Had Hunter made a vigorous assault on the line through Judge Daniel's Rivermont farm, he could have marched directly into Lynchburg and burned the railroad bridges without successful resistance, for Early could not have spared a man from his line to oppose him. Wharton's two brigades were both east of the Blackwater, and between that stream and James River there was only the skirmish line of McCausland's cavalry, and a few old men in the trenches across the Rivermont farm. These old citizens, however, though entirely "muster free" either from age or physical infirmity, did good service. They remained in the trenches, though without equipment or even the scant comforts of the regular soldier, and were anxiously and gallantly awaiting the anticipated attack. Had it been made, they were ready to die in defence of their homes.
A reconnoissance was made by Averell on the 18th in the direction of the Campbell Courthouse Turnpike. It amounted to nothing, and he soon returned to the main lines. Beyond these two movements, picket firing and artillery duels, nothing was done until about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon, when the infantry divisions of Sullivan and Crook commenced their advance upon Early's centre. This brought about for a short time a very active engagement. Our skirmish line was driven in upon the main body, as is usual in such cases, and the engagement was fairly general and, for a time, very sharp. The enemy soon fell back into a new line, and there each side rested on their arms apparently for the night.
Early scarcely felt himself strong enough, before Rodes arrived, to attack the enemy on ground selected by them, but was courting an attack all day. The enemy's forces showed no signs of weakness or timidity, but the indications were that its movements were lacking in well defined purpose, and there was obviously want of confidence on the part of the subordinate Brigadiers in the Major-General commanding. That this feeling prevailed amongst the division and brigade commanders is clearly observed on reading their official reports, in which they differ with him as to what was done and the causes of the failure to do more.
The report of General Crook, who was a very excellent officer, is particularly striking. After telling of his march and the occupation of his corps on the 17th, he says (70 W. of R. 121):
"Next morning I was sent to the right with my division to make a reconnoissance for the purpose of turning the enemy's left; found it impracticable after marching some three or four miles, and just returned with my division and got into position to support Sullivan's division when the enemy made an attack on our lines."
Having said this, and without further word of explanation or description of the result, he continues:
"On the retreat this evening my division brought up the rear. When I reached Liberty, I found General Averell had gone into camp on the edge of the town. The infantry were going into camp some mile and a half further on."
He sings no paean of victory, as did Hunter, but preserved a silence which is suggestive, if not eloquent.
General Sullivan made no report. All that General Averell says about the movements is an elaborate analysis of the causes of the failure, chief amongst which he asserts was General Hunter's delay at Lexington (70 W. of R. 148). Colonel Frost, who commanded a regiment in Crook's division, reports that on the 18th—
"His command marched three miles to the right, and on the afternoon was ordered again to the front of the enemy's works, and were afterwards formed in line on our left under a heavy fire of artillery. Our brigade charged the enemy and drove them back to his rifle-pits.
Here the right gave way, and our brigade being exposed to a close firing of musketry, grape and canister, we were obliged to retire about thirty paces to a new line of battle, which was held until orders were received to fall back. Marched all that night, and reached Liberty about 3 p.m. on the 9th." (70 W. of R. 135.)