[64] Foy’s diary in Girod de l’Ain, p. 178.
[65] For an analysis of the controversy, see Dumolin’s preface to his Précis des Guerres de la Révolution, and compare Colin’s Education Militaire de Napoleon.
[66] See especially the record of the great English and Austrian charges against French infantry at Villers-en-Cauchies, Beaumont, and Willems (Fortescue’s British Army, lv. 240–56).
[67] The French battalion then comprising nine companies, of which one, the Voltigeur company, would not be in the column.
[68] From an essay entitled Character of the Armies of the various European Powers, in a collection called Essays on the Theory and Practice of the Art of War. 3 vols. London: Philips & Co.
[69] Though Marshal Broglie had used something like an approach to permanent divisions in the Seven Years’ War: see Colin’s Transformations de la Guerre, p. 97.
[70] Colin quotes as bad examples of French armies coming on the field dispersedly, without the proper timing and co-operation, Wattignies, Neresheim (1796), and all Moreau’s operations beyond the Rhine in that year from Rastadt to Ettlingen (Transformations de la Guerre, p. 99).
[71] See Dumolin’s Précis d’Histoire Militaire, x. p. 263, and Colin’s Tactique et Discipline, p. lxxxv.
[72] At Arcola Augereau’s division attacked the bridge over a raised road passing over a dyke only 30 feet broad, with marshes on each side. There were three regiments, one behind the other. Cohorn’s column at Ebersburg was not so deep, only a brigade. But it had to defile over a bridge 200 yards long.
[73] E.g.: this was the formation of the 3rd corps at Lützen, see Fabry, Journal des 3me et 5me Corps en 1813, p. 7.