On the morning of the 25th of October Suchet was ready to receive the attack which was impending. He could make out the general dispositions of the enemy, and the concentric advance of Obispo’s, O’Donnell’s, and Blake’s own men was duly reported to him. It was on receiving notice of the heavy appearance of the second, or central, hostile column that he detached Chlopiski’s two battalions to strengthen Robert’s flank-guard. Presently, about 7 o’clock, the Spaniards came within touch; the left, it would seem, somewhat before the right[27], the first shots being interchanged between the two battalions which Mahy had sent towards Cabezbort and Robert’s troops. This was only a trifling skirmish, the Spaniards being completely checked. But soon after a serious attack was delivered.
The next advance was that of the two Valencian divisions under Charles O’Donnell, who were a long way ahead of the main body of Mahy’s Murcians, their destined reserve. Blake’s intention was apparently to strike with his left wing first, and to force in the French right before his own column delivered its blow. Everything depended on the successful action of the mass of Valencian and Murcian infantry against the small hostile force posted on the slopes of the Sancti Espiritus hills.
The divisions of Miranda and Villacampa duly descended from the lower opposite heights of the Germanels, crossed the bottom, and began to mount the opposing slope, Villacampa on the left, somewhat in advance, Miranda a little to his right rear: behind them in support marched San Juan’s Valencian cavalry. Beyond the latter there was a considerable gap to the nearest troops of Blake’s own column, which had not yet come into action. Mahy, whose orders definitely said that he was to act as a reserve, and to protect O’Donnell’s flank if the latter were checked, occupied the Germanels, when the Valencians had gone on, and was still at the top of his own slope, having to his left front the two detached battalions at Cabezbort under O’Ronan, when the clash came. Waiting till the two Valencian divisions and the cavalry in support were some little way up the hill, and had begun to drive in his skirmishers, Chlopiski moved down upon them with the whole of his modest force—Robert’s five battalions in front, to the right of the pass and the road, his own two battalions of the 44th to its left and somewhat on the flank. Meanwhile Schiazzetti’s regiment of Italian dragoons charged down the gap between the two bodies of infantry. As Villacampa was somewhat ahead of Miranda, the first crash fell upon him. Robert’s infantry drove him without any difficulty right downhill, while the Italian dragoons rode at Miranda’s battalions on his right. Villacampa’s men fell into hopeless confusion, but what was worse was that Miranda’s division, seeing their comrades break, gave way before the cavalry without making any resistance whatever, apparently before the French 44th had even got into touch with them on the flank. This was a disgraceful business: the 7,000 Valencian infantry, and the 1,700 cavalry in support, were routed in ten minutes by half their own numbers—one good cavalry regiment of 450 sabres sufficed to upset a whole division of seven battalions—if a single one of them had formed a steady square, the Italian horse ought to have been driven off with ease!
But this was not the end of the affair. San Juan’s horse were close behind the routed divisions—O’Donnell ordered them up to save the wrecks of his infantry: at the same time Mahy hurried forward two battalions of his Murcians[28] to support San Juan, and began to advance with the rest of his division down the slope of the Germanels hill.
After making havoc of the Valencian foot, Chlopiski had halted his troops for a moment, wishing to be sure that matters were going well with the French main body before he committed himself to any further enterprise. But the temptation to go on was too great, for the routed Spanish troops and their supports were weltering together in confusion at the bottom of the hill. It is said that the dragoon colonel, Schiazzetti, settled the matter for his superior, by charging at San Juan’s horse the moment that he had got his squadrons re-formed. The Valencian cavalry, though it outnumbered the Italians by two to one, turned tail at once and bolted, riding over the two battalions of Murcian infantry which were in its immediate rear, and carrying them away in its panic. Chlopiski then led on his seven battalions against the disordered mass in front of him, and swept the whole before him. It gave way and fled uphill, horse and foot, the Murcian cavalry brigade in reserve going off on the same panic-stricken way as the Valencian. It was some time before Mahy could get a single regiment to stand—but at last he found a sort of rearguard of two battalions (one of his own, one of Villacampa’s[29]) which had kept together and were still capable of obeying orders. The French were now exhausted; the infantry could not follow in regular formation so fast as their enemy fled; the handful of cavalry was dispersed, driving in prisoners on every side. So Mahy and O’Donnell ultimately got off, with their men in a horde scattered over the country-side—the cavalry leading the stampede and the two rallied battalions bringing up the rear[30]. The Spanish left wing lost over 2,000 prisoners, mainly from Miranda’s division, but only some 400 killed and wounded; several guns from the divisional batteries were of course lost. All this was over so early in the day that the fighting on Blake’s right wing was at its hottest just when the wrecks of his left were disappearing over the hills. Obispo, who came up too late to help,[31] and the two detached battalions under O’Ronan got off separately, more towards the north, retiring on Naquera.
