SECTION XXXII: CHAPTER III
THE SIEGE OF BADAJOZ. MARCH-APRIL 1812
In narrating the troubles of the unlucky Duke of Ragusa, engaged in fruitless strategical controversy with his master, we have been carried far into the month of March 1812. It is necessary to return to February 20th in order to take up the story of Wellington’s march to Estremadura. We have seen that he commenced his artillery preparations in January, by sending Alexander Dickson to Setubal, and dispatching a large part of his siege-train southward, partly by sea, partly across the difficult mountain roads of the Beira.
The Anglo-Portuguese infantry and cavalry, however, were not moved till the guns were far on their way. It was Wellington’s intention to show a large army on the frontier of Leon till the last possible moment. He himself kept his old headquarters at Freneda, near Fuentes de Oñoro, till March 5th, in order that Marmont might be led to persist in the belief that his attention was still concentrated on the North. But, starting from February 19th, his divisions, one by one, had made their unostentatious departure for the South: on the day when he himself followed them only one division (the 5th) and one cavalry brigade (V. Alten’s) still remained behind the Agueda. The rest were at various stages on their way to Elvas. Most of the divisions marched by the route Sabugal, Castello Branco, Villa Velha, Niza. But the 1st Division went by Abrantes, in order to pick up there its clothing for the new year, which had been brought up the Tagus in boats from Lisbon to that point. Some of the cavalry and the two independent Portuguese brigades of Pack and Bradford, whose winter cantonments had been rather to the rear, had separate routes of their own, through places so far west as Thomar[243] and Coimbra. The three brigades of the 2nd Division, under Hill, which had been brought up to Castello Branco at the beginning of January, were at the head of the marching army, and reached Portalegre, via Villa Velha, long before the rest of the troops were across the Tagus. Indeed, the first of them (Ashworth’s Portuguese) started as early as February 2nd, and was at Castello de Vide, near Elvas, by February 8th, before the troops behind the Agueda had begun to move[244].
The lengthy column of infantry which had marched by Castello Branco and the bridge of Villa Velha was cantoned in various places behind Elvas, from Villa Viçosa to Portalegre, by March 8th: the 1st Division, coming in from the Abrantes direction, joined them on March 10th, and halted at Monforte and Azumar. Only the 5th Division and the two Portuguese independent brigades were lacking, and of these the two former were expected by the 16th, the latter by the 20th. With the exception of the 5th Division the whole of Wellington’s field army was concentrated near Elvas by the 16th. Only the 1st Hussars of the King’s German Legion, under Victor Alten, had been left to keep the outpost line in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, in order that the French vedettes in Leon should not detect that all the army of Wellington had disappeared, as they were bound to do if only Portuguese or Spanish cavalry showed at the front[245]. Counting Hill’s corps, now long returned to its old post in front of Badajoz, there were now nearly 60,000 troops nearing Elvas, viz. of infantry, all the eight old Anglo-Portuguese divisions, plus Hamilton’s Portuguese division[246], and Pack’s and Bradford’s independent Portuguese brigades. Of cavalry not only were all the old brigades assembled (save Alten’s single regiment), but two powerful units now showed at the front for the first time. These were the newly-landed brigade of German heavy dragoons under Bock[247], which had arrived at Lisbon on January 1st, and Le Marchant’s brigade of English heavy dragoons[248], which had disembarked in the autumn, but had not hitherto been brought up to join the field army. Of Portuguese horse J. Campbell’s brigade was also at the front: the other Portuguese cavalry brigade, which had served on the Leon frontier during the preceding autumn, had been made over to General Silveira, and sent north of the Douro. But even after deducting this small brigade of 900 sabres, Wellington’s mounted arm was immensely stronger than it had ever been before. He had concentrated it on the Alemtejo front, in order that he might cope on equal terms with the very powerful cavalry of Soult’s Army of Andalusia.
The Commander-in-Chief himself, travelling with his wonted speed, left his old head-quarters at Freneda on March 5th, was at Castello Branco on the 8th, at Portalegre on the 10th, and had reached Elvas, his new head-quarters, on the 12th. Before leaving the North he had made elaborate arrangements for the conduct of affairs in that quarter. They are contained in two memoranda, given the one to Castaños, who was still in command both of the Galician and the Estremaduran armies of Spain, and the other to Generals Baccelar and Silveira, of whom the former was in charge of the Portuguese department of the North, with head-quarters at Oporto, and the other of the Tras-os-Montes, with head-quarters at Villa Real[249].
It was a delicate matter to leave Marmont with nothing save the Spaniards and Portuguese in his front. Of the former the available troops were (1) the Army of Galicia, four weak field divisions, making about 15,000 men, of whom only 550 were cavalry, while the artillery counted only five batteries. There were 8,000 garrison and reserve troops in Corunna, Vigo, Ferrol, and other fortified posts to the rear, but these were unavailable for service[250]. Abadia still commanded the whole army, under the nominal supervision of Castaños. He had one division (3,000 men under Cabrera) at Puebla Senabria on the Portuguese frontier, two (9,000 men under Losada and the Conde de Belveder) at Villafranca, observing the French garrison of Astorga and Souham’s division on the Esla, which supported that advanced post, and one (2,500 men under Castañon) on the Asturian frontier watching Bonnet. (2) The second Spanish force available consisted of that section of the Army of Estremadura, which lay north of the Sierra de Gata, viz. Carlos de España’s division of 5,000 men, of whom 3,000 had been thrown into Ciudad Rodrigo, so that the surplus for the field was small, and of Julian Sanchez’s very efficient guerrillero cavalry, who were about 1,200 strong and were now counted as part of the regular army and formally styled ‘1st and 2nd Lancers of Castille.’
The Portuguese troops left to defend the northern frontier were all militia, with the exception of a couple of batteries of artillery and the cavalry brigade of regulars which had been with Wellington in Leon during the autumn, under Madden, but was now transferred to Silveira’s charge, and set to watch the frontier of the Tras-os-Montes, with the front regiment at Braganza. Silveira in that province had the four local regiments of militia, of which each had only one of its two battalions actually embodied. Baccelar had a much more important force, but of the same quality, the twelve regiments forming the divisions of Trant and J. Wilson, and comprising all the militia of the Entre Douro e Minho province and of northern Beira. Three of these regiments were immobilized by having been told off to serve as the garrison of Almeida. Farther south Lecor had under arms the two militia regiments of the Castello Branco country, watching their own district. The total force of militia available on the whole frontier must have been about 20,000 men of very second-rate quality: each battalion had only been under arms intermittently, for periods of six months, and the officers were for the most part the inefficient leavings of the regular army. Of the generals Silveira was enterprising, but over bold, as the record of his earlier campaigns sufficiently demonstrated—Trant and Wilson had hitherto displayed equal energy and more prudence: but in the oncoming campaign they were convicted of Silveira’s fault, over-confidence. Baccelar passed as a slow but fairly safe commander, rather lacking in self-confidence.
Wellington’s very interesting memoranda divide the possibilities of March-April into three heads, of which the last contains three sub-sections:—
(1) Marmont may, on learning that Badajoz is in danger, march with practically the whole of his army to succour it, as he did in May-June 1811. If this should occur, Abadia and Carlos de España will advance and boldly take the offensive, laying siege to Astorga, Toro, Zamora, Salamanca, and other fortified posts. Silveira will co-operate with his cavalry and infantry, within the bounds of prudence, taking care that his cavalry, which may support Abadia, does not lose communication with, and a secure retreat upon, his infantry, which will not risk itself.