most celebrated opinions restraining the powers of the states in favor of the general government. But there was one subject which not even a Marshall could have handled effectively—this was slavery. Slavery had occupied the attention of the first Congress, which had been petitioned by anti-slavery societies to abate the evils of the system. In 1793 an act for restoring slaves who had fled from one state to another was passed. The slave trade had been prohibited in 1808, as soon as the Constitution allowed, and a great effort had been made by the American Colonization Society in 1816, to begin the work of exporting the negroes to Africa; but the invention of the cotton gin, in 1793, had rendered slavery too profitable to the far Southern states to make it probable that they would peaceably consent to the abolishment of the institution. On the other hand, the number of people who thought slavery morally wrong had increased in the North and Northwest, and the way in which new slaveholding and non-slaveholding states had been admitted into the Union by pairs, so as not to disturb the balance of power in the Senate, showed that many Southerners were alive to the dangers of the situation. Yet, after all, so great was the general desire for internal harmony that most persons were startled when the debates concerning the admission of Missouri revealed the fact that the existence of slavery was a menace to the Union.

328. The Missouri Controversy.—The inevitable struggle between slavery and freedom was precipitated by the endeavor to bring in Arkansas as a territory and Missouri as a state. Both were to be carved out of that part of the Louisiana Cession in which slavery had already gained a footing. Northern members of Congress objected to the spread of the institution into the vast territory still to be occupied, while Southern members felt that any limitation of slavery was an infringement on their property rights. If a man could carry his other chattels when he removed to the new region, why, they asked, could he not carry those human chattels known as slaves. Finally Arkansas was organized without mention of slavery, but a stand was made on Missouri. James Tallmadge, a New York representative, offered an amendment to the act admitting Missouri, to the effect that further introduction of slaves into the proposed state should be prohibited, and that the children of slaves born after the state’s admission to the Union should be considered free at the age of twenty-five. The Senate refusing to concur, the matter went over.

329. The First Missouri Compromise.—The close of the year 1819 saw a renewal of the contest in the new Congress, which assembled after the matter had been much discussed in state legislatures and throughout the country. Alabama was admitted to balance Illinois; then bills passed the House admitting Maine[[142]] and Missouri, but with the anti-slavery proviso made applicable to the latter. The Senate would admit Maine only if Missouri were admitted as a slave state. The House refused to yield, but finally a compromise was effected. A line was drawn across the Louisiana Territory at 36° 30′, i.e. along the northern boundary of Arkansas, and it was agreed that north of this line slavery should not exist save in Missouri. This famous arrangement, which went into effect in March, 1820, became known as the “Missouri Compromise” and was effective until new territory was added to the Union as a result of the Mexican War.