[250] These figures are those of January, taken from the ‘morning state’ in Los Ejércitos españoles, the invaluable book of 1822 published by the Spanish Staff.
[251] For details see Jones, Sieges of the Peninsula, Appendix in vol. i. pp. 421-5, and the Dickson Papers, ed. Leslie, for Feb. 1812.
[252] For details see Duncan’s History of the Royal Artillery, ii. pp. 318-19.
[253] Wellington, Dispatches, viii. p. 601.
[254] For Wellington’s speculations (fairly correct) as to Marmont’s distribution of his troops, see Dispatches, viii. p. 618, Feb. 19, to Graham.
[255] Wellington to Victor Alten, March 5, Dispatches, viii. p. 649, makes a special point of ‘the difficulties which the enemy experiences in getting intelligence’ as a means of gaining time for himself.
[256] Napier (iv. p. 98) tries to make out that Wellington’s siege began ten days later than he wished and hoped, by the fault of the Portuguese Regency. I cannot see how Badajoz could have been invested on the 6th of March, when (as the route-directions show) the head of the marching column from the Agueda only reached Portalegre on the 8th. The movement of the army was not delayed, so far as I can see, by the slackness of Portuguese management at Lisbon or Elvas. But Wellington certainly grumbled. Did he intend that Hill alone should invest Badajoz, before the rest of the army arrived?
[257] D’Urban’s diary, Feb. 7-16: he accompanied Beresford, being his Chief-of-the-Staff.
[258] I spare the reader the question of Portuguese paper money and English exchequer bills, which will be found treated at great length in Napier, iv. pp. 97-9. Napier always appears to think that cash could be had by asking for it at London, in despite of the dreadful disappearance of the metallic currency and spread of irredeemable bank-notes which prevailed in 1812.
[259] The Conde had 1,114 horse and 3,638 foot on Jan. 1, not including two of Morillo’s battalions then absent. The total force used for the raid was probably as above.