[78]. Kant discriminates the laws of morality, which are a priori, from rules of skill, having to do with technique or art, and counsels of prudence, having to do with welfare. The latter he calls pragmatic; the a priori laws practical. See Metaphysics of Morals, Abbott’s trans., pp. 33 and 34.
[79]. See the article in the Monist already mentioned, and another one in the same volume, p. 481, “The Issues of Pragmaticism.”
[80]. It is probably fair to see here an empirical rendering of the Kantian generality of moral action, while the distinction and connection of “rational purport” and “sensible particular” have also obvious Kantian associations.
[81]. P. 26.
[82]. P. 56-57.
[83]. P. 105.
[84]. P. 45.
[85]. P. 43.
[86]. P. 151.
[87]. P. 53.