The committees do not quarrel with your personal right to declare specific acts or communications as “confidential.” They do argue that many subordinate officials are wrongfully using the May 17, 1954, letter to claim that their government actions and communications are “confidential.”

Some agencies have stated that Congress is entitled to “only final decisions” of the agency, and has no right of access to papers leading up to the decisions.

Do you feel that all employees of the Executive Branch have the discretion to testify or not testify before Congress about their official acts, when no security is involved?

At what level does this discretion lodge?

If you feel this is a misuse of the precedent, would you clarify this matter on the access to information by the Congress and the press?

I knew the question would be answered by Gerald D. Morgan, the White House counsel, and I made several trips to the White House to convince him of the wisdom of limiting the use of “executive privilege” to cases approved specifically by the President.

Morgan seemed to be convinced at that stage that the Eisenhower administration should put some bridle on the unrestrained use of “executive privilege” by officials at all levels. I argued that it was to the advantage of the administration in power to have the congressional committees actively policing the agencies, and that there was grave danger of corruption developing in any agency where those in charge felt they could arbitrarily block congressional investigators.

Morgan asked that I send him a memorandum on the proper safeguards against improper use of “executive privilege.” I felt optimistic when I submitted the memorandum to Morgan October 4, 1956, and felt that perhaps the Eisenhower administration was willing to take action publicly to end this arbitrary secrecy.

I had mentioned to Morgan that I had read the article he had written for the California Law Review of December 1949, in which he spoke forcefully in support of the power of Congress to compel testimony and production of records.

Morgan’s article, entitled “Congressional Investigations and Judicial Review,” was written when he was an assistant legislative counsel to the House of Representatives. In those years he had been a critic of the Truman administration for excessive secrecy and a strong advocate of the power of Congress to investigate.