CLAIMS ON ENGLAND,—INDIVIDUAL AND NATIONAL.
Speech on the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty, in Executive Session of the Senate, April 13, 1869.
MR. PRESIDENT,—A report recommending that the Senate do not advise and consent to a treaty with a foreign power, duly signed by the plenipotentiary of the nation, is of rare occurrence. Treaties are often reported with amendments, and sometimes without any recommendation; but I do not recall an instance, since I came into the Senate, where such a treaty has been reported with the recommendation which is now under consideration. The character of the treaty seemed to justify the exceptional report. The Committee did not hesitate in the conclusion that it ought to be rejected, and they have said so.
I do not disguise the importance of this act; but I believe that in the interest of peace, which every one should have at heart, the treaty must be rejected. A treaty, which, instead of removing an existing grievance, leaves it for heart-burning and rancor, cannot be considered a settlement of pending questions between two nations. It may seem to settle them, but does not. It is nothing but a snare. And such is the character of the treaty now before us. The massive grievance under which our country suffered for years is left untouched; the painful sense of wrong planted in the national heart is allowed to remain. For all this there is not one word of regret, or even of recognition; nor is there any semblance of compensation. It cannot be for the interest of either party that such a treaty should be ratified. It cannot promote the interest of the United States, for we naturally seek justice as the foundation of a good understanding with Great Britain; nor can it promote the interest of Great Britain, which must also seek a real settlement of all pending questions. Surely I do not err, when I say that a wise statesmanship, whether on our side or on the other side, must apply itself to find the real root of evil, and then, with courage tempered by candor and moderation, see that it is extirpated. This is for the interest of both parties, and anything short of it is a failure. It is sufficient to say that the present treaty does no such thing, and that, whatever may have been the disposition of the negotiators, the real root of evil remains untouched in all its original strength.
I make these remarks merely to characterize the treaty and prepare the way for its consideration.
THE PENDING TREATY.
If we look at the negotiation which immediately preceded the treaty, we find little to commend. You have it on your table. I think I am not mistaken, when I say that it shows a haste which finds few precedents in diplomacy, but which is explained by the anxiety to reach a conclusion before the advent of a new Administration. Mr. Seward and Mr. Reverdy Johnson unite in this unprecedented activity, using the Atlantic cable freely. I should not object to haste, or to the freest use of the cable, if the result were such as could be approved; but, considering the character of the transaction, and how completely the treaty conceals the main cause of offence, it seems as if the honorable negotiators were engaged in huddling something out of sight.
The treaty has for its model the Claims Convention of 1853. To take such a convention as a model was a strange mistake. This convention was for the settlement of outstanding claims of American citizens on Great Britain, and of British subjects on the United States, which had arisen since the Treaty of Ghent in 1814. It concerned individuals only, and not the nation. It was not in any respect political; nor was it to remove any sense of national wrong. To take such a convention as the model for a treaty which was to determine a national grievance of transcendent importance in the relations of two countries marked on the threshold an insensibility to the true nature of the difference to be settled. At once it belittled the work to be done.