MAPS AND PLANS
[I.]General Theater of Suchet’s Operations in Eastern SpainTo face[8]
[II.]Plan of the Battle of Saguntum”[42]
[III.]Plan of Suchet’s Investment of Valencia”[64]
[IV.]General Map of Catalonia”[96]
[V.]Plan of Tarifa”[128]
[VI.]Plan of the Siege Operations at Ciudad Rodrigo”[176]
[VII.]Plan of the Siege Operations at Badajoz”[256]
[VIII.]Map of the District round Almaraz”[328]
[IX.]General Map of Central Spain, to illustrate the Salamanca Campaign”[352]
[X.]Plan of the Salamanca Forts”[376]
[XI.]Map of the Country between Salamanca and Tordesillas”[400]
[XII.]General Plan of the Battle of Salamanca”[448]
[XIII.](1) The Last Episode at Salamanca; (2) Garcia Hernandez”[480]
[XIV.]General Map of Estremadura to illustrate Hill’s Campaigns in March-April and June-August 1812”[528]
ILLUSTRATIONS
Portrait of Marshal Soult[Frontispiece]
Portrait of Marshal SuchetTo face[80]
View of Ciudad Rodrigo, on the Morning after the Storm”[186]
Portrait of Marshal Marmont”[208]
(1) View of the French Arapile, and (2) view of the General Lie of the Ground at Salamanca”[422]

SECTION XXX

SUCHET’S CONQUEST OF VALENCIA.
SEPTEMBER 1811-JANUARY 1812

CHAPTER I

THE INVASION OF VALENCIA. SIEGE OF SAGUNTUM. SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1811

In the last volume of this work the chronicle of all the campaigns of 1811 was completed, save in one corner of Spain, where, on the eastern coast, the fortunes of the French armies have only been pursued down to the recall of Marshal Macdonald to Paris on October 28th. Already, before the Duke of Tarentum had been added to the list of the generals who had been withdrawn and superseded for failure in Catalonia, another series of operations had been begun in the East, which was destined to lead directly to one more Spanish disaster, but indirectly to the ruin of the French cause in Spain. For, as has already been pointed out in the last pages of the last volume[1], it was to be the diversion by Napoleon’s orders of French divisions eastward, from the borders of Portugal to those of Valencia, that was to give Wellington his long-desired opportunity of opening a successful offensive campaign against his immediate opponents in the West. The fall of Valencia was to lead to the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo in January 1812.

It will be remembered that the Emperor’s ambitious schemes for the conquest of the kingdom of Valencia, the last district of eastern Spain where he had as yet secured no solid foothold, had been deferred perforce till Figueras fell, on August 19, 1811. As long as that great fortress, which lies only a few miles from the French frontier, and blocks the main road from Perpignan to Barcelona, had been maintained against Macdonald by the resolute Martinez, it was impossible to take up a new offensive campaign: all the disposable French troops in Catalonia were immobilized around the stubborn garrison. At length the remnant of the starving miqueletes had laid down their arms, and the troops which had been for so long blockading them became disposable for the assistance of Suchet, whose ‘Army of Aragon’ was to deliver the main blow against Valencia.

Six days after the surrender of Figueras the news that the obstacle to advance had been at last removed reached Paris, on August 25, and on the same evening Berthier wrote, by his master’s orders, to bid Suchet move forward: ‘Everything leads us to believe that Valencia is in a state of panic, and that, when Murviedro has been taken and a battle in the open field has been won, that city will surrender. If you judge otherwise, and think that you must wait to bring up your siege artillery for the attack on the place, or that you must wait for a better season [i. e. early autumn] to commence the operation, I must inform you that, in every case, it is the imperative order of the Emperor that your head-quarters are to be on Valencian territory on or about September 15th, and as far forward towards the city as possible.’