Having accomplished his purpose with complete success, Hill moved off without delay, and by two forced marches reached Truxillo and his baggage on the 21st. Here he was quite safe: Foy, being too weak to pursue him to any effect, followed cautiously, and only reached Miravete (whose garrison he relieved) on the 23rd and Truxillo on the 25th, from whence he turned back, being altogether too late. He had received news of Hill’s movement rather late on the 17th, had been misinformed as to his strength, which report made 15,000 men instead of the real 7,000, and so had been disposed to act cautiously. He had ordered a battalion of the 6th Léger from Naval Moral to join the garrison of Almaraz, but it arrived on the afternoon of the 19th, only in time to hear from fugitives of the disaster[375]. He himself was confident that the forts could hold out eight days even against artillery, which was also Marmont’s calculation. Hence their fall within 48 hours of Hill’s appearance was a distressing surprise: Foy had calculated on being helped not only by D’Armagnac from Talavera but by the division of Clausel from Avila, before moving to fight Hill and relieve them.
Wellington appears to have been under the impression that this expedition, which Hill had executed with such admirable celerity and dispatch, might have been made even more decisive, by the capture of the castle of Miravete, if untoward circumstances had not intervened. In a letter to Lord Liverpool, written on May 28[376], he expresses the opinion that Tilson-Chowne might have taken it on the night of the 16th—which must appear a hazardous decision to those who look at the precipitous position of the place and the strength of its defences. He also says that Hill might have stopped at Almaraz for a few days more, and have bombarded Miravete with Dickson’s heavy howitzers, if he had not received false news from Sir William Erskine as to Drouet’s movements in Estremadura. There can be no doubt, as we shall see, about the false intelligence: but whether the bombardment would have been successful is another thing. Probably Wellington considered that the garrison would have been demoralized after what had happened at Almaraz.
As to Drouet’s movements, having received rather tardy notice of Hill’s northward march from Merida, he had resolved to make a push to ascertain what was left in his front. Lallemand’s dragoons, therefore, pressed out in the direction of Zafra, where they came into contact with Slade’s outposts and drove them in. At the same time Drouet himself, with an infantry division and some light cavalry, advanced as far as Don Benito, near Medellin, on the 17th May, from whence he pushed patrols across the Guadiana as far as Miajadas. This movement, made to ascertain whether Hill had departed with his whole corps, or whether a large force had been left in Estremadura, was reported to Sir William Erskine, the commander of the 2nd cavalry division, along with rumours that Soult was across the Sierra Morena and closely supporting Drouet. Erskine sent on the news to Graham at Portalegre, and to Hill, who was then before Miravete, with assertions that Soult was certainly approaching. This, as Wellington knew, was unlikely, for the Marshal had been before Cadiz on the 11th, and could not possibly have crossed the Sierra Morena by the 17th. As a matter of fact he only learnt on the 19th, at Chiclana, that Hill had started, and Drouet’s move was made purely to gain information and on his own responsibility. But Graham, naturally unaware of this, brought up his two divisions to Badajoz, as he had been directed to do if Estremadura were attacked during Hill’s absence. And Hill himself was certainly induced to return promptly from Almaraz by Erskine’s letter, though it is doubtful whether he would have lingered to besiege Miravete even if he had not received it. For Foy might have been reinforced by D’Armagnac and the Avila division up to a strength which would have made Hill’s longer stay on the Tagus undesirable.
Drouet did no more; indeed, with his own force he was quite helpless against Hill, since when he discovered that there was a large body of allied troops left in Estremadura, and that more were coming up, it would have been mad for him to move on Merida, or take any other method of molesting the return of the expedition from Almaraz. Though Soult spoke of coming with a division to his aid, the succours must be many days on the way, while he himself could only act effectively by marching northward at once. But if he had taken his own division he would have been helpless against Hill, who could have beaten such a force; while if he had crossed the Guadiana with his whole 12,000 men, he would have been cut off from Soult by the ‘uncontained’ allied force left in Estremadura, which he knew to be considerable.
But to move upon Almaraz on his own responsibility, and without Soult’s orders, would have been beyond Drouet’s power: he was a man under authority, who dared not take such a step. And when Soult’s dispatches reached him, they directed him not to lose touch with Andalusia, but to demonstrate enough to bring Hill back. The Marshal did not intend to let Drouet get out of touch with him, by bidding him march toward the Tagus.
