“It shall be the duty of the secretary of marine to examine into and to report to Congress the present state of the navy, a register of the officers in and out of command, and the dates of their respective commissions; and an account of all the naval and other stores belonging to that department; to form estimates of all pay, equipments, and supplies necessary for the navy; and from time to time to report such estimates to the superintendant of finance, that he may take measures for providing for the expences, in such manner as may best suit the condition of the public treasury; to superintend and direct the execution of all resolutions of Congress respecting naval preparations; to make out, seal, and countersign all marine commissions, keep registers thereof, and publish annually a list of all appointments; to report to Congress the officers and agents necessary to assist him in the business of his department; and in general to execute all the duties and powers specified in the act of Congress constituting the board of admiralty.”

Speaking generally, the Secretary of Marine was to succeed to the duties and powers of the Board of Admiralty. It is, however, significant that the Secretary was not specifically charged with the ordering and directing of the movements of the vessels of war, as was the Board. The specified duties of the new office are largely secretarial. Congress was disposed to be less liberal in granting powers to a Secretary chosen outside its membership than to a Board partly composed of Congressmen. On February 9th the salary of the Secretary of Marine was fixed at $5000 per annum.[272]

On February 27, 1781, Congress, with a promptness which was exceptional, elected Major-General Alexander McDougall of New York to be Secretary of Marine, for which position he had been recommended by Alexander Hamilton. McDougall’s qualifications for the office were above the average. In the French and Indian War he had been a commander of privateers. Later he became a merchant in New York City. He was a leader of the Revolution in that state, and had risen to the rank of a major-general in the Revolutionary army. McDougall declined to accept the position proferred him unless permitted to hold his rank in the army, and to retain the privilege of returning to the field when his services were required. He based this partial refusal on patriotic grounds. Congress did not wish a Secretary of Marine on these conditions; and it therefore voted that it did not expect the acceptance of Major-General McDougall, and that it had a due sense of his zeal “for the safety and honour of America, and applaud his magnanimity in declining ‘to retire from the toils and perils of the field in the present critical condition of the United States in general, and that of New York in particular.’”[273] Congress made no other choice of a Secretary of Marine.

During the summer of 1781 the control of naval affairs gravitated towards Robert Morris. Soon after assuming the office of Superintendant of Finance in May, 1781, he was brought into close relation with the navy. He was invited to take upon himself more or less of the naval business by the urgent need of sending the cruisers on important errands, the helplessness of the Board of Admiralty, the inertia of Congress, and the interregnum in the headship of the Naval Department, which lasted from the discontinuance of the Board of Admiralty early in July, 1781, until the appointment of an Agent of Marine on September 7. The figure that Morris presents at this time is that of the strong and confident man of affairs, sagacious, expeditious, and painstaking, who is surrounded by weaker men, hesitating, vacillating, and procrastinating in their administrative attempts.

In June, 1781, Morris wrote to the President of Congress recommending the appointment of a captain for the 74-gun ship “America,” and explaining how money for completing her might be obtained. He says that he is aware that John Jay has liberty to sell this ship at the Court of Madrid; that he thinks and hopes that Jay will not succeed, for the sale of the “America” would be injurious to the United States; and that it would be “more consistent with Oeconomy and with the dignity of Congress to have her finished than to let her Perish.” On the receipt of this letter, Congress authorized Morris to take measures for launching the “America” and fitting her for sea.[274] Morris now hinted to the Board of Admiralty that the frigate “Trumbull” could perform an essential public service if put under his direction, and pursuing his plan, he obtained a resolution of Congress giving him control of this vessel.[275] During the summer of 1781, while the reorganization of the Naval Department was in suspense, Morris, on his own initiative, directed the fitting out of the “Alliance” and “Deane,” and ordered them to proceed to sea, “being convinced that while they lay in port, an useless Expence must necessarily be incurred.”[276]

