Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes, afterwards President of the United States, in reporting the battle of the 18th, says:
"Pursued the retreating rebels and drove them from their rifle-pits to the protection of their main works. The works being too strong to be carried by the force then before them, the regiment retired in some disorder, but was promptly reformed before reaching our own lines. After leaving Lynchburg the officers and men of the First Brigade sustained themselves through the hardships and privation of the retreat like good soldiers." (70 W. of R. 123.)
Other quotations from other reports might be made to the same effect.
That these reports may have their true significance it is necessary that we note what General Hunter himself says of what took place on the 17th and 18th. It will be found difficult to understand where all the glory comes in. He writes:
"Early in the morning of the 17th orders were given for the troops to move, but the march was delayed for several hours at the Great Otter River, owing to the difficulty in crossing the artillery, and in consequence we did not overtake the enemy until four o'clock in the afternoon. At that hour Averell's advance came upon the enemy, strongly posted and intrenched at Diamond Hill, five miles from Lynchburg. He immediately attacked, and a sharp contest ensued. Crook's infantry arriving at the same time, made a brilliant advance upon the enemy, drove him from his works back upon the town, killing and wounding a number and capturing seventy men and one gun. It being too late to follow up this success, we encamped upon the battle-field. The best information to be obtained at this point of the enemy's forces and plans indicated that all the rebel forces heretofore operating in the Valley and West Virginia were concentrated in Lynchburg, under the command of General Breckinridge. This force was variously estimated at from ten thousand to fifteen thousand men, well supplied with artillery, and protected by strong works.
"During the night the trains on the different railroads were heard running without intermission, while repeated cheers and the beating of drums indicated the arrival of large bodies of troops in the town, yet up to the morning of the 18th I had no positive information as to whether General Lee had detached any considerable force for the relief of Lynchburg. To settle the question, on this morning, I advanced my skirmishers as far as the toll-gate on the Bedford Road, two miles from the town, and a brisk fire was opened between them and the enemy behind their works. This skirmishing with musketry, occasionally assisted by the artillery, was kept up during the whole of the forenoon. Their works consisted of strong redoubts on each of the main roads entering the town, about three miles apart, flanked on either side by rifle-pits protected by abatis. On these lines the enemy could be seen working diligently, as if to extend and strengthen them. I massed my two divisions of infantry in front of the works on the Bedford Road, ready to move to the right or left as required, the artillery in commanding positions, and Averell's cavalry division in reserve. Duffie was ordered to attack resolutely on the Forestville Road, our extreme left, while Averell sent two squadrons of cavalry to demonstrate against the Campbell Courthouse Road, on our extreme right. This detachment was subsequently strengthened by a brigade. Meanwhile I reconnoitred the lines, hoping to find a wreak interval through which I might push with my infantry, passing between the main redoubts, which appeared too strong for a direct assault. While the guns were sounding on the two flanks, the enemy, no doubt supposing my centre weakened by too great extension of my lines, and hoping to cut us in two, suddenly advanced in great force from his works, and commenced a most determined attack on my position on the Bedford Turnpike. Although his movement was so unexpected and rapid as almost to amount to a surprise, yet it was promptly and gallantly met by Sullivan's division, which held the enemy in check until Crook was enabled to get his troops up. After a fierce contest of half an hour's duration, the enemy's direct attack was repulsed; but he persistently renewed the fight, making repeated attempts to flank us on the left and push between my main body and Duffie's division. In his effort he was completely foiled, and at the end of an hour and twenty minutes was routed and driven back into his works in disorder and with heavy loss. In the eagerness of pursuit, one regiment (One Hundred and Sixtieth Ohio) entered the works on the heels of the flying enemy, but being unsupported, fell back with trifling loss. Our whole loss in this action was comparatively light. The infantry behaved with the greatest steadiness, and the artillery, which materially assisted in repelling