[120] See especially the notes from officers on the spot in Napier’s appendix to vol. iv. pp. 442-4.
[121] ‘Sin duda ignorará V.S. que me hallo yo en esta plaza, cuando se prononce á su gubernador que admite una capitulacion. Á la cabeza de mis tropas me encontrará V.S. y entonces hableremos.’ See Arteche, appendix to vol. xi. p. 524.
[122] For this, see Jones, Sieges of the Peninsula, ii. p. 477, from which Napier copies his narrative, iv. p. 55.
[123] Their part in the defence must not be denied to the Spaniards. Napier, with his usual prejudice, remarks (iv. p. 60) that Skerrett ‘assigned the charge of the breach entirely to the Spaniards, and if Smith had not insisted upon placing British troops alongside of them this would have ruined the defence, because hunger and neglect had so broken the spirit of these poor men that few appeared during the combat, and Copons alone displayed the qualities of a gallant soldier.’
[124] Skerrett and Copons estimated the loss of the enemy at nearly 500, no doubt an exaggeration. But Leval’s 207 seems far too few. The commanding officer of the 51st Ligne reports from his four flank-companies 7 officers and 81 men hit (Belmas, iv, Appendix, p. 58). Of the sapper detachment which led the column, from 50 men 43 were hors de combat (Belmas, iv. p. 31). It seems incredible that when 23 companies took part in the assault 5 of them should have suffered 131 casualties out of a total of 207. Martinien’s tables show 18 officers killed and wounded on Dec. 31, a figure which proves nothing, for though at the usual casualty rate of 20 men per officer this would imply a total loss of 360, yet it is well known that in assaults the officers often suffer a loss out of all proportion to that of the rank and file. Eighteen officers hit might be compatible with a loss as low as 200 or as high as 400 in such a case.
[125] Defence of Tarifa, p. 47.
[126] See the letter in Belmas, iv. pp. 55-6.
[127] Defence of Tarifa, p. 75.
[129] See Wellington to Hill, Dec. 18th, Dispatches, ix. pp. 465-6.