The Navy of the American Revolution

by Charles Oscar Paullin

[264] Journals of Continental Congress, July 17, 1781.

[265] Ibid., July 18, 1781.

CHAPTER VIII
THE SECRETARY OF MARINE AND THE AGENT OF MARINE

On the question of the proper organization of the executive departments, the leaders of the Revolution were divided into two factions. Moved by their love of liberty, their distrust of governments, and their jealousy of delegated and concentrated powers, the members of one faction favored the vesting of the executive business in Congressional committees. The members of the other faction, who stood for governmental authority and control, for constructive legislation in the field of administration, and for the application of the principles of business to the affairs of state, declared for a system of permanent and single-headed executives chosen outside of the membership of Congress. The issue that was here joined in the special field of administration was of course a part of that perennial and perpetual conflict between the freedom of the individual and social control. In this case, as everywhere and always, the political doctrinaires, the iconoclasts and radicals, and the men of heart rather than of head, lined up on the side of liberty; while the practical and conservative men, the representatives of vested interests, and the cold, logical thinkers, stood together on the side of governmental control.

The faction which distrusted power and wished to keep it scattered, may be called the “dispersive school;” and the faction which wished to gather up the power and lodge it with a few men, may be called the “concentrative school.” To the “dispersive school” belonged Samuel Adams, the Lees, Patrick Henry, and William Whipple; to the “concentrative school”, Hamilton, Washington, the Morrises, and Jay. Early in the Revolution the advantage lay with the “dispersive school.” Its executive plan of Congressional committees needed little work to put it into operation; it was more flexible than the scheme of permanent single-headed executives; and it was more in harmony with the ultra anti-monarchical spirit of the times. The Revolutionary government, originating as a congress of delegates, organized itself, after the manner of congresses, by means of committees of its own members. When the Congress became a Government, and had entrusted to it a multiplicity of executive duties, it naturally continued and adapted the old organization for the transaction of its new business. The executive system of Congressional committees, in this way becoming fixed, could not be easily changed.

By 1780 the “concentrative school” was winning its way. Indeed, the adoption in 1779 of mixed boards composed of men both in and out of Congress was a compromise between the two schools, in which the “concentrative school” gave up its contention for simplicity in the executive organs, in order to secure, in part at least, another of its objectives, permanency in the tenure of the administrators. By 1780 both committees and boards had been tried and found wanting. Then too, there was a greater need for a change in the executive system, than in the first years of the war. As Congress became imbecile, the quality of its committees and of their work deteriorated; and as the country wearied of the war, and its finances tightened, the necessity for greater economy and efficiency in administration increased. In 1780 the feeling among the leaders was general that a crisis in the army, in the finances, and in the business of the government, which could be met only by some thorough and far-reaching reform, was approaching. The leaders of the “concentrative school” proposed a complete change in the administrative system of Congress as a solution of the serious problems that confronted the country. By the end of 1780 a movement for a reform of this sort was in progress. It was diligently furthered by one school and zealously opposed by the other.

“If Congress,” Washington wrote in December, 1780, “suppose that Boards composed of their own body, and always fluctuating, are competent to the great business of war (which requires not only close application, but a constant and uniform train of thinking and acting), they will most assuredly deceive themselves. Many, many instances might be adduced in proof of this.” Washington was convinced that extravagant and improper expenditures of the public money, inexpertness in the transacting of business, and needless delays resulted from vesting all or a part of the duties of an executive office in Congress.[266] Hamilton declared specifically for the substitution of single executives for plural ones, and he named three men whom he considered especially qualified for departmental posts, General Schuyler for Minister of War, General McDougall for Minister of Marine, and Robert Morris for Minister of Finance. He conceived that there were always more knowledge, energy, responsibility, decision, despatch, zeal, and attraction for first-rate ability “where single men, than where bodies are concerned.”[267] Gouverneur Morris contributed to the agitation in behalf of better executives an enumeration of the qualifications requisite in the men who were to become heads of the leading departments. He held, as still do some of the writers on naval administration, that a Minister of Marine should possess a practical and technical knowledge of naval affairs; and he presented a unique list of his qualities in the following words:

“A minister of the marine should be a man of plain good sense, and a good economist, firm but not harsh; well acquainted with sea affairs, such as the construction, fitting, and victualling of ships, the conduct and manœuvre on a cruise, and in action, the nautical face of the earth, and maritime phenomenon. He should know the temper, manners, and disposition of sailors; for all which purposes it is proper, that he should have been bred to that business, and have followed it, in peace and war, in a military, and commercial capacity. His principles and manners should be absolutely republican, and his circumstances not indigent.”[268]

It has been said that the debate in Congress over the change in the executive system was long, and was marked by the workings of party spirit, the self-interest of some members, and the doubts and fears and divided opinions of others.[269] Samuel Adams placed himself at the head of the advocates of the old system. On January 10, 1781, the friends of the new system gained their first decisive victory; for on this day Congress resolved to establish a Department of Foreign Affairs, and to appoint for its chief officer a Secretary for Foreign Affairs.[270] Five days later Adams wrote to Richard Henry Lee a letter which is almost pathetic in its earnestness and seriousness. “My friend,” he said, “we must not suffer anything to discourage us in this great conflict. Let us recur to first principles without delay. It is our duty to make every proper exertion in our respective States to revive the old patriotic feelings among the people at large, and to get the public departments, especially the most important of them, filled with men of understanding and inflexible virtue. Our cause is surely too interesting to mankind to be put under the direction of men, vain, avaricious, or concealed under the hypocritical guise of patriotism, without a spark of public virtue.” Adams recognized that the public service needed reforming. This he would accomplish, not by a change of the administrative system, but by the introduction of more competent and more virtuous men into Congress and into its committees. This latter was to be brought about by a revival of civic interest in the several states.[1]

On February 7, 1781, Congress “resumed the consideration of the plan for the arrangement of the civil executive departments.”[271] It this day resolved that there should be a Superintendant of Finance, a Secretary of War, and a Secretary of Marine. It summed up the duties of the Secretary of Marine in the following brief paragraph: