The Senator from Illinois says there must be an act. Allow me to say that words are sometimes acts, and especially if associated with important events. It is a familiar phrase of law that language enters into what we call the res gestæ; language is welded into the transaction and becomes a part of it. Words then become things; and when were words more things than when the commanding general in Mississippi distinctly declared his purpose to resign his commission in the Army of the United States and accept a nomination as Senator? Here was a declaration constituting part of the res gestæ, and in itself an act.
I am not speaking merely on theory. I have in my hand a case, which I think, when I read it, you will see is applicable: I refer to Metcalf’s Reports, volume three, page 200, the case of Kilburn v. Bennett. In the statement of facts is the following passage:—
“For the purpose of showing with what intent the defendant went to Tyngsborough on the 27th of April, he offered to prove that about three weeks before that day he told S. Shattuck, in whose house he then resided, that he should leave Groton before the 1st of May, and remove with his family to Tyngsborough, to reside at his brother’s, and make his house a home, until he should go to Illinois. But the judge ruled that the evidence was inadmissible, and rejected it.”
The case was carried before the full bench, when the ruling of the judge below was set aside, and the Court observed as follows:—
“The Court held that this, being the mere declaration of the defendant, was not competent evidence in his favor, and it was rejected. The general rule undoubtedly is, that a party cannot give in evidence his own declarations in his favor, unless they accompany some act, and are a part of the res gestæ. But it appears to us that the declarations offered to be proved are within the qualification of the rule. They were made in the ordinary course of business, and in relation to the defendant’s removal, and they were made to the owner of the house in which he was at the time residing. This giving notice of his intended removal is to be considered an act which he might prove in any case in which it became material; and if so, all that he said explanatory of his intention in relation to his removal seems to us to be admissible in evidence.”
Now on the authority of this case it seems to me that the declaration of General Ames, accompanied by the acceptance of candidacy as a Senator, is clearly an act. But I do not argue that the Senate is now bound by any technical rule of this kind. It is enough if the Senate is satisfied with regard to his intent on the evidence adduced. No rule of limitation or exclusion can prevail. If the Senate believes that he had at the time the animus manendi, it must act accordingly.
Is the Senate, on the evidence before it,—without the application of any technical rule of evidence, without recognizing his declaration as part of the res gestæ,—is the Senate satisfied that at the time named he intended to reside in Mississippi? This is the whole case. On this question of fact each Senator will judge for himself, on the evidence before him. This evidence I will read in the Report of the Committee, being the language of General Ames in a written statement to them, as follows:—