By this time Jackson’s mind was thoroughly made up. The tour of Kendall had not been a complete success. The banks were timid and fearful of the power of “The Monster.” Catterall credits the report that Kendall himself had concluded the plan unwise, and had admitted to Jackson that “the project of removing the deposits must be given up.”[649] This advice, if given,[650] came too late. The old military leader was in the saddle, war was declared, retreat was defeat. Thus, a few days after receiving Taney’s letter, Jackson wrote him that he had considered the probability that Congress would attempt to overawe him, and had determined that, when Duane withdrew, Taney should step into the place and conduct the affairs of the Treasury until toward the close of the next session of Congress, when the battle would have been won or lost, and the refusal of the Senate to confirm Taney’s nomination would not interfere. He was only awaiting proof of the expenditure of $40,000 of Bank money in the campaign. With this proof, of which he had no doubt, he would feel justified in removing the deposits. The Bank might “rebel against our power, and even refuse to pay to the order of the Government the public money in its vaults, and lay claim to all the money that remains uncalled for on the books of the loan office.” Everywhere he found the “assumed power of this monster.” This pretension must be challenged and tested, and he had no doubt of being “sustained by the people.”[651]
Thus the die was definitely cast at Rip Raps early in September, and Jackson returned to Washington determined to force the fighting.
V
As soon as he reached the capital, he began to press Duane more insistently, with the Secretary stubbornly refusing to budge. Some time before he had voluntarily given the assurance that if the President should determine upon the course outlined, and he should be unable to comply, he would promptly tender his resignation. The President’s intentions were now thoroughly understood, but Duane gave no indication of a disposition to relinquish his post, and the pro-Bank papers were decorating him with laurels. The first covert attack upon him from Administration circles appeared in the “Globe” of September 12th, when Blair, taking cognizance of an article in the “Baltimore Chronicle,” denounced it as a “slanderer of Mr. Duane.” “Would the ‘Chronicle’ convert the Secretary of the Treasury into a Bank officer, and have him communicating to the corporation what belongs only to his relations with the President?” Even Duane could not have mistaken the implication. Five days after this article appeared, the Cabinet was convened, and Jackson took the opinion of his advisers. McLane, Duane, and Cass were against the step, with Taney, Barry, and Woodbury (who had previously hedged), favoring it.
On the following day the Cabinet was again convened to hear the President’s reasons for his determination, set forth in the famous “Paper Read to the Cabinet.” This document, as read, had been revised and rewritten from the notes sent by Jackson from his retreat at Hampton Roads to Taney, and was to become the storm center of congressional controversy, although it did not concern the Congress in the least. Beginning with a confession of a fixed hostility to the Bank on the conviction of its unconstitutionality and danger to the liberties of the people, he elaborately reviewed the charter controversy. The people had passed upon his conduct at the polls and he had been overwhelmingly vindicated. The Nation, therefore, having definitely decided on the abandonment of the Bank as a place of deposit, some method should be devised for the future deposit of the public funds before the expiration of the charter. Under the law, the Secretary of the Treasury could withdraw the deposits whenever he saw fit, provided he informed Congress of his act at the earliest opportunity. To leave the deposits with the Bank until the day of the expiration of the charter with the expectation of making the transfer to some other depository at once would mean “serious inconvenience to the Government and people.” Such work, he thought, “ought not to be the work of months only, but of years,” for otherwise “much suffering and distress would be brought upon the people.” These considerations alone, he thought sufficient to justify the step he proposed.
But in the conduct of the Bank additional and more pressing reasons could be found. Knowing of the Government’s decision to appropriate the greater part of its deposits during 1832 to the payment of the public debt, the Bank, in the sixteen months preceding May, 1832, had extended its loans more than $28,000,000, and the maximum of the extension had been made in May. And two months before that, the Bank had so perfectly understood its inability to pay over the public deposits when called upon, that it had secretly negotiated with foreign holders of