A Prisoner of the Khaleefa: Twelve Years Captivity at Omdurman

by Charles Neufeld

There is another aspect to the case. Gordon’s troops were Muslims. The “Christians” had adopted the “true faith” and become Muslims also. Why, then, should Muslim lives be sacrificed to “rescue” them from Islam and bring them back to Christianity? And it must not be forgotten that Slatin, so far from denying his conversion, excused himself on the ground that his religious education had been neglected at home. Gordon is not to be blamed for having believed that the “Christians” had sincerely adopted Islam, for apart from the mere adoption of the religion, people sworn to celibacy and chastity had entered the matrimonial state, which was considered a further evidence of their conversion. While the gardener of the Khartoum Mission was bewailing the money he had sent to the “apostates,” Consul Hansal wrote, asking that the matter be kept secret, to the Austrian |315| Consul-General in Cairo, informing him of what had occurred. Had there been any “Christians” to rescue from the Mahdi, doubtless Gordon’s paramount duty would have exhibited itself in some action. Nor is there any evidence that the Mahdi’s “fanatical fury” was in any single instance especially directed against the “Christians,” but there is a great deal of evidence to the contrary. With the exception of putting Slatin in chains, when he believed that he was playing him false, I know of no case of wanton cruelty practised by the Mahdi towards the “Christians,” and I am not sure whether “clemency” would not be the proper word to use in Slatin’s case, when it is remembered what happens to prisoners of war who break their parole, for Slatin and the others had sworn the oath of allegiance.

Extract No. 3, apart from the extraordinary censure on Gordon for feeding the families of his enemies, and being moved to pity at the sight of the tears of starving women, calls for a more detailed reply to the criticism. Gordon, according to “Ten Years’ Captivity,” ought to have turned these women out of the town to be at the tender mercies of the “wild fanatical savages” and been responsible for the rehearsal under his own eyes of the hunt for lust which followed on the fall of Khartoum. Father Ohrwalder can never have heard of England’s proud roll of heroes who on land and sea have given their lives to save those of helpless women and children. In feeding these women—even had all been the wives of his enemies, which they were not—Gordon committed |316| no graver military crime than did the commander of the troops on board the Birkenhead, when, instead of seeing first to the safety of the soldiers for whose lives he was responsible, he placed the women and children in the boats which could have saved the troops, and called upon his men to present arms as the boats left the side of the ship—and to stand to attention as the vessel sank under them. So much for British principle, apart from Christ’s teachings, in peace and war; now for the facts in Gordon’s case.

When Gordon arrived in Khartoum, he found wandering—hungry and helpless—the thousands of widows and orphans of the soldiers who a few months before constituted Hicks Pasha’s army. Throughout his journals you will discover constant reference to the food question, with accounts of his successful search for the stolen biscuits, which had “enormously reduced” the supplies in the hands of the Government. Gordon had calculated that the relieving army would reach him at the beginning of November, so that we find him writing on the 2nd of that month that he has six weeks’ food supplies. In making this estimate he was allowing for full rations to the troops (who were also in receipt of the money with which to buy those rations), and the wants of the poor. On the 11th of that month he discovers nearly a million pounds of stolen biscuits. On the 21st he writes, “I do not believe one person has died of hunger during the months we have been shut up.” On December 14—that is a month after the latest date he had estimated for the arrival of the relief expedition, he |317| says that unless the troops come in ten days the town may fall, and this because he had on November 12 written, “Omdurman fort has one and a half months’ supply of food and water.” With the fall of this fort, he knew that the end would soon come.

But up to this date the soldiers, who were not entitled to rations since they received money for their purchase, were given full rations, and there is every reason to believe that the pinch only came when Omdurman fort fell on January 14 or 15, and the town was completely hemmed in. Food was short, no doubt, but, eight days before the fall of the town, Gordon could spare from the stores fifteen hundred pounds of biscuits to provision a boat for the Europeans. One should only be filled with amazement that Gordon held out so long after the date when he had expected relief, and it is not only ridiculous but monstrous to attack him, because he did not calculate that the expedition would only arrive seventy-eight instead of seventy-six days late, when we know for certain that his troops were receiving full rations which they were not entitled to for at least a month after the date of the expected arrival of the expedition.

