Revolutions, like every thing elſe in France, are a mode, and the Convention already commemorate four ſince 1789: that of July 1789, which rendered the monarchical power nugatory; that of Auguſt the 10th, 1792, which ſubverted it; the expulſion of the Briſſotins, in May 1793; and the death of Robeſpierre, in July 1794.
The people, accuſtomed, from their earlieſt knowledge, to reſpect the perſon and authority of the King, felt that the events of the two firſt epochs, which diſgraced the one and annihilated the other, were violent and important revolutions; and, as language which expreſſes the public ſentiment is readily adopted, it ſoon became uſual to ſpeak of theſe events as the revolutions of July and Auguſt.
The thirty-firſt of May has always been viewed in a very different light, for it was not eaſy to make the people at large comprehend how the ſucceſſion of Robeſpierre and Danton to Briſſot and Roland could be conſidered as a revolution, more eſpecially as it appeared evident that the principles of one party actuated the government of the other. Every town had its many-headed monſter to repreſent the defeat of the Foederaliſts, and its mountain to proclaim the triumph of their enemieſ the Mountaineers; but theſe political hieroglyphics were little underſtood, and the merits of the factions they alluded to little diſtinguiſhed—ſo that the revolution of the thirty-firſt of May waſ rather a party aera, than a popular one.
The fall of Robeſpierre would have made as little impreſſion as that of the Girondiſts, if ſome melioration of the revolutionary ſyſtem had not ſucceeded it; and it is in fact only ſince the public voice, and the intereſt of the Convention, have occaſioned a change approaching to reform, that the death of Robeſpierre is really conſidered as a benefit.
But what was in itſelf no more than a warfare of factions, may now, if eſtimated by its conſequences, be pronounced a revolution of infinite importance. The Jacobins, whom their declining power only rendered more inſolent and daring, have at length obliged the Convention to take decided meaſures againſt them, and they are now ſubject to ſuch regulations as muſt effectually diminiſh their influence, and, in the end, diſſolve their whole combination. They can no longer correſpond aſ ſocieties, and the miſchievous union which conſtituted their chief force, can ſcarcely be ſupported for any time under the preſent reſtrictions.*
* "All affiliations, aggregations, and foederations, as well aſ correſpondences carried on collectively between ſocieties, under whatever denomination they may exiſt, are henceforth prohibited, aſ being ſubverſive of government, and contrary to the unity of the republic. "Thoſe perſons who ſign as preſidents or ſecretaries, petitions or addreſſes in a collective form, ſhall be arreſted and confined aſ ſuſpicious, &c. &c.—Whoever offends in any ſhape againſt the preſent law, will incur the ſame penalty." The whole of the decree is in the ſame ſpirit. The immediate and avowed pretext for this meaſure was, that the popular ſocieties, who have of late only ſent petitions diſagreeable to the Convention, did not expreſs the ſenſe of the people. Yet the depoſition of the King, and the eſtabliſhment of the republic, had no other ſanction than the adherence of theſe clubs, who are now allowed not to be the nation, and whoſe very exiſtence as then conſtituted is declared to be ſubverſive of government.
It is not improbable, that the Convention, by ſuffering the clubs ſtill to exiſt, after reducing them to nullity, may hope to preſerve the inſtitution as a future reſource againſt the people, while it repreſſeſ their immediate efforts againſt itſelf. The Briſſotins would have attempted a ſimilar policy, but they had nothing to oppoſe to the Jacobins, except their perſonal influence. Briſſot and Roland took part with the clubs, as they approved the maſſacres of Auguſt and September, juſt as far as it anſwered their purpoſe; and when they were abandoned by the one, and the other were found to incur an unprofitable odium, they acted the part which Tallien and Freron act now under the ſame circumſtances, and would willingly have promoted the deſtruction of a power which had become inimical to them.*—
* Briſſot and Roland were more pernicious as Jacobins than the moſt furious of their ſucceſſors. If they did not in perſon excite the people to the commiſſion of crimes, they corrupted them, and made them fit inſtruments for the crimes of others. Briſſot might affect to condemn the maſſacres of September in the groſs, but he is known to have enquired with eager impatience, and in a tone which implied he had reaſons for expecting it, whether De Morande, an enemy he wiſhed to be releaſed from, was among the murdered.
—Their imitators, without poſſeſſing more honeſty, either political or moral, are more fortunate; and not only Tallien and Freron, who ſince their expulſion from the Jacobins have become their moſt active enemies, are now in a manner popular, but even the whole Convention is much leſſ deteſted than it was before.
It is the ſingular felicity of the Aſſembly to derive a ſort of popularity from the very exceſſes it has occaſioned or ſanctioned, and which, it was natural to ſuppoſe, would have conſigned it for ever to vengeance or obloquy; but the paſt ſufferings of the people have taught them to be moderate in their expectations; and the name of their repreſentation has been ſo connected with tyranny of every ſort, that it appears an extraordinary forbearance when the uſual operations of guillotines and mandates of arreſt are ſuſpended.