Hill’s column, then, was never in any danger. But Wellington, who had for a moment some anxiety in his behalf, was deeply vexed by Erskine’s false intelligence, which had given rise to that feeling, and wrote in wrath to Henry Wellesley and Graham[377] concerning the mischief that this very incapable officer had done. He was particularly chagrined that Graham had been drawn down to Badajoz by the needless alarm, as he was intending to bring him back to join the main army within a short time, and the movement to Badajoz had removed him three marches from Portalegre, so that six days in all would be wasted in bringing him back to his original starting-point. It is curious that Wellington did not harden his heart to get rid of Erskine after this mishap: but though he wrote bitterly about his subordinate’s incapacity, he did not remove him. ‘Influence’ at home was apparently the key to his long endurance: it will be remembered that this was by no means the first of Erskine’s mistakes[378].
The fall of the Almaraz forts, as might have been expected, was interpreted by Marmont and Soult each from his own point of view. The former, rightly as it turned out, wrote to Foy that he must be prepared to return to Leon at short notice, and that the Army of the Centre and Drouet must guard the valley of the Tagus on his departure[379]. Soult, on the other hand, having heard of Graham’s arrival at Badajoz and Hill’s return to Merida, argued that the allies were massing on the Guadiana for an advance into Andalusia. He made bitter complaints to Jourdan that he had violated the rules of military subordination by sending a letter to Drouet warning him that he might be called up to the Tagus. It was unheard of, he said, to communicate directly with a subordinate, who ought to be written to only through the channel of his immediate superior. He even threatened to resign the command of the Army of the South[380]—but when Joseph showed no signs of being terrified by this menace, no more was heard of it. The viceroyalty of Andalusia was not a thing to be lightly given up.
It soon became evident to Wellington that the surprise of Almaraz was not to be resented by the enemy in any practical form. Foy was not reinforced, nor was Drouet brought up to the Tagus: it was clear that the French were too weak to take the offensive either in the North or the South, even under such provocation. They could not even rebuild the lost bridge: the transport from Madrid of a new pontoon train as a substitute for the lost boats was beyond King Joseph’s power. One or two boats were finally got to Almaraz—but nothing that could serve as a bridge. Nor were the lost magazines ever replaced.
It was at this same time that Wellington took in hand a scheme for facilitating his communications north and south, which was to have a high strategical importance. As long as Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz were in the enemy’s hands, the most eastern crossing of the Tagus practicable for the Anglo-Portuguese army was the boat-bridge of Villa Velha. But when these two fortresses were regained, it was possible to open up a line farther east, which had not been available for two years. Since Mayne blew up the ancient Roman bridge of Alcantara in June 1809[381], the Middle Tagus had been impassable for both sides. The allies had usually been in possession of both banks of the Tagus in this direction, but so intermittently that it had never been worth their while to restore the passage, which would have been lost to them whenever the French (as not unfrequently happened) extended their operations into the Coria-Zarza Mayor country on the north bank, or the Caçeres-Albuquerque country on the other. But when the enemy had lost both Badajoz and Rodrigo, and had no posts nearer to Alcantara than the Upper Tormes, the forts of Miravete, and Zalamea, when, moreover, he had adopted a distinctly defensive attitude for many months, Wellington thought it worth while to recover possession of a passage which would shorten the route from Estremadura to the frontiers of Leon by a hundred miles, and would therefore give him an advantage of six marches over the enemy in transferring troops from north to south. Whether Almaraz were again seized and reoccupied by the French mattered little: the restoration of Alcantara would be safe and profitable.
Accordingly, on May 24th, Colonel Sturgeon[382] and Major Todd of the Royal Staff Corps were sent to Alcantara to report on the practicability of restoring the broken arch, which, owing to the immense depth of the cañon of the Tagus, overhung the river by no less than 140 feet. It was intended that if the engineering problem should prove too hard, a flying bridge of rafts, boats, or pontoons should be established at the water level[383]. But Sturgeon and Todd did more than Wellington had expected, and succeeded in a very few days in establishing a sort of suspension-bridge of ropes between the two shattered piers of Trajan’s great structure. The system adopted was that of placing at each end of the broken roadway a very large and solid beam, clamped to the Roman stones, by being sunk in channels cut in them. These beams being made absolutely adhesive to the original work, served as solid bases from which a series of eighteen cables were stretched over the gap. Eight more beams, with notches cut in them to receive the cables, were laid at right angles across the parallel ropes, and lashed tight to them. The long cables were strained taut with winches: a network of rope yarn for a flooring was laid between the eight beams, and on this planks were placed, while a screen of tarpaulins supported on guide-ropes acted as parapets. The structure was sound enough to carry not only infantry and horses, but heavy artillery, yet could always be broken up in a short time if an enemy had ever appeared in the neighbourhood[384]. Several times it was rolled up, and then replaced.