It is true that Gordon, seeing the food supplies giving out, recommended people to leave him and join the Mahdi, but this was only after more days had slipped away after the “ten days from December 14.” He had then abandoned all hope, and saw that his prophecy was to come true—the expedition would arrive just “too late.” In comparison with the number of widows whom Gordon had had to support |318| for ten months, without the slightest assistance or aid from outside, the number of wives of his “enemies” in the Mahdi’s camp was so insignificant as to be unworthy of notice. But even supposing that all the starving women who went to Gordon crying for the bread which Father Ohrwalder suggests should have been represented by a stone, were the wives of his enemies, his own writing justifies Gordon’s feeding of them, for he says, “These crafty people thus assured themselves that, should the Mahdi be victorious, their loyalty to him would ensure the safety of their families and property in Khartoum, while, on the other hand, should Gordon be victorious, then their wives and families would be able to mediate for them with the conquerors.”

It is quite evident, then, that these people who went over to the Mahdi’s camp did so, not from conviction of his divine mission, but to save the lives of their wives and families, whom by preference they entrusted to Gordon even at the last hour, and nearly a year after the date when his arrival without five hundred British bayonets is supposed to have ruined his reputation in the Soudan. I am inclined to think that the “craftiness” displayed by some in trying to secure their wives and daughters against violation and death, was no less justifiable than the “craftiness” displayed by others for an entirely different purpose. What a tribute these “crafty” people paid to Gordon! I mean the crafty people who left Khartoum in January, 1885, and trusted Gordon with the lives of their wives and children. |319| In discussing this food question with Khartoum survivors, I laid particular stress upon the feeding of the women and children, and I can do no better than give the summing-up of it in the words of a native survivor, after I had translated to him the criticisms I am replying to—“What! Would Gordon Pasha send away the hungry women and children of soldiers who had been killed fighting for the Government?”

I pass over extract No. 5 for the moment to refer to No. 6. The use of my portrait in advertising the book I am quoting from led most to believe that I approved of the criticisms it contained, and I have taken this opportunity of showing how thoroughly I disagree with them. To say that Slatin and others had offered, at the risk of their lives, to join Gordon is hardly correct, and if Gordon did not vouchsafe a written answer to the letters he received, he probably had good reason for not doing so, especially as it appears likely that some of Said Bey Gumaa’s letters addressed to the Governor-General before Gordon’s appointment had succeeded in getting through to Khartoum, and from these and deserters from the Mahdi, Gordon must have learned all.

Under pretence of intending to submit, Gumaa gained time, and tried to hurry up reinforcements, but this having been suspected, Zoghal ordered Slatin, Tandal, the President of the Civil Court, Aly Bey Ibrahim-el-Khabir, Slatin’s head-clerk Ahmad Riad, and a few others, to send in an ultimatum to Gumaa, |320| and await his reply. The reply travelled quickly; as soon as he read the letter, Gumaa opened fire upon the spot where Slatin and his companions were awaiting him. During the first siege of El Fasher, Gumaa must have accounted for at least fifteen thousand dervishes, and utterly defeated the army which retired to Walad Birra, from whence a party was sent off to Dara to bring up the ammunition which, as appears from Gordon’s Journal, was handed over to the Mahdists by Slatin when he surrendered the province. This occupied eleven days, and then the second siege was laid. The wells were filled up, thus depriving the garrison of water; but for seven or eight days they held out, dying of thirst, while the town was constantly bombarded with Government ammunition. Said Bey Gumaa has always protested that had it not been for the ammunition handed over by Slatin to the Mahdists he could have held out—and more.

The knowledge of these things must have influenced Gordon, especially when Slatin writes to him, through Consul Hansal, offering to place his services at his disposal, but only on condition that Gordon should guarantee never to surrender, for, if he did, Slatin would be maltreated by the Mahdists when they laid hands upon him. Gordon was the best judge as to the value of services offered under such conditions. For “moral and political reasons,” Gordon considered it unadvisable to have anything whatever to do with what he called “apostate” Europeans in the Mahdi’s camp, but appreciating the enormous responsibility |321| thrown upon his shoulders, he appealed to the Ulema for their advice, as these apostates were now their co-religionists, and they decided to have nothing whatever to do with their “proposals of treachery,” as no good could come of it. Matters were made still worse by Slatin writing to Gordon asking him to be a party to proceedings very foreign indeed to Gordon’s nature at all events. Slatin’s request to Gordon was to write to him personally one letter in French, and another letter in Arabic, “asking him to obtain permission from his Master to come to Omdurman and discuss with him the conditions of his (Gordon’s) surrender,” which letter he could use in order to obtain permission to come to Omdurman. If Gordon had written that Arabic letter. . . .

If all these facts were not known to Father Ohrwalder before 1892, six years is quite long enough time to have learned them, and now I have no hesitation in saying that to assert that Gordon brought about his downfall by refusing the services of people willing to risk their lives in reaching him is, to put it charitably, pure fiction.