The tale of this part of the battle of Saguntum is lamentable. There is no record so bad in the whole war: even the Gebora was a well-contested fight compared with this—and at Belchite the army that fled so easily gave way before numbers equal or superior to its own, not inferior in the proportion of one to three. The fact was that the Valencian troops had a long record of disasters behind them, were thoroughly demoralized, and could not be trusted for one moment, and that the Murcians (as Mahy confessed) were not much better. The defeat was rendered more shameful by the fact that the smaller half of Blake’s Army, the ‘Expeditionary Force,’ was at the same moment making head in good style against numbers rather larger than its own, and seemed for a moment about to achieve a splendid success. If the Spanish left, 17,000 strong, could have ‘contained’ half its own strength, if it could have kept 8,000 instead of 4,000 French employed for one hour, Blake might have relieved Saguntum and driven off Suchet. But the story is disgraceful. Mahy wrote next morning to Blake, ‘I must tell you, with my usual bluntness, that you had better sell the horses of this cavalry, and draft the men into the infantry. I could not have believed in the possibility of such conduct, if I had not seen it with my own eyes take place and cost us so much[32].’ Blake actually gave orders for one hussar regiment (a Murcian one) to be deprived of its horses and drafted out. But did the infantry behave much better?
We may now turn to a less depressing narrative, the story of the operations of Blake’s own wing. The Commander-in-Chief, as it will be remembered, had with him the ‘Expeditionary Divisions,’ the Valencian Reserve Division, and Loy’s and Caro’s 1,100 cavalry. He took post himself on the height called El Puig, with one brigade of the Valencians, to the south of the ravine of the Picador, which crosses the plain in a diagonal direction. The rest of the troops went forward in two columns: Zayas formed the right near the sea; his flank was covered by a squadron of gunboats, which advanced parallel with him, as near the shore as their draught permitted. He was ordered to push on and get, if possible, round Suchet’s flank, where Habert’s line was ‘refused,’ because of the guns of the flotilla, whose fire the French wished to avoid. If successful Zayas was to try to communicate with the garrison of Saguntum. Further inland Lardizabal’s division, accompanied by the 1,100 cavalry, and followed by the other brigade of the Valencian reserve, crossed the Picador at the bridge on the chaussée, and deployed in the plain, directly opposite Harispe’s division. The whole force was about equal to the French opposed to it.
The two ‘Expeditionary Divisions’ went forward in good order and with great confidence: Suchet remarks in his Mémoires that in all his previous campaigns he had never seen Spanish troops advance with such resolution or in such good order[33]. Zayas, on the sea-flank, became immediately engaged with Habert, before the village of Puzzol, in a heavy fight, with exactly equal numbers—each had about 2,500 men. Both sides lost heavily, and neither had any advantage: Suchet had ordered Habert not to take the offensive till matters were settled in the centre, but the defensive proved costly, and the Spaniards pushed on—these were the same battalions which had behaved so well on the hill of Albuera—Irlanda, Patria, and the Spanish and Walloon Guards.
Further to the left Lardizabal had deployed, after crossing the ravine, with his two weak brigades in line; the Valencian reserve remained behind near the bridge, but Loy’s and Caro’s cavalry came forward on the right in support. Opposite the front brigade (Prieto’s) was a long low mound, the last outlying spur of the Sancti Espiritus range. This was soon seen by both sides to be a point of vantage—the army that could occupy it would have a good artillery position commanding the hostile line. Suchet ordered up Harispe’s right battalions to seize it, and galloped thither in person at the head of his escort of fifty hussars. But the Spaniards had also marked it, and the Marshal had hardly reached its top when he found Prieto’s skirmishers swarming up the slope. He had to retire, and rode back to bring up his infantry; but, by the time that they had come forward, the enemy had formed a hasty line of battle along the mound, with a battery in its centre. Suchet had therefore to attack—which he did in full force, the four battalions of the 7th Line forming a heavy column in the centre, while those of the 116th and the 3rd of the Vistula deployed on each side somewhat to the rear—a clear instance of the use of the ordre mixte which Napoleon loved. The left flank was covered by two squadrons of the 4th Hussars and one of the 13th Cuirassiers, brought out from the reserve.
This was bringing 3,600 bayonets to bear against 1,500, for Prieto’s brigade counted no more upon the mound. The attack was successful, but not without severe loss: General Paris, leading on the 7th regiment, was wounded, as were both his aides-de-camp, and Harispe’s horse was killed under him; the Spanish artillery fire had been deadly. When the mound was stormed, the Spanish infantry were forced back, but by no means in disorder. They formed up again not far from its foot, and Lardizabal brought up his second brigade to support his first, placed two batteries in line, and stood to fight again. Suchet, having re-formed Harispe’s men, found that he had before him a second combat on the flat ground. The infantry on both sides were heavily engaged, and six French guns had been brought forward to enfilade Lardizabal’s right, when a new turn was given to the battle. The Spanish general ordered Loy’s and Caro’s 1,100 cavalry to charge in mass upon the three squadrons of hussars and cuirassiers which covered Harispe’s left. The move was an unexpected one, and was concealed for some time by scattered carob-trees: the attack was well delivered, and the French horse, outnumbered by more than two to one, were completely routed and fled in disorder. Loy then wheeled in upon the French flank, captured three guns of the battery there placed, and nearly broke the 116th of the Line, which had only just time to fall back and form itself en potence to the rest of the division. The remainder of the Spanish cavalry pursued the retreating hussars.