“There is no basis why reports on the subject of the types pointed out above should not be made available to the General Accounting Office unless the purpose is to delay or hamper the efforts of the office to disclose all facts bearing upon the activity or area under audit.
“We believe that any departmental regulation denying to the General Accounting Office access to any report relating to ‘internal audit and control’ is contrary to the law.”
It should be remembered that this was not a Democratic congressman or senator accusing a Republican administration. This was Joseph Campbell, long-time friend of President Eisenhower, charging that the Eisenhower administration was acting “contrary to the law” in the claim of an “executive privilege.”
Congressman John Moss subsequently declared that President Eisenhower was not discharging his duties under the Constitution. Under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, the President is obliged to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed....” In this instance, President Eisenhower was not only disregarding the Budgeting and Accounting Act but also supporting those acting “contrary to the law,” Moss said.
Although the fuss had started over GAO access to a sixty-two-page Air Force inspector general report on the ballistic missile program (see Appendix C), the real issue was whether the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, or any other executive agency could arbitrarily refuse to give reports, papers, and financial records to the GAO.
It was difficult to follow President Eisenhower’s thinking. This was a period of time when President Eisenhower and members of his administration were emphasizing that financial problems could be one of the nation’s big worries. One of the major problems, they believed, was making sure the government was getting its money’s worth from military spending.
Even in times past, when GAO investigators were given maximum access to records, serious scandals had been unearthed. Most of them were not discovered by the military establishment but came to light only after the GAO or the congressional committees went to work. Chairman Hebert and Campbell had a long record of fruitful hearings to back them in questioning the wisdom (to say nothing of the legality) of allowing our military spenders to erect more barriers for the GAO auditors—the only independent outside check on the billions spent on military matters.
At the presidential press conference on November 5, 1958, I raised the question of the right of the General Accounting Office to examine reports of the Air Force and the Defense Department.
“Mr. President,” I said, “you have mentioned the spending in the Defense Department here as one of the important issues, and the General Accounting Office, which is the watchdog on frauds and extravagances in the various agencies, has been barred from reports over in the Air Force and the Defense Department generally, and on this they [the Air Force and Defense Department officials] claim that they have authority from you to withhold reports if it is ‘expedient to do so.’”
I tried to make the question conform as much as possible to the precise trouble area between the GAO and the Defense Department.