“I wonder,” I continued, “if you have given that authority [to withhold] and if you feel that the GAO should have a full rein to go in and investigate all indications of fraud and extravagance?”
Replied the President: “You are obviously talking about some special thing that I would have to study before I could make—give an answer. I have stated this time and time again: I believe that every investigating committee of the Congress, every auditing office, like the GAO, should always have the opportunity to see official records if the security of our country is not involved.”
President Eisenhower was now saying that the GAO should have all records unless the security of our country was involved. I tried to pin him down on it.
“Will they claim this, Mr. President, under ‘executive privilege—’” I started my question.
President Eisenhower cut in before I had finished to avoid any further comment. “No, that’s all I have to say—I told you that is all I had to say for the moment.”
Representative Clare Hoffman, the wily Michigan Republican, noted that President Eisenhower’s answer seemed to bar use of “executive privilege” in refusing reports to the GAO. A few days after the press conference, he wrote President Eisenhower to call attention to the press conference exchange and to ask:
“Did you mean to imply by your comments that the complete text of Inspector General reports, including recommendations, be made available to Congress and the General Accounting Office?”
President Eisenhower’s letter to Representative Hoffman on the same day again barred the GAO from the full reports of inspectors general. The President said that “facts” in the reports would be made available to the GAO, but that “recommendations and other advisory matter” were not to be released (see Appendix C).
The whole situation landed right back where it had started. The Air Force, Navy, or Army officials would still screen the Inspector General reports, eliminate material they didn’t want to fall into the hands of GAO auditors, and pass out their own self-serving summary to the investigators. Law and logic had fallen by the wayside. The Budgeting and Accounting Act might as well not have been written for all the good it was doing in forcing departments to produce all pertinent documents.
The next big test came with the Navy. In February 1959, Comptroller General Campbell wrote to the Moss subcommittee stating that the secrecy curtain made it impossible for him to fulfill his responsibility to audit Navy financial affairs.