“Vattel seems to define it to be a fixed residence in any place with an intention of always staying there.”[4]
On this Judge Story very properly remarks:—
“This is not quite accurate. It would be more correct to say that that place is the home or domicile of a person in which his habitation is fixed, without any present intention of removing therefrom.”
Here are words completely applicable to the case now before us. The learned author then proceeds to say:—
“It is often a mere question of intention.”
And then adds:—
“The mere dwelling or residence in a place is not of itself sufficient to make it the domicile of the party. He must be there with the intention of remaining, animo manendi.”
Mark the old recurring phrase, with its light and limitation. Here again I say is the rule. You cannot go outside of it. If you go outside of it, you are lost. I am speaking of the rule of law. I know that there can be no addition to that, because, if you do undertake to add to it or to take from it, you must depart from the jurisprudence of every civilized country,—not only of our own country, not only of England, but of every civilized nation on the continent of Europe. In the jurisprudence of every one of those countries you will find this same distinct, precise, simple rule.
Now, Sir, allow me to say,—I say it with entire respect,—the confusion in this debate has arisen from confounding the rule of law with the evidence under that rule. The rule, I say, is precise, that there must be intent. But how shall the intent be proved? Sometimes in one way, sometimes in another; sometimes by long-continued residence,—by purchase of property,—by the establishment of a home,—by the establishment of a place of business,—by all those circumstances and incidents which show fixity of purpose. All this comes under the head of evidence. It does not touch the rule of law behind.