Musnier returned in haste from Calatayud at the news of this disaster, but left the bulk of Severoli’s division to occupy western Aragon. He then set himself, with the help of Reille, to hunt down Mina. But the latter, marching with ease between the columns that pursued him, for the peasantry kept him informed day by day of every movement of the enemy, retreated westward. Easily eluding the French, he made an extraordinary excursion, right across Navarre, Alava, and Biscay, down to the sea coast at Motrico, where he handed over his prisoners to the captain of the British frigate Isis, and then returned unharmed to his familiar haunts. Of such a delusive nature was the hold of the French on Northern Spain, that a column of 5,000 men could march for 200 miles across it without being intercepted or destroyed.
All these exploits of the guerrilleros were daring and well planned, but though they had given Musnier much trouble, and cost the French many a weary hour of march and countermarch, they had not cleared Aragon of the enemy, nor shaken Suchet’s position. Indeed, on October 20, the general condition of affairs in Aragon was more favourable for the invaders than on September 20, for two fresh divisions had been drawn down into that province, and there were 20,000 French and Italian troops in it instead of 6,000. The petty disasters at Calatayud and Ayerbe were irritating rather than important. Suchet never for a moment felt inclined to relax his hold upon Valencia: that western Aragon was in an uproar affected him little, when his communication with his two main dépôts of stores at Tortosa and Morella was not interrupted.
Blake, it may be mentioned, did not content himself with setting the Empecinado and Duran in motion, he tried another division in another quarter with even less result. Rumours had reached him that King Joseph’s Army of the Centre was about to co-operate with Suchet, by sending a column across the mountains to Cuenca and Requeña. The news was false, for though Napoleon had ordered the King to do what he could to help in the invasion of Valencia, Joseph had replied that he had not even one brigade to spare for a serious demonstration, and had not moved—the guerrilleros gave sufficient occupation to his much-scattered army, of which a large portion was composed of untrustworthy Spanish Juramentados. But, listening to vain reports, Blake ordered Mahy to collect the best of his Murcian troops and to march on Cuenca to meet the supposed invaders. His subordinate, leaving Freire in command in Murcia, took seven selected battalions of foot under Creagh and the Marquis of Montijo, with 800 horse and one battery, and moved from his camp at Mula by Hellin and Chinchilla northward. The distance to be covered was great, the roads after Chinchilla very bad. Mahy arrived in front of Cuenca on October 15th, to find that there was only one battalion and two squadrons of Joseph’s army there. This little force evacuated the high-lying city in haste, and fled towards Madrid the moment that the Murcians showed themselves. No other French force could be heard of in any direction. At Cuenca Mahy received a dispatch from Blake (who had apparently discovered his mistake about the Army of the Centre), telling him to descend from the mountains by Moya and Liria, and to join the wing of the main army, which lay under Obispo at Segorbe. It was only on the 23rd October that he came in: his troops, the pick of the Murcian army, had been completely wasted for some twenty days in a circular march against a non-existent enemy. Meanwhile every man had been wanted in Valencia.
Suchet, when once he had settled down to the siege of Saguntum, had not failed to notice Blake’s weak demonstration against his flank by means of the divisions of Obispo and Charles O’Donnell. He did not intend to tolerate it, and on September 30 had sent Palombini with his own Italian division and Robert’s French brigade to beat up Obispo’s quarters at Segorbe. The Spanish division made a poor attempt to defend itself on a position in front of that town, but was easily beaten and retired into the mountains. It was then the turn of Charles O’Donnell; when Palombini had come back to the camp, Suchet took Harispe’s division, with Robert’s brigade, and two regiments of cavalry, to evict the Spanish division from Benaguacil. O’Donnell made a slightly better fight than Obispo had done, and deployed Villacampa’s infantry behind an irrigation canal, with San Juan’s cavalry on his flanks. But the French were superior in numbers as well as in confidence: one fierce charge broke O’Donnell’s line, and he had to retreat in haste to the hills behind him, losing 400 men, cut up in the pursuit by Suchet’s cavalry, while the French casualties barely reached three officers and sixty men (October 2nd). Blake, who had been quite close enough to succour O’Donnell if he had chosen, made no attempt to aid him, and kept quiet behind his lines on the Guadalaviar. There the routed troops joined him next day.
Suchet, having thus cleared his flanks, settled down to the siege of Saguntum, where his heavy artillery was now much needed. The besieging army had to content itself for another fortnight with making preparations for the expected train—levelling roads and constructing approaches on the ground which was destined for the front of attack, at the west end of the hill of Saguntum.
Meanwhile the siege-train was lumbering down from Tortosa by the coast-road. On October 6th Suchet started to meet it, taking with him the 1,500 Neapolitans of Compère. On the 8th he reached Oropesa, where he found the small Spanish garrison still holding the two towers which have before been mentioned. The first guns that came up were turned against the tower by the high-road; it was easily breached, and on the 10th surrendered: 215 men and four guns were captured. Next day came the turn of the other tower, that by the sea; but before the siege-battery had opened on it, the British 74 Magnificent and a squadron of Spanish gunboats ran inshore, and took off the garrison of 150 men in their boats, under the ineffective fire of the French.
The moment that the tower which blocked the high-road had fallen, and before that on the shore had been evacuated, Suchet began to push the head of his precious convoy of heavy artillery southward. It made such a good pace that the first guns arrived at the camp before Saguntum as early as the night of October 12th. Meanwhile the Marshal himself returned thither, escorted by Compère’s Neapolitans: the brigade of Ficatier, which had escorted the train hitherto, was dispersed to cover the line of communications, placing its five battalions at Oropesa, Almenara, and Segorbe.
SECTION XXX: CHAPTER II
THE BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM. OCTOBER 1811