English domestic politics during the time of the struggle with Lewis XIV. had presented a shameful spectacle. It is difficult to say whether the Whigs or the Tories disgraced themselves the more, by their factious violence and treacherous intrigues. In all her history Britain has never known such a sordid gang of self-seeking, greedy, and demoralized statesmen, as the generation who had been reared in the evil times of Charles II. Danby, the corrupt old Tory minister of 1674; Sunderland, the renegade tool of James II.; the traitors Russell and Churchill, were typical men of the day. The party warfare of Whig and Tory was prosecuted by disgraceful personalities—impeachments for corruption, embezzlement, or treacherous correspondence with France; and, to the shame of England, the accusations were generally true. Even the unamiable William III. appears a comparatively dignified and sympathetic figure among these squalid intriguers. We cannot wonder that he disliked and distrusted Englishmen, when those with whom he had most to do were such a crew of sharpers and hypocrites. For eight years he contrived to combine Tories and Whigs in his ministry, an extraordinary testimony to his powers of management, and to his subjects' blind love of office. His own troubles were constant and galling; not only was he abused by both political parties for his moderation, but he was openly accused of favouritism and even of corruption. His very life was not safe: a conspiracy formed by some extreme Tories and Jacobites, headed by a member of Parliament named Sir John Fenwick, came to light in 1696, which was found to involve a plot to shoot the king as he was on his way to hunt in Richmond Park. When the conspirators were arrested and examined, evidence came to hand which proved that half the statesmen in England had been corresponding with James II., though it is true that no one of importance had been implicated in the actual assassination plot. It is no wonder that William grew yet more sour and cold as the years passed over his head. He had lost his bright and able wife, Queen Mary, on December 28, 1694, and after her death he felt himself more than ever a stranger in England. If only the political exigencies of his situation would have allowed it, he would have preferred to return to Holland for good.
Reform of the coinage—The Bank of England founded.
Only two successful political experiments emerged from the faction-ridden times of William III. The first was the reform of the coinage in 1695, when the clipped and worn money of the Tudors and Stuarts was honestly redeemed by the government for new and good pieces—in earlier days the state had always cheated the public on the occasion of a recoinage. The other was the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694. This excellent device was intended to give the nation a solid and solvent bank, provided with a government guarantee, that should be above the dangers of fraud and ill luck which render private banks dangerous to the investor. At the same time, in return for the grant of the government guarantee, the new Bank of England contracted to lend the state money, and took over the management of the National Debt, then a small matter of a very few millions.
The Spanish Succession.
The peace which followed the treaty of Ryswick lasted for four uneasy years only. The old war had hardly ceased before a new trouble began to appear on the horizon. This was the vexed question of the Spanish Succession. The reigning king of Spain, Charles II. was a hypochondriacal invalid. His next of kin was his eldest sister, Maria Theresa, who had wedded Lewis XIV.; her son, the Dauphin, would have been the natural heir to Spain, if his mother had not executed on her marriage a deed of renunciation of her rights of succession. After the Dauphin, the nearest relative of Charles II. was his younger sister Margaret, the wife of the Emperor Leopold I.; but the rights of this princess and her daughter, Maria Antonia, were also barred by a renunciation, made when she married the Emperor. Next in the family came Leopold himself, as the son of an aunt of Charles II., who had made no such engagement at her espousals. The question turned on the validity of the renunciations made by the two infantas. Lewis XIV. said that his wife's agreement was worthless, because no one can sign away the rights of their heirs. Yet the document had been solemnly sanctioned by the Cortes, the Spanish Parliament. The Emperor stood out for the validity of the document, and urged, not the claims of his Bavarian daughter, who had also been the victim of her mother's renunciation, but his own right as grandson of Philip III.
| Philip III., 1598-1621. | |||||||||||||
| Philip IV., 1621-1665. | Maria = Ferdinand III., Emperor | ||||||||||||
| Charles II., 1665-1700. | Maria Theresa = Lewis XIV. of France. | Margaret = Leopold, Emperor = Eleanor of Neuburg. | |||||||||||
| Lewis the Dauphin. | Maximilian of Bavaria = Maria Antonia. | ||||||||||||
| Lewis, Duke of Burgundy. | Philip, Duke of Anjou. | Joseph of Bavaria, died 1699. | Joseph I, Emperor. | Charles, Archduke. | |||||||||
The real difficulty of the situation lay in the fact that all Europe viewed with dismay the union of Spain and France, and was very little better pleased at the idea of the union of Spain and the Empire. The Spanish dominions were still so broad and so wealthy, that they would throw out the balance of power in Europe, if they were united to any other large state. For Charles II. reigned not only over Spain, but in Belgium, in Milan, Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, and over the rich Spanish colonies in Mexico, the West Indies, South America, and the Malay Archipelago.
The first Partition Treaty.
While Charles II. was slowly sinking into his grave, all his heirs were busily engaged in discussing the changes that must follow his decease. Both Lewis and the Emperor saw that it would be unwise to claim Spain for themselves, therefore the French king named his youngest grandson, Philip, Duke of Anjou, as his representative, while the Austrian passed on his personal claims to his younger son, the Archduke Charles. They then arrived at an agreement that neither Philip nor Charles should have Spain itself, but that each should have compensation for resigning his full claim—the archduke was to take Milan, Duke Philip Naples and Sicily. Meanwhile Spain, Belgium, and the Indies were to go to the young Prince of Bavaria, the one claimant who was unobjectionable to all Europe; a secret treaty to this effect was signed, and carefully kept from the knowledge of the Spaniards, to whom it would have been very offensive, as taking away their obvious right to choose their own king. England and Holland, however, were both made consenting parties to the treaty, of which William III. fully approved.
The second Partition Treaty.