This move brought on very sharp fighting: the turning movement of the French dragoons was promptly met by Victor Alten’s brigade [14th Light Dragoons, 1st Hussars K.G.L.], whose squadrons had been watching the lower fords of the Guarena all day. Alten allowed the hostile cavalry to cross the river and come up the slope, and then charged suddenly, in échelon of squadrons, the left squadron of the 1st Hussars K.G.L. leading[485]. The enemy had only begun to deploy when he was attacked, Alten’s advance having been too rapid for him. The two French regiments (15th and 25th Dragoons) were, after a stiff fight, completely routed and driven downhill with great loss, till they finally found refuge behind a half-battery and an infantry battalion which formed their supports. General Carrié, commanding the two regiments, was taken prisoner by a German hussar, having got cut off from his men in the flight. The French lost in all 8 officers and more than 150 men, of whom 94 were prisoners—mostly wounded. How sharp the clash was may be seen from the fact that Alten’s victorious brigade had not much fewer casualties—the 14th Light Dragoons lost 75 killed and wounded, the German hussars 60[486]. But no doubt some of these losses were suffered not in the cavalry combat, but a little later in the day, when Alten charged the French infantry[487].
While this lively fight was in progress on the flank, Brennier’s division had crossed the Guarena in a mass, and on a very short front, apparently in three columns of regiments, battalion behind battalion. They were ascending the lower slopes below Cole’s position, when Wellington, who was present here in person, suddenly took the offensive against them, sending W. Anson’s brigade (3/27th and 1/40th) against them in line, with Stubbs’s Portuguese (11th and 23rd regiments) supporting, in columns of quarter distance. The French division halted, apparently with the intention of deploying—but there was no time for this. The line of Anson’s brigade enveloped both the hostile flanks with its superior frontage, and opened fire: after a short resistance the French gave way in great disorder, and streamed down to the Guarena. As they fled Alten let loose part of his brigade against their flank: the horsemen rode in deep among the fugitives, and cut off 6 officers and 240 men as prisoners. Clausel had to bring up a regiment of his own division to cover the broken troops as they repassed the river; it suffered severely from Cole’s artillery, losing 6 officers killed and wounded, and many men[488].
The attempt to take liberties with Wellington’s army, when it had assumed the defensive on favourable ground, had thus failed in the most lamentable style, and with very heavy loss—at least 700 men had been killed, wounded, or taken in Marmont’s army that day, and all but a few scores belonged to the four infantry and two cavalry regiments which Clausel sent to attack the heights by Castrillo[489]. The corresponding British loss that day was 525, including about 50 stragglers taken prisoners during the retreat from the Trabancos to the Guarena, because they had fallen behind their regiments—foot-sore infantry, or troopers whose horses had been shot. The cavalry, which had so successfully covered the long march across the open, had a certain amount of casualties, but the only units that had suffered heavily were the four regiments—horse and foot—that dealt with Clausel’s attack, who lost 276 men between them.
Wellington must have felt much disappointment at seeing Clausel’s offensive move at Castrillo unsupported by the rest of the French divisions, who were lining the farther bank of the Guarena parallel with the whole of his front. But Marmont, unlike his venturesome subordinate, nourished no illusions about the advisability of attacking a British army in position. He made no move in the afternoon; in his memoirs he points out that the infantry was absolutely exhausted, having been continuously on the march for three days and one night.
This day had been a disappointing one for the French marshal also. He had failed to cut off Wellington’s two detached divisions, so that all the advantage which he had obtained by his marches and countermarches between Toro and Tordesillas was now exhausted. The allied army had succeeded in concentrating, and was now drawn up in his front, covering Salamanca and its own line of communications in a very tenable position. Napier truly remarks that, since the attempt to isolate and destroy Cotton’s detachment had miscarried, Marmont had gained no more by his elaborate feint and forced marches than he would have obtained by continuing his original advance across Toro bridge on the 16th. He had got the whole Anglo-Portuguese army arrayed in a defensive position in front of him, on the line of the Guarena, instead of somewhere in the neighbourhood of Fuente Sauco, a few miles farther east.