Meanwhile, a movement to place the Naval Department under the control of Morris had been set on foot in Congress. On June 26 Meriwether Smith of Virginia reported a series of resolutions providing for the reorganization of the Naval Department, a work which he considered necessary because the present naval system was “inefficient and expensive.”[277] The most important of these resolutions was one which dissolved the offices of the Board of Admiralty, the navy boards, and the naval agents; and another, which empowered the Superintendant of Finance to appoint some discreet agent to manage the navy under the order and inspection of the said superintendant, until a Secretary of Marine should be appointed, or until the further pleasure of Congress. On the day of their introduction these resolutions were referred to a committee, consisting of Meriwether Smith of Virginia, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, and Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, of Maryland. On July 2, having made a slight change in the phraseology of the resolutions, this committee reported them to Congress;[278] and on July 6 it again reported them, having now added a few additional resolutions. One of the latter was to the effect that the election of a Secretary of Marine should be postponed until the first Monday in November. On the putting of this resolution, it passed in the negative. The states divided sectionally; the four New England states and Delaware voted in the negative; Pennsylvania and the five Southern states, except South Carolina which was divided, voted in the affirmative; delegates from New York and New Jersey were not present in Congress. The vote seems to indicate the defeat of those who were in favor of placing the navy under the control of Morris. On the same day, July 6, the remaining resolutions were referred to a committee consisting of Thomas McKean of Delaware, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, and Theodoric Bland of Virginia.[279]

On July 18 the new committee reported a series of resolutions, differing little from those which had been referred to it, with the exception of one important change; the Agent of Marine was now to be appointed, not by Morris, but by Congress. On this day Congress passed two of the committee’s resolutions. One of these transferred the care of the marine prisoners from the Board of Admiralty to the Commissary of Prisoners of the army; and the other ordered the seal of the admiralty to be deposited with the Secretary of Congress, and empowered him to use it in countersigning naval commissions. The remaining resolutions again went over. Congress was able to agree on the discontinuance of the Board of Admiralty, but not on the arrangements for its successor.[280]

Finally, the whole business of the re-organization of the Naval Department was referred to a third committee, composed of Theodoric Bland of Virginia, James M. Varnum of Rhode Island, and James Duane of New York. On the report of this committee on August 29, Congress agreed “that for the present an agent of marine be appointed, with authority to direct, fit out, equip, and employ the ships and vessels of war belonging to the United States, according to such instructions as he shall, from time to time, receive from Congress.” The Agent of Marine was to direct the selling of all prizes. He was to settle and pay the naval accounts, and keep a record of his work. As soon as he entered into the execution of his office, the functions and appointments of the board of admiralty, the several navy boards, and all civil officers, appointed under them, should cease and be determined. The salary of the new head of the Naval Department was fixed at $1,500 a year, and that of his clerk at $500. Both the Agent of Marine and his clerk were required to take an oath “well and faithfully to execute the trust reposed in them, according to the best of their skill and judgment”; and to give good and sufficient bond.[281]

These resolutions of August 29 were to be only temporary; and they did not displace those of February 7, 1781, which provided for a Secretary of Marine. A second temporary expedient was resorted to on September 7, when Congress resolved: “That until an agent of marine shall be appointed by Congress, all the duties, powers, and authority assigned to the said agent, be devolved upon and executed by the said superintendant of finance.”[282]

The reason why Congress appointed an Agent of Marine instead of a Secretary of Marine is not at all points clear. Having failed to secure the acceptance of McDougall as Secretary of Marine, Congress may have decided that the small and disheartening business of the navy would not attract first-rate talent; or that for the transaction of this business a full-fledged executive department was not necessary. It is more probable that the appointment of an Agent of Marine, under the circumstances of a disagreeing Congress, the failure of the Board of Admiralty, and the improbability of securing an efficient Secretary, was merely a temporary and feasible expedient for conducting the affairs of the navy. There are obvious reasons why the proposal to give the Superintendant of Finance the power to appoint the Agent of Marine, or the selection of Morris as Agent, should have aroused vigorous opposition. Men of Samuel Adams’s way of thinking would oppose it, among other reasons, because it placed too much power in the hands of one man. The friends of the navy would dislike to see the Naval Department swallowed up by the Department of Finance. But on the other hand, many considerations recommended the step which was finally taken. It was the most economical disposition of the naval business which could be made. Morris had superior qualifications for the office, and he was at once available. Indeed, he was the only man in sight that promised to be equal to the task of straightening out the tangle of marine accounts, of financing a bankrupt navy, and of wielding effectively that arm of the military service. He was admirably qualified for the headship of the Naval Department by his experience as a man of business, familiar with accounts and the selection of employees, as the owner of a fleet of merchantmen, and as one of two or three of the most influential members of the Marine Committee during the years 1776 and 1777, when the navy was founded. Whatever may have been the shortcomings of the navy while Morris was directing it, they did not spring from the lack of an efficient executive. For the first time during the Revolution its management was marked by despatch, decision, and an expert and adequate understanding of its problems.