Another Englishman, in an elaborate pamphlet, bears similar testimony. I refer to the pamphlet of Mr. Edge, published in London by Ridgway in 1863, and entitled “The Destruction of the American Carrying-Trade.” After setting forth at length the destruction of our commerce by British pirates, this writer thus foreshadows the damages:—
“Were we,” says he, “the sufferers, we should certainly demand compensation for the loss of the property captured or destroyed, for the interest of the capital invested in the vessels and their cargoes, and, maybe, a fair compensation in addition for all and any injury accruing to our business interests from the depredations upon our shipping. The remuneration may reach a high figure in the present case; but it would be a simple act of justice, and might prevent an incomparably greater loss in the future.”[77]
Here we have the damages assessed by an Englishman, who, while contemplating remuneration at a high figure, recognizes it as “a simple act of justice.”
Such is the candid and explicit testimony of Englishmen, pointing the way to the proper rule of damages. How to authenticate the extent of national loss with reasonable certainty is not without difficulty; but it cannot be doubted that such a loss occurred. It is folly to question it. The loss may be seen in various circumstances: as, in the rise of insurance on all American vessels; the fate of the carrying-trade, which was one of the great resources of our country; the diminution of our tonnage, with the corresponding increase of British tonnage; the falling off in our exports and imports, with due allowance for our abnormal currency and the diversion of war. These are some of the elements; and here again we have British testimony. Mr. W. E. Forster, in the speech already quoted, announces that “the carrying-trade of the United States was transferred to British merchants”;[78] and Mr. Cobden, with his characteristic mastery of details, shows, that, according to an official document laid on the table of Parliament, American shipping had been transferred to English capitalists as follows: in 1858, 33 vessels, 12,684 tons; 1859, 49 vessels, 21,308 tons; 1860, 41 vessels, 13,638 tons; 1861, 126 vessels, 71,673 tons; 1862, 135 vessels, 64,578 tons; and 1863, 348 vessels, 252,579 tons; and he adds, “I am told that this operation is now going on as fast as ever”; and this circumstance he declares to be “the most serious aspect of the question of our relations with America.”[79] But this “most serious aspect” is left untouched by the pending treaty.
Our own official documents are in harmony with these English authorities. For instance, I have before me now the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1868, with an appendix by Mr. Nimmo, on shipbuilding in our country. From this Report it appears that in the New England States, during the year 1855, the most prosperous year of American shipbuilding, 305 ships and barks and 173 schooners were built, with an aggregate tonnage of 326,429 tons, while during the last year only 58 ships and barks and 213 schooners were built, with an aggregate tonnage of 98,697 tons.[80] I add a further statement from the same Report:—
“During the ten years from 1852 to 1862 the aggregate tonnage of American vessels entered at seaports of the United States from foreign countries was 30,225,475 tons, and the aggregate tonnage of foreign vessels entered was 14,699,192 tons, while during the five years from 1863 to 1868 the aggregate tonnage of American vessels entered was 9,299,877 tons, and the aggregate tonnage of foreign vessels entered was 14,116,427 tons,—showing that American tonnage in our foreign trade had fallen from two hundred and five to sixty-six per cent. of foreign tonnage in the same trade. Stated in other terms, during the decade from 1852 to 1862 sixty-seven per cent. of the total tonnage entered from foreign countries was in American vessels, and during the five years from 1863 to 1868 only thirty-nine per cent. of the aggregate tonnage entered from foreign countries was in American vessels,—a relative falling off of nearly one half.”[81]
It is not easy to say how much of this change, which has become chronic, may be referred to British pirates; but it cannot be doubted that they contributed largely to produce it. They began the influences under which this change has continued.
There is another document which bears directly upon the present question. I refer to the interesting Report of Mr. Morse, our consul at London, made during the last year, and published by the Secretary of State. After a minute inquiry, the Report shows that on the breaking out of the Rebellion in 1861 the entire tonnage of the United States, coasting and registered, was 5,539,813 tons, of which 2,642,628 tons were registered and employed in foreign trade, and that at the close of the Rebellion in 1865, notwithstanding an increase in coasting tonnage, our registered tonnage had fallen to 1,602,528 tons, being a loss during the four years of more than a million tons, amounting to about forty per cent. of our foreign commerce. During the same four years the total tonnage of the British empire rose from 5,895,369 tons to 7,322,604 tons, the increase being especially in the foreign trade. The Report proceeds to say that as to the cause of the decrease in America and the corresponding increase in the British empire “there can be no room for question or doubt.” Here is the precise testimony from one who at his official post in London watched this unprecedented drama, with the outstretched ocean as a theatre, and British pirates as the performers:—
“Conceding to the Rebels the belligerent rights of the sea, when they had not a solitary war-ship afloat, in dock, or in the process of construction, and when they had no power to protect or dispose of prizes, made their sea-rovers, when they appeared, the instruments of terror and destruction to our commerce. From the appearance of the first corsair in pursuit of their ships, American merchants had to pay not only the marine, but the war risk also, on their ships. After the burning of one or two ships with their neutral cargoes, the ship-owner had to pay the war risk on the cargo his ship had on freight, as well as on the ship. Even then, for safety, the preference was, as a matter of course, always given to neutral vessels, and American ships could rarely find employment on these hard terms as long as there were good neutral ships in the freight markets. Under such circumstances there was no course left for our merchant ship-owners but to take such profitless business as was occasionally offered them, let their ships lie idle at their moorings or in dock with large expense and deterioration constantly going on, to sell them outright when they could do so without ruinous sacrifice, or put them under foreign flags for protection.”[82]