The whole of Ireland was subdued ere the spring of 1692 began. A month later occurred the cruel deed which marked the final end of the revolt in the Scottish Highlands. The wrecks of Dundee's followers had been scattered at the skirmish of Cromdale in 1690. But a few chiefs still refused their submission. William proclaimed that there should be an amnesty for all who surrendered before January 1, 1692. This opportunity was taken by all the Highlanders, save Macdonald of Glencoe, a petty chief of 200 families in Argyleshire. He made his submission a few days later than the appointed time. Lord Stair, the Secretary of State for Scotland, prevailed upon William to give him leave to make an example of Macdonald and his tribe. A regiment was sent to Glencoe, and courteously received by the chief, who thought his tardy submission had brought him impunity. But, obeying their orders, the soldiery fell at midnight upon their unsuspecting hosts, shot Macdonald and all the men they could catch, and drove the survivors out of their valley. This cold-blooded outrage was sanctioned by William, but only because he had been carefully kept in ignorance of the fact that Macdonald had submitted a few days after the appointed date.

The French war.—Tory disaffection.

While the Irish war had been in progress, important events had been taking place nearer home. The war on the continent had proved indecisive, though if either party had a slight advantage, it was the French. Even at sea the fleets of Lewis at first gained some successes, mainly owing to the culpable slackness of the English admiral, Lord Torrington. His negligence—treachery would perhaps be the more appropriate word—was only a symptom of a very widespread spirit of disloyalty among the Tory party. Many persons had not got out of the Revolution the private advantages for which they had hoped. William III. had endeavoured to hold an equal balance between the English parties, but could not wholly conceal his suspicions of the Tories and his private preference for the Whigs. In consequence, some of those who had been foremost in expelling James II., now began to intrigue with him, and expressed a more or less real sympathy with his plans for recovering his crown. Among these traitors were the best sailor and the best soldier that England owned, Admiral Russell, who succeeded Torrington in command of the Channel fleet, and John Churchill—the Marlborough of later days—who had been appointed commander of the English troops whom William had taken to the continent. It is some palliation to their guilt that they neither of them actually did desert William in the moment of trial, but both were undoubtedly guilty of habitual correspondence with the enemy. Churchill even descended so far into the depths of baseness as to send secret intelligence of William's plans to the French—though, with characteristic duplicity, he sent them too late to be of any use.

The battle of La Hogue.

How much these secret protestations of loyalty to James meant, was shown in 1692 by the event of the battle of La Hogue. The French king had collected an army in Normandy to invade England, and ordered up his ships from Brest to convoy it, relying on the promise of Russell that he would bring over the Channel fleet. But when the squadron of De Tourville came in sight, the admiral promptly attacked it. Either the spirit of fighting had overcome him, or compunction for his treachery smote him at the last moment. At any rate, he fell briskly upon the French—whose squadron was much inferior in numbers—destroyed twelve ships, and completely scattered the rest. This victory gained Russell a very undeserved peerage, and saved England from all danger of a French invasion or a Jacobite rising (May 19, 1692).

The war in the Netherlands, 1692-1695.

Meanwhile the armies of Lewis XIV. and William were contending obstinately in the Netherlands, without any marked success on either side. William was opposed by a general as able as himself in Marshal Luxembourg, and met his usual ill luck in the field. He was defeated at two great pitched battles, Steenkerke (August, 1692), and Landen (July, 1693), yet after each engagement he made such a formidable front, that the enemy gained nothing by his victory, and hardly won a foot of ground in the Spanish Netherlands. At each of these fights the English troops were in the thick of the fray, and justified by their conduct the anxiety that William had always shown to have England on his side. Yet Churchill, their best general, was not leading them; he had been deservedly disgraced in 1692, when his intrigues with James II. were discovered. When at last the fortune of war began to turn in favour of the allies (mainly owing to the death of William's great opponent, Marshal Luxembourg), it was again the English troops who got the chief credit in the one great success of the king's military life—the storm of Namur. When that great fortress, whose lofty citadel, overhanging the Meuse, was the strongest place in Belgium, was taken by assault in the very face of a French army of 80,000 men, it was the English infantry, under Lord Cutts, who forced their way into the breaches and compelled Marshal Boufflers to surrender (August, 1695).

The treaty of Ryswick.

After the fall of Namur the war languished: the King of France saw his resources wasting away, and, in spite of all his efforts, had utterly failed to conquer the Netherlands, though his armies had been somewhat more successful in Italy and Spain. He finally consented to treat for peace, which, after long negotiations, was at last secured by the treaty of Ryswick (1697). This was the first occasion on which the ambitious and grasping king had to own defeat. Making terms with England, Holland, Spain, and Austria, he surrendered all that he had gained since 1678, with the single exception of the town of Strasburg. He was also compelled to recognize William as the lawful King of England, though he refused to expel James II. and his family from their asylum at St. Germains, where they had been dwelling since 1691.

English factions.