the attack, was served with remarkable rapidity and efficiency. This affair closed about two p.m. From prisoners captured we obtained positive information that a portion of Ewell's corps was engaged in the action, and that the whole corps, twenty thousand strong, under the command of Lieutenant General Early, was either already in Lynchburg or near at hand. The detachment sent by General Averell to operate on our right had returned, reporting that they had encountered a large body of rebel cavalry in that quarter, while Duffie, although holding his position, sent word that he was pressed by a superior force. It had now become sufficiently evident that the enemy had concentrated a force of at least double the numerical strength of mine, and what added to the gravity of the situation was the fact that my troops had scarcely enough of ammunition left to sustain another well-contested battle. I immediately ordered all the baggage and supply trains to retire by the Bedford turnpike, and made preparation to withdraw the army as soon as it should become sufficiently dark to conceal the movement from the enemy. Meanwhile, as there still remained five hours of daylight, they were ordered to maintain a firm front, and with skirmishers to press the enemy's lines at all points. I have since learned that Early's whole force was up in time to have made a general attack on the same afternoon (18th)—an attack which under the circumstances would probably have been fatal to us; but, rendered cautious by the bloody repulse of Breckinridge, and deceived by the firm attitude of my command, he devoted the afternoon to refreshment and repose, expecting to strike a decisive blow on the following morning. As soon as it became dark I quietly withdrew my whole force, leaving a line of pickets close to the enemy, with orders to remain until twelve o'clock (midnight), and then follow the main body. This was successfully accomplished without loss of men or material, excepting only a few wounded who were left in a temporary hospital by mistake."
By a critical examination and comparison of these reports it will be seen that the men who did the fighting say nothing of the Confederate force being "disgracefully routed," or of their "overwhelming numbers," and maintain a prudent silence as to the cause of Hunter's withdrawal. No one can read the whole correspondence without being satisfied that such men as Averell, Crook, Sullivan and Hayes, who seemed to have all been gallant soldiers, were much discouraged and had no faith in Hunter. They believed they could have forced their way through our lines and were anxious to do so, for they knew that they had force superior both in numbers and equipment. Believing this, they were chagrined that a retreat was ordered just as victory was apparently within their grasp.
Hunter claimed that he was overwhelmed by numbers, and that he was short of ammunition. That he was not outnumbered the official reports plainly show. He had two full divisions of infantry, each with three brigades, two of cavalry, composed in the aggregate of five brigades and thirty-two guns. Early, on the other hand, had only the small though very efficient force belonging to Breckinridge's department, McCausland's and Imboden's cavalry, the corps of cadets, the Silver Grays of the city, the invalids, and about one-half of Ewell's corps; the second half did not reach Lynchburg in time to take active part in the battle on the 18th. Opposed to Hunter's thirty-two guns, Early had none of the artillery attached to the second corps and only the guns under Major Floyd King belonging to Breckinridge's command, Douthat's battery, two of Berkeley's and several of Lurty's, some fifteen or twenty all told. King had four companies of four guns each in his command, but Otey's battery was on duty elsewhere. The batteries with him were Chapman's, Bryant's and Lowry's. Doing good service in Lowry's company was our townsman M.H. Dudley, of the Glamorgan Works.
Early's cavalry, opposed to the elegant divisions of Averell and Duffie, consisted of Imboden's remnant, one-half of which was dismounted, and all of which, though it did good service, was disorganized by the defeat at Piedmont, and, in addition, the gallant little brigade so admirably handled by General McCausland.
If General Hunter did not know all this, it was his fault, for it was his duty to know, and he had ample opportunity to acquire the information. He had scouts on both railroads and the country was filled with the vigilant spies who prided themselves on their cleverness. They were famous under the name of "Jessie's Scouts"; a name assumed in honor of Mrs. General Fremont, who was a daughter of Senator Thomas H. Benton. He also had the aid of several notorious local traitors, who affected to keep him informed. The truth is he had all the necessary information, but lacked the nerve to act on it.