[366] The statement in Jones’s Sieges, i. p. 259, that the enemy were unaware of the turning column is disproved by the official reports of the surviving French officers Sêve and Teppe.
[367] The berm is the line where the scarp of the ditch meets the slope of the rampart: the scarp should be perpendicular, the rampart-slope tends backward, hence there is a change on this line from the vertical to the obtuse in the profile of the work. The berm should have been only a foot or so wide and was three.
[368] The official report of the French captain, Sêve of the 6th Léger, accuses the grenadiers of the 39th of giving way and bolting at the critical moment, and this is confirmed by the report of the chef de bataillon Teppe of the 39th, an unwilling witness.
[369] According to Teppe’s narrative they left the walls, and many hid in the bakehouses, while most of the officers headed the rush for the bridge.
[370] Foy says that the centre link of the bridge was not a regular pontoon but a river boat, which could be drawn out when the garrison wanted to open the bridge for any purpose, and being light it collapsed under the feet of the flying crowd (p. 163).
[371] The 92nd and the right wing of the 71st reached the tête-de-pont just as the fugitives from Fort Napoleon entered it, and swept away the garrison. They only lost two wounded.
[372] Gardyne’s history of the 92nd gives the names of two of these gallant men, Gauld and Somerville.
[373] Hill’s total of casualties is 2 officers and 31 men killed: 13 officers and 143 wounded. The second officer killed was Lieutenant Thiele of the Artillery of the K.G.L., accidentally blown up by a mine on the day of the evacuation. But two of the wounded officers died.
[374] Teppe by name, whose narrative, written in captivity, is our best source for the French side. It is a frank confession of misbehaviour by the troops—particularly the 4th Étranger.
[375] D’Armagnac also sent the battalion of Frankfort for the same purpose, which arrived late with less excuse. See Foy, p. 375.