The total of this makes 5,560 for these fourteen corps; we leave fifteen others unaccounted for. As a rough calculation I suppose that we may hold that as these regiments lost, as we know from Martinien’s lists [which are not quite complete], at least 152 officers out of 5,560 of all ranks, then the other fifteen regiments with 181 officers killed or wounded must have lost something like 6,000. The vagaries of the proportion between officers and men hit are extraordinary in individual units, but these tend to rectify themselves on a large total consisting of many regiments. I therefore believe that 11,560 would be something very like the total loss killed and wounded in the French infantry. We have then to allow for some 40 unwounded officers taken prisoners, and corresponding to them perhaps 1,200 unwounded men. The total loss for the infantry would thus be 12,800. For cavalry and artillery, &c., 53 officers hit—as by Martinien’s tables—must imply something over a thousand men lost. We should thus arrive at a total of 14,000 for the casualties—the sum which I suggest in my text (p. 469).
To show the worthlessness of any attempt to deduce the French losses by a mere comparison of the official ‘morning states’ of July 15 and August 1, the following instances may suffice.
The 65th Line shows 59 officers and 1,527 men present on July 15, 52 officers and 1,302 men on August 1. The apparent loss is 7 officers and 225 men. But this unit’s regimental report shows 3 officers killed, 5 officers wounded, 204 men killed or prisoners, 106 men wounded, 39 missing; total, 8 officers and 349 men. Therefore, as is obvious, one officer and 124 men must have joined from somewhere (dépôt at Valladolid?) between the two dates, or the deficiency would be 125 greater between the ‘present under arms’ of the two dates than is shown.
A more striking case is the 62nd Line, of Thomières’s Division. It shows present on July 15, 47 officers and 1,076 men, on August 1st 45 officers and 1,048 men—the apparent loss is only 2 officers and 28 men. But Martinien’s lists show us that the regiment lost at least 15 officers, killed and wounded, and the regimental report gives 20 officers and 848 men killed, wounded, or missing! The real loss is 868 not 30! Therefore 18 officers and about 800 men, the equivalent of a strong battalion, must have joined between July 15 and August 1. This corresponds to the fact that the 62nd showed only 2 battalions[787] at Salamanca, while the ‘morning state’ of June 15th showed it as having at the front three battalions and 1,900 rank and file. Clearly the third battalion rejoined the colours after the battle—having presumably been quartered in the small garrisons of Castile evacuated after the disaster of July 22. Many men must also have rejoined the other two battalions.
But the most absurd case of all is that of the 47th Line, whose total figures actually go up from 1,625 to 1,712 of all ranks between July 15th and August 1st—in despite of the fact that it lost (as Martinien’s lists show), 18 officers and not less therefore than 360 rank and file (20 men per officer is a low allowance) at Salamanca. It must have picked up from Valladolid and the small garrisons 13 officers and 452 men at least[788].
Clausel, writing to King Joseph on July 25, said that of the whole Army of Portugal he could not yet show in the field on that day 20,000 men. This tallies well enough with the conclusion that we have already drawn, that the total loss from the army, which on July 15 had about 48,000 men, must have been some 14,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, and over 10,000 men dispersed who were only just rallying.
XII
BRITISH LOSSES AT THE COMBATS OF CASTREJON AND CASTRILLO[789], JULY 18, 1812
| Officers. | Men. | Missing Men. | Total. | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Killed. | Wounded. | Killed. | Wounded. | |||
| G. Anson’s Brigade: | ||||||
| 11th Lt. Dragoons | — | 2 | 3 | 10 | — | 15 |
| 12th Lt. Dragoons | — | 1 | 5 | 11 | 1 | 18 |
| 16th Lt. Dragoons | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| V. Alten’s Brigade: | ||||||
| 1st Hussars K.G.L. | — | 4 | 7 | 45 | 4 | 60 |
| 14th Lt. Dragoons | — | 3 | 14 | 49 | 9 | 75 |
| Bock’s Brigade: | ||||||
| 1st Dragoons K.G.L. | — | — | — | 1 | — | 1 |
| 2nd Dragoons K.G.L. | — | — | 5 | 1 | 1 | 7 |
| Le Marchant’s Brigade: | ||||||
| 3rd Dragoons | — | 1 | — | 9 | — | 10 |
| 4th Division. | ||||||
| W. Anson’s Brigade: | ||||||
| 3/27th Foot | 2 | 1 | 11 | 58 | — | 72 |
| 1/40th Foot | — | 1 | 8 | 59 | 1 | 69 |
| Ellis’s Brigade: | ||||||
| 1/7th Foot | — | 1 | 1 | 14 | 3 | 19 |
| 1/23rd Foot | — | — | — | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| 1/48th Foot | — | — | — | 5 | 1 | 6 |
| 5th Division. | ||||||
| Greville’s Brigade: | ||||||
| 3/1st | — | — | — | 2 | — | 2 |
| Detached Companies of 5/60th | — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Horse Artillery | — | 1 | 2 | 2 | — | 5 |
| German Artillery | — | — | — | 2 | — | 2 |
| Portuguese | 1 | 6 | 33 | 90 | 27 | 157 |
| Total | 3 | 21 | 89 | 361 | 51 | 525 |