[613] Moore to Frere, Dec. 6. The version presented to Parliament has been somewhat expurgated: I quote from that given by James Moore.
[614] Frere to Moore, from Truxillo, Dec. 9.
[615] Frere to Moore, from Merida, Dec. 14.
[616] Moore’s plans between Dec. 6 and 10, the day on which he got news of the fall of Madrid, must be gathered from his rather meagre dispatches to Castlereagh of midnight, Dec. 5, and of Dec. 8; from his much more explicit letters to Frere on Dec. 6 and 10; from that to La Romana on Dec. 8; and most of all from the very interesting and confidential letters to Baird on Dec. 6 and 8.
His doubts as to the permanence of the outburst of enthusiasm in Madrid are plainly expressed in nearly every one of these epistles. The terrible under-estimate of Napoleon’s disposable forces is to be found in that to Castlereagh on Dec. 12, where he writes that ‘the French force in Spain may fairly be set down at 80,000 men, besides what is in Catalonia.’ Acting upon this hypothesis, it is no wonder that he was convinced that Bonaparte could not both besiege Madrid and hunt the British army.
[617] Consisting of the 51st Regiment, 59th (2nd batt.), and 76th.
[618] Except the ‘Light Brigade’ of Baird’s army which had never left Astorga, having been intended to act with the cavalry as a rearguard.
[619] The 3rd had been at Ciudad Rodrigo since Oct. 29 guarding communications.
[620] They were the 45th (1st batt.) and the 97th.
[621] See the tables in the [Appendix]. It seems to result that the gross total who marched from Corunna and Lisbon was 33,884, that the deduction of 3,938 sick leaves 29,946. Leith’s battalions and the 82nd were 2,539 strong, the men on detachment 1,687: this leaves 25,720 for the actual marching force.