Particular animals, birds, insects, etc., bark, gibber, bray, sing, crow, grunt, rub their wing-cases (crickets), etc., showing that each has a different language, and different modes of expressing emotion: showing, too, by these differences that their sorts of minds must vary much more from one another, than do the minds of men in their different human varieties; for men do not employ such immensely different modes of conveying their ideas and feelings by sounds as is the case in animals with their lowing, snorting, barking, etc.
The making of these very different sounds by different animals is therefore to me the clearest possible proof that different animals possess different sorts of mind; yet of course there is some general resemblance, as is the case in so many of God’s works made diversely in specific instances, yet on the same general plan in the main. I said just now that, while fully admitting the possession of a kind of language by animals, I should maintain strictly that it is not of an intellectual character, and I may be asked what I mean by this assertion.
My answer is that I believe the language of the animal is limited chiefly to the expression of animal needs; and animal sensations; and the conveyance of such requirements, and feelings to their kind; although it can doubtless be used also for communicating in some slight degree such ideas concerning animal experiences and feelings as their feeble reasoning powers enable them to arrive at; such as the devices for protection, and escape from danger; and the manifestation and interpretation of the sort of questionings, and answerings which occur when two dogs meet, as shown by the wagging of tails, and pleased looks, or the reverse; and which seem to indicate as if the dogs could by gesture, etc., ask, and reply to one another, whether it is to be peace, or war.
My belief is that the mind of the mere animal is in no ease able to reach beyond the limit of simple ministration to the animal needs, and animal feelings, and instincts of the creature according to its kind; and that it can never form pure intellectual ideas, such as those of intellectual love; intellectual hatred; intellectual ideas as to time; space; God, etc. Nor can it form the mental abstractions—words—and by the use of these arrive at the intellectual operation of mind which their employment renders possible.
MODES OF EXPRESSING LANGUAGE IN ANIMALS.
These may take place—
First—By vocal intonations (as in man) in brutes and birds: and I may remark that all brutes possess a tongue, larynx, and vocal cords; and that birds have these also, with the exception that the bird’s larynx (syrinx) is rather modified from that of man and the mammalia; still we know its perfection; and we know how the parrot can use it.
Secondly—By gesture and visual regard, as seen in dogs, and in birds.
Thirdly—By means of sounds other than vocal, as is witnessed in the stamping on the ground by various animals to intimate danger. Also the noises of insects made by rubbing their wing-cases (elytra) together, as in the cricket, etc.
Fourthly—By means of touch, as in the cases of ants, bees, and other insects, which can convey meanings by crossing their antennæ.