Henry Clay (1832).
330. The Second Missouri Compromise.—Missouri was not, indeed, admitted until 1821, on account of a provision in its Constitution against allowing free colored men to enter its borders. This obstacle was overcome by the address and dexterity of Henry Clay[[143]] who, as a Virginian by birth and a Kentuckian by residence, was in every way admirably suited to act as mediator between the two sections. He did not like slavery, and had been president of the Colonization Society; but he understood how thoroughly in earnest the Southern men were to defend the institution. He used all the tact and personal charm for which he was conspicuous among his contemporaries, and succeeded in making the people of Missouri agree not to deprive citizens of other states of their rights.
John Randolph.
331. General View of the Compromises.—The Second Compromise was distinctly ambiguous and meant little; the First was a sacrifice of principle which, however, was regarded as necessary at the time. Both sides were in earnest, and the extreme adherents of each stood out to the end for their respective principles. On the whole, the responsibility for the settlement rested largely on the moderate Southerners and on their Northern and Western sympathizers, who were very influential in some states,—for example, in Illinois. Few men saw with John Randolph[[144]] that the day of settlement was only postponed. Whether it would have been best to fight the question out then and there, will always be a mooted point. Compromise on matters of principle is incapable of satisfying men’s consciences for long; but it is equally true that principles cannot be uncompromisingly maintained with success at all times and seasons. Fighting unyieldingly for them at the wrong time may postpone their final triumph indefinitely. Hence it was, perhaps, best that the forces of freedom were given time to grow strong and that the Union was not hazarded at so early a juncture.
FACTIONAL POLITICS.
332. Political Factions and the Tariff of 1824.—The fight over Missouri was not the only indication that the Era of Good Feeling was to be of short duration. Politics throughout the country were becoming personal in character and therefore more or less petty. The influence of the Revolutionary statesmen was waning, in spite of the prestige of survivors like John Adams and Jefferson. The right to vote no longer depended in the main upon the possession of property, as had been the case when the Union was formed, but was being extended to all male citizens of the age of twenty-one. This extension of the franchise was largely due to the example set by the new Western states, which were naturally far more democratic than the older commonwealths. As a result, political tricksters were fast controlling the vote of the masses. Offices were being given for political services, and congressional caucuses and state cliques were dictating nominations. The nominating convention, with its opportunities for “wire-pulling” and its aptitude for selecting compromise candidates, was also coming into vogue in state politics, and political clubs, like the “Tammany Society” of New York, were beginning their sinister work. Under these circumstances it is no wonder that, as the tariff of 1816 was not sufficient for their purposes, the manufacturers of the Middle states and New England should have endeavored to obtain legislation of a more decidedly protective character. Aided by the West, which believed with Clay in creating “a home market” and thus adhering to a truly “American policy,” they succeeded, in 1824, against the wishes of the South, in passing a tariff act with higher duties, especially on wool, woolens, cotton goods, iron, and hemp. They had nearly succeeded in 1820 in carrying their point. Now, on the eve of an election, the politicians who were supporting the various Presidential candidates were afraid to risk votes by opposing such strong financial interests, and three sections[[145]] were in any case stronger than one. But the passage of such an act under such circumstances was sure to give trouble, for although in theory designed for the good of the nation, protection really involved financial loss to one section, the South, which, as a whole, did not yet realize the fact, but was beginning to do so.
John Quincy Adams.
333. The Presidential Election of 1824.—Meanwhile, the choice of Monroe’s successor seemed more important than the tariff. Each of the candidates was a Democratic-Republican, a fact which perhaps made their struggle all the fiercer. John Quincy Adams,[[146]] as Secretary of State, had precedents in his favor,—Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe having served in that capacity,—and he had also the support of New England; but his lack of magnetism counted greatly against him. Calhoun, who was still strong in the North on account of his nationalistic views, which, however, he was fast abandoning, soon contented himself with receiving assurance of the Vice Presidency. Crawford, whose health was very poor at the time, was nominated by the regular party caucus of congressmen; but as caucus nominations had grown in disfavor, this fact hurt his chances. Clay had the support of the West, and was popular elsewhere. Andrew Jackson, then a senator, was popular on account of his military record, represented the democratic masses more nearly than any other candidate, and had astute political managers. At the election of 1824, Jackson led with ninety-nine electoral votes; Adams had eighty-four; Crawford, forty-one; and Clay, thirty-seven. The election thus went to the House of Representatives, which had to choose from the three highest names.