[675] See Ainslie’s History of the 1st Royals, p. 133.
[676] Including one officer killed and four wounded.
[677] See Slade’s report in Dispatches, ix. pp. 242-3. Tomkinson (p. 174) says that Slade’s report to Cotton, commanding the cavalry, was ‘the best I ever saw. He made mention of his son having stained his maiden sword!’
[678] Wellington to Hill, Dispatches, ix. p. 238.
[679] Letters of D’Erlon to Jourdan on June 9th, and of Soult to King Joseph June 12, copies from the Paris archives—lent me by Mr. Fortescue.
[680] In this report (the copy of which I owe to Mr. Fortescue’s kindness) Drouet says that Soult had told him to expect reinforcements to the total of some 15,000 men, but that Barrois brought him only 3,500 infantry and 1,500 horse, and Daricau 4,500 infantry and 1,000 horse, so that his reinforcements were only 10,500 men instead of 15,000. Drouet stated his own force, horse and foot (his own division and Lallemand’s cavalry) in a preceding letter of June 9th at 6,000 of all arms, so that the concentration would only give 16,000 men. I fancy that he is deliberately understating Barrois, for that general had 7,000 men in March, and 5,000 still in October at the end of a long and fatiguing campaign, and Pierre Soult too. Drouet’s object in giving these figures to Joseph was to prove that he was so weak that he could make no detachment towards the Tagus, as the King had directed him to do. Was it for the same purpose that he always over-stated Hill’s army? Or did he really believe that the latter had 30,000 men arranged opposite him, as he repeatedly told Soult?
[681] Cf. Wellington to Hill of July 11th. Dispatches, ix. p. 280.
[682] See chapter i above, [pp. 309-10].
[683] Joseph to Soult, May 26, intercepted dispatch in the Scovell ciphers.