Beyond the actual loss in the national tonnage, there was a further loss in the arrest of our natural increase in this branch of industry, which an intelligent statistician puts at five per cent. annually, making in 1866 a total loss on this account of 1,384,953 tons, which must be added to 1,229,035 tons actually lost.[83] The same statistician, after estimating the value of a ton at forty dollars gold, and making allowance for old and new ships, puts the sum-total of national loss on this account at $110,000,000. Of course this is only an item in our bill.
To these authorities I add that of the National Board of Trade, which, in a recent report on American Shipping, after setting forth the diminution of our sailing tonnage, says that it is nearly all to be traced to the war on the ocean; and the result is summed up in the words, that, “while the tonnage of the nation was rapidly disappearing by the ravages of the Rebel cruisers and by sales abroad, in addition to the usual loss by the perils of the sea, there was no construction of new vessels going forward to counteract the decline even in part.”[84] Such is the various testimony, all tending to one conclusion.
This is what I have to say for the present on national losses through the destruction of commerce. These are large enough; but there is another chapter, where they are larger far: I refer, of course, to the national losses caused by the prolongation of the war, and traceable directly to England. Pardon me, if I confess the regret with which I touch this prodigious item; for I know well the depth of feeling which it is calculated to stir. But I cannot hesitate. It belongs to the case. No candid person, who studies this eventful period, can doubt that the Rebellion was originally encouraged by hope of support from England,—that it was strengthened at once by the concession of belligerent rights on the ocean,—that it was fed to the end by British supplies,—that it was encouraged by every well-stored British ship that was able to defy our blockade,—that it was quickened into frantic life with every report from the British pirates, flaming anew with every burning ship; nor can it be doubted that without British intervention the Rebellion would have soon succumbed under the well-directed efforts of the National Government. Not weeks or months, but years, were added in this way to our war, so full of costly sacrifice. The subsidies which in other times England contributed to Continental wars were less effective than the aid and comfort which she contributed to the Rebellion. It cannot be said too often that the naval base of the Rebellion was not in America, but in England. The blockade-runners and the pirate ships were all English. England was the fruitful parent, and these were the “hell-hounds,” pictured by Milton in his description of Sin, which, “when they list, would creep into her womb and kennel there.” Mr. Cobden boldly said in the House of Commons that England made war from her shores on the United States, with “an amount of damage to that country greater than would be produced by many ordinary wars.”[85] According to this testimony, the conduct of England was war; but it must not be forgotten that this war was carried on at our sole cost. The United States paid for a war waged by England upon the National Unity.
There was one form that this war assumed which was incessant, most vexatious, and costly, besides being in itself a positive alliance with the Rebellion. It was that of blockade-runners, openly equipped and supplied by England under the shelter of that baleful Proclamation. Constantly leaving English ports, they stole across the ocean, and then broke the blockade. These active agents of the Rebellion could be counteracted only by a network of vessels stretching along the coast, at great cost to the country. Here is another distinct item, the amount of which may be determined at the Navy Department.
The sacrifice of precious life is beyond human compensation; but there may be an approximate estimate of the national loss in treasure. Everybody can make the calculation. I content myself with calling attention to the elements which enter into it. Besides the blockade, there was the prolongation of the war. The Rebellion was suppressed at a cost of more than four thousand million dollars, a considerable portion of which has been already paid, leaving twenty-five hundred millions as a national debt to burden the people. If, through British intervention, the war was doubled in duration, or in any way extended, as cannot be doubted, then is England justly responsible for the additional expenditure to which our country was doomed; and whatever may be the final settlement of these great accounts, such must be the judgment in any chancery which consults the simple equity of the case.
This plain statement, without one word of exaggeration or aggravation, is enough to exhibit the magnitude of the national losses, whether from the destruction of our commerce, the prolongation of the war, or the expense of the blockade. They stand before us mountain-high, with a base broad as the Nation, and a mass stupendous as the Rebellion itself. It will be for a wise statesmanship to determine how this fearful accumulation, like Ossa upon Pelion, shall be removed out of sight, so that it shall no longer overshadow the two countries.
THE RULE OF DAMAGES.
Perhaps I ought to anticipate an objection from the other side, to the effect that these national losses, whether from the destruction of our commerce, the prolongation of the war, or the expense of the blockade, are indirect and remote, so as not to be a just ground of claim. This is expressed at the Common Law by the rule that “damages must be for the natural and proximate consequence of an act.”[86] To this excuse the answer is explicit. The damages suffered by the United States are twofold, individual and national, being in each case direct and proximate, although in the one case individuals suffered, and in the other case the nation. It is easy to see that there may be occasions, where, overtopping all individual damages, are damages suffered by the nation, so that reparation to individuals would be insufficient. Nor can the claim of the nation be questioned simply because it is large, or because the evidence with regard to it is different from that in the case of an individual. In each case the damage must be proved by the best possible evidence, and this is all that law or reason can require. In the case of the nation the evidence is historic; and this is enough. Impartial history will record the national losses from British intervention, and it is only reasonable that the evidence of these losses should not be excluded from judgment. Because the case is without precedent, because no nation ever before received such injury from a friendly power, this can be no reason why the question should not be considered on the evidence.
Even the rule of the Common Law furnishes no impediment; for our damages are the natural consequence of what was done. But the rule of the Roman Law, which is the rule of International Law, is broader than that of the Common Law. The measure of damages, according to the Digest, is, “Whatever may have been lost or might have been gained,”—Quantum mihi abest, quantumque lucrari potui;[87] and this same rule seems to prevail in the French Law, borrowed from the Roman Law.[88] This rule opens the door to ample reparation for all damages, whether individual or national.