A few minutes' halt to enable the men to have a drink of water and fill up their ammunition pouches was allowed, and then the column continued its march towards the hill. When the gravelly ridge was occupied the sun was about setting, and the river, which had been so long looked for, was not yet in sight. Parties were pushed on in search of it in the darkness, and eventually, half an hour after nightfall, the Nile was reached.[113]
The wounded were at once taken to the most suitable place to be found on the river bank, whilst the men went down by companies to drink. The camels, which were by this time as worn out as the men, were turned adrift to graze in the surrounding vegetation. The men were so exhausted that when they came up from their drink they fell down like logs, and difficulty was experienced in rousing them and getting them into their places for the night.
The force was allowed to bivouac in peace on the Nile bank, and both officers and men, lying on the bare ground, found the rest of which they were so much in need. The only sign of the enemy's presence was the beating of the "tom-toms," which went on all night.
On the 20th the adjacent village of Abu Kru (which for some unknown reason was called Gubat) was occupied, and a small garrison being placed there, the rest of the troops, recruited and refreshed, marched back to relieve the party at the zeriba. As the returning column neared the work, the small garrison greeted it with hearty cheers. The task of removing the wounded, together with the rest of the camels, the baggage, and guns, was then commenced, and continued until the whole were brought to the new position at Gubat.[114] The Hussars' horses by this time had been two days and the camels five days without water.
Sir Charles Wilson's dash for the Nile was one of the most hazardous of military operations, and has been condemned by nearly all professional critics. He not only divided his already reduced forces in the face of the enemy, but cut himself off from his baggage, artillery, and supplies. On the other hand, there was an absolute necessity for gaining a position on the river with the least possible delay, and, if a further justification were wanted, Sir Charles can point to the complete success which attended the movement. If one regards closely the question of risk, it is impossible not to feel that the despatch of Stewart's column of only 1,800 men across the desert against an enemy of unknown strength was in itself a highly venturesome proceeding, and one which, if undertaken by a less able commander or with inferior troops, must have ended in disaster. This, in fact, was very nearly being the case with the column at Abu Klea, where nothing but the steadiness of the men saved the day. "Success justifies all risks," but it is a curious circumstance that, whilst one argument against adopting the Souakim-Berber route was that it involved a long desert march with a fight at the end at Berber, this was practically what happened to Stewart's force, which, after a long and trying march, had to fight towards its end both at Abu Klea and Metammeh. There was this difference, however, between the two, that the result of Stewart's operations was to open a line of communications from Metammeh to Cairo of more than 1,300 miles, instead of one of only 280 miles from Berber to the Red Sea. There was the further consideration that, from the disposition of the Mahdi's forces, less resistance would probably have been met with at Berber than was encountered in the Bayuda desert, whilst Khartoum being almost as accessible from Berber as from Metammeh, the former would have been nearly as important as the latter as an objective point for the purposes of the expedition.
On the 21st, a garrison having been left in camp to protect the wounded, the rest of the column marched towards Metammeh, which was found to be a long village of mud houses with loopholed walls and two or three mountain guns. If, as was thought possible after the events of the previous day, it was found to be undefended, Wilson's idea was to take possession of the place. The advance commenced at daybreak. On nearing the town it was found to be full of people and strongly held. An adjoining village was occupied by Wilson's men, who had to sustain a well-aimed fire from the loopholed buildings, whilst they could hit nobody in return. Two of the British guns were brought up, but did little harm, the shell merely going through the mud walls without bursting. Wilson's force was too small and already too much incumbered with wounded to justify an attack at close quarters, and the town if taken was too big to hold. So he determined to retire without pressing the attack. The troops, whose casualties amounted to only one man killed and one officer wounded, now deployed and fell back covered by skirmishers and the artillery.
Just at the moment when the attacking force was nearest the town, and the guns were attempting to make a breach in the enemy's walls, four steamers flying the Egyptian flag came down stream and anchored. Every one knew at once that they were from General Gordon, and greeted them with loud cheers. They were commanded by Nusri Pasha, and were sent by Gordon from Khartoum to communicate with the expeditionary force. They had on board some Soudanese and Egyptians and some brass howitzers. Four of the latter were at once landed and run into action by a force of Soudanese from the steamers under Khasm-el-Mus, a native sheikh with the rank of bey. These made excellent practice at the town up to the moment when the retreat sounded.
Khasm-el-Mus stated that he had seen a force under Feki Mustapha marching down the west bank from Khartoum, and that it would reach Metammeh by sunset or very early next morning. The camp at Gubat was therefore hurriedly placed in a state to resist an attack, and arrangements were made for bringing in such of the stores as still remained at the zeriba.