Why did not those perfectly ready to leave leave with the members of the Austrian mission, or leave between the date of their departure, December 11, and the early days of February, when the news of Gordon’s mission first reached Khartoum? Who prevented their leaving during that interval of at least two months from the moment when they were all thrown into “indescribable dismay” until they heard of Gordon’s appointment? And if, when he did arrive, they were so bitterly disappointed at his not being accompanied with five hundred British |312| bayonets—much good these would have been against the “universally worshipped Mahdi” in extricating those who had surrendered to him—why did they stay on? Did not Gordon beg them to leave? did he not try and compel them to do so? did he not put boats at their disposal to sail north or south as best suited them? And has not Gordon himself given the real reason for their staying on?—though to this should be added their unbounded faith and confidence in Gordon.
Gordon, I venture to believe, sustained his reputation in the Soudan up to the end—up to the moment when, with the hand of Death on him, he fell facing his last assailant. True, he lost his reputation for telling the truth, but there are few men in this world whose telling of an untruth would startle and astonish a community. The people of Khartoum, their eyes dry and wearied with looking for a sign of the returning steamers which Gordon had sent off three months before to bring up the troops expected to arrive at the beginning of November, turned to each other, and, in an amazed whisper, said, “Gordon has told a lie,” and were startled and afraid at their own words.
Having dealt as tersely as possible with this curious collection of contradictions, I proceed to the quotation of and replies to the criticisms passed upon Gordon in the book I have already quoted from.
1. “Looking back on the events of the siege of Khartoum, I cannot refrain from saying I consider Gordon carried his humanitarian views too far, and this excessive forbearance on his part added to his difficulties.”
2. “It was Gordon’s first and paramount duty to rescue the |313| Europeans, Christians, and Egyptians, from the fanatical fury of the Mahdi, which was especially directed against them. This was Gordon’s clear duty, but unfortunately he allowed his kindness of heart to be made use of to his enemy’s advantage.”
3. “Thus, in his kindness of heart, did Gordon feed and support the families of his enemies. It was quite sufficient for a number of women to appeal to Gordon, with tears in their eyes, that they were starving for him to order that rations of corn should be at once issued to them, and thus it was that the supplies in the hands of the Government were enormously reduced.”
4. “Gordon should have recognized that the laws of humanity differ in war from peace time, more especially when the war he was waging was especially directed against wild fanatical savages, who were enemies to all peace.”
5. “He was entirely deceived if he believed that by the exercise of kindness and humanity he was likely to win over these people to his side; on the contrary, they ridiculed his generosity, and only thought it a sign of weakness. The Soudanese respect and regard only those whom they fear, and surely those cruel and hypocritical Mahdists should have received very different treatment to civilized Europeans.”
6. “I also think that Gordon brought harm on himself and his cause by another action, which I am convinced led to a great extent to his final overthrow. Such men as Slatin, Lupton, Wad-el-Mek, and others, had offered, at the risk of their lives, to come and serve him. . . . Gordon would not, however, vouchsafe an answer to the letters of appeal these men wrote to him.”
In the first five extracts, Father Ohrwalder, from an initial mistake in forgetting or being unaware of the presence in Khartoum of the thousands of widows and orphans of the soldiers of Hicks’ army, flounders on until, as I have said, he is credited with opinions which he should be the last to give utterance to. It is passing strange that any missionary should place limits to the humanitarian views and forbearance of a military commander in time of war, who may invariably be |314| depended upon to err on the wrong side from the biblical point of view. Gordon, in keeping in mind the Sermon on the Mount, and acting up to its precepts as far as the exigencies of a state of war permitted, performed no act derogatory to him as a military commander. Gordon was no worse a Christian than he was a soldier—and the world never saw a better soldier. And whatever Gordon’s paramount duty may have been, it certainly was not his paramount duty to weaken his little garrison by sending an expedition into Kordofan to rescue, say, a dozen people who, as far as Gordon and every one else in Khartoum knew, had disavowed the Christian religion and adopted that of the Mahdi.