On the morning of the 19th July it seemed as if a new deadlock was to bring the campaign to a standstill, for the two armies continued to face each other across the Guarena, Wellington hoping rather than expecting to be attacked, Marmont looking in vain for a weak point between Castrillo and Vallesa, where it would be worth while to try a forward thrust. While he was reconnoitring, his weary infantry got a much-needed rest. At about four o’clock in the afternoon, however, the whole French army was seen falling into column, and presently edged off southward till it lay between Tarazona and Cantalapiedra. Wellington thereupon made a corresponding movement, evacuating Castrillo to the north, and extending his line of battle beyond Vallesa to the south. There was a little distant cannonading across the valley of the Guarena, and some of the shells set fire to the vast fields of ripe wheat which covered the whole country-side in this region. The conflagration went rolling on for a long way across the plain, leaving a trail of smoke behind.
The situation on this evening had nothing decisive about it. It was clear that neither side intended to fight save at an advantage. Marmont had shown himself more cautious than had been expected. Wellington had at this moment every motive for risking nothing, unless the enemy proved more obliging than he had shown himself hitherto. He had reasons for self-restraint at this moment of which his adversary knew nothing. The first was that he was aware (from intercepted dispatches) of King Joseph’s intention to march from Madrid to join the Army of Portugal: with a possible 15,000 men about to appear on his flank, he must look to the future with care. The second was that he had received a few days before the untoward news that Lord William Bentinck’s long-promised expedition to Catalonia might not ever take place. The Commander-in-Chief in Sicily wrote that he had found new opportunities in Italy, which it might be his duty to seize. His troops had been embarked, but they were not to be expected for the present off the coast of Spain. This was a disheartening piece of intelligence: Wellington had been told to count upon this support both by Bentinck himself and by the Home Government. If it should fail, Marshal Suchet, left undisturbed by this diversion, might send considerable reinforcements to Madrid[490].
As a matter of fact he did not—being, like Soult, a general of much too self-centred a type of mind to help a neighbour if he could avoid it. Only one regiment of the Valencian army ever got to Madrid, and that came too late for King Joseph’s purpose. But so far as Wellington could guess on July 19, it was quite possible that Suchet might find 10,000 men, to add to the disposable 15,000 of the Army of the Centre.
There was also the possibility that D’Erlon, obeying the orders which King Joseph kept sending to him, might make up his mind to cross the Guadiana and Tagus, and come north by Arzobispo and Madrid. If so, Hill was to make a parallel march by Alcantara, and would certainly arrive many days before D’Erlon. This was a mere possibility; there were good reasons for holding that Soult might forbid any such move; and till D’Erlon started northward, Hill must remain behind to contain him. The problem was not pressing: it could not develop for many days[491].
On the other hand there was news that the Galicians were at last on the move. Santocildes had been prevailed upon to leave a smaller force to besiege Astorga, and had come down with a second division to join Cabrera at Benavente. This force, advancing up the Douro valley, would find absolutely no enemy in front of it, and must obviously disturb Marmont’s operations, since it might be at the gates of Valladolid, his base and storehouse, in a few days. He would then be forced to detach a division or so to save his dépôts, and he could not spare even a brigade if he wished to continue on the offensive. Certain intelligence that there was not a Frenchman left behind on the Douro, save the trifling garrisons of Toro, Zamora, and Tordesillas, had been brought in by General D’Urban. That officer, after conducting a very daring exploration round the rear of Marmont’s army, almost to the gates of Valladolid, had recrossed the Douro by Wellington’s orders at the ford of Fresno de Ribera, and fell in upon the left flank of the allied army near Fuente Sauco on July 18th[492]. For the rest of the campaign his 700 sabres were at Wellington’s disposal[493]. His report showed that Marmont’s rear was absolutely undefended, and that the Galicians could march up the Douro, if desired, without finding any opponents: it would be perfectly possible for them to cut all Marmont’s communications with Valladolid and Burgos, without being in any danger unless the Marshal detached men against them.