The question came to formal judgment on the memorable trial of the Tory preacher, Sacheverell, March 10, 1709-10, impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors, on account of two sermons in which he put forth the doctrines of Non-Resistance and denounced the Revolution of 1688, by which English liberty was saved. After argument on both sides, and questions propounded by the Lords, the judges delivered their opinion seriatim, that, by the law of England and the constant practice of Westminster Hall, “the particular words supposed to be criminal ought to be specified in indictments or informations.” And yet, in face of this familiar and indisputable rule of the Common Law, thus pointedly declared, the Lords solemnly resolved:—
“That, by the law and usage of Parliament, in prosecutions by impeachments for high crimes and misdemeanors, by writing or speaking, the particular words supposed to be criminal are not necessary to be expressly specified in such impeachments.”[171]
The respondent, being found guilty, moved in arrest of judgment:—
“That no entire clause, sentence, or expression, contained in either of his sermons or dedications, is particularly set forth in his impeachment, which he has already heard the judges declare to be necessary in all cases of indictments or informations.”[172]
The Lord Chancellor, denying the motion, communicated to the respondent the resolution already adopted after full debate and consideration, and added:—
“So that, in their Lordships’ opinion, the law and usage of the High Court of Parliament being a part of the law of the land, and that usage not requiring the words should be expressly specified in impeachments, the answer of the judges, which related only to the course used in indictments and informations, does not in the least affect your case.”[173]
And so the judgment was allowed to stand.
The substantial justice of this proceeding is seen, when it is considered that the whole of the libel had been read at length, so that the respondent had the benefit of anything which could be alleged in extenuation or exculpation, as if the libellous sermons had been entered verbatim. The Report already cited presents the practical conclusion:—
“It was adjudged sufficient to state the crime generally in the impeachment. The libels were given in evidence; and it was not then thought of, that nothing should be given in evidence which was not specially charged in the impeachment.”[174]
The principle thus solemnly adjudged was ever afterwards asserted by the managers for the House of Commons in all its latitude, and with an energy, zeal, and earnestness proportioned to the magnitude of the interests involved,—as appeared conspicuously on the impeachment for high treason of the Lords who had taken part in the Rebellion of 1715 to bring back the Stuarts. Lord Wintoun, after conviction, moved in arrest of judgment, and excepted against the impeachment for error, on account of the treason not being described with sufficient certainty,—the day on which the treason was committed not having been alleged. The learned counsel, arguing that Parliamentary Law was part of Common Law, submitted “whether there is not the same certainty required in one method of proceeding at the Common Law as in another.”[175] To this ingenious presentment, by which proceedings in Parliament were brought within the grasp of the Common Law, the able and distinguished managers replied with resolution, asserting the supremacy of Parliamentary Law. Walpole, afterwards the famous Prime Minister, began:—