MR. PRESIDENT,—I hesitate to say a word in this debate. The question has been exhausted on both sides, and to me, I must be pardoned for saying, it is infinitely plain. It is plain in law; it is plain in fact. When I say it is plain in law, I believe all the Senate on both sides will concur,—for, indeed, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Thurman] stated the law precisely as I understand it.
We all know that in topography there are what are called water-sheds, sometimes high, sometimes low, and from these elevations flow in opposite directions the currents which there find their fountains. Sir, the water-shed of this debate is found in the intent; and this water-shed may be high or low. Suffice it that it is a water-shed; this is enough. Suffice it that the intent appears; and this is all that is required, in order to determine the character of the residence. Show me a citizen actually in a State, then the intent to remain fixes his inhabitancy.
The Senator from Illinois [Mr. Trumbull] substantially admitted this rule of law. I agree with him that there are but two things to be shown: first, what the old books call the factum, and, secondly, what the same old books call the animus. What is the factum? It is residence. What is the animus? It is intent to stay. Now in point of law you can add nothing to these. You may argue till doomsday, you may cite authorities without number, but you can add nothing to these two simple requirements, residence and intent.
Mr. Thurman. Will the Senator allow me to interrupt him?
Mr. Sumner. Certainly.
Mr. Thurman. As he has referred to my statement of the law, I will say that I did state that those were the two things necessary, residence and intention,—that you want to find out what is residence that creates inhabitancy, and what is intention that creates inhabitancy; and what I said was, and I maintain yet, that a residence which is enforced is no residence, and an intention that the party has no power to execute so long as he remains in the Army is no intention at all: an intention that the party has no power to execute has no virtue whatever.
Mr. Sumner. Very well,—I will come to that. The Senator and myself agree that in point of law there are two things to be established, and only two,—residence and intent. The question that remains is one of evidence; it is not a question of law. If the Senator were on the bench, which he once adorned, he would be obliged to charge the jury in this way. The rule of law is positive. All that remains comes under the head of evidence. Now I say by law you must show those two things, residence and intent, and you cannot add to either a tittle.
On this occasion, the most important requirement is that of intent. This is the requirement that has been most argued. And here I go back to that original Latin phrase which dominates this case, and which is in itself an all-sufficient rule: I mean the animus manendi. Why is this phrase, so often repeated, handed down for successive centuries? Simply because, like maxims of law, or like proverbs, it contains in one short phrase a rule. You have there a chapter of jurisprudence, if you please, or a volume. It is the mind, or the intent to remain, which governs. This is all that the law says. The law does not go forward and require, as the Senator from Illinois has argued to-day, that there must be an act. You find no such requirement in the rule. The rule is explicit, precise; and here I challenge contradiction. It is simply the intent to remain, the animus manendi. Step beyond that and you are lost, if you undertake to state the law. There is no rule of law outside of this simple sum-total.
I come, then, to the point that we have before us, simply a question of intent. I might cite authorities here. I have some of them before me. I will read one. For instance, here is Vattel, quoted by Judge Story in his article on Domicile in the “Encyclopædia Americana,” which Senators familiar with this subject know is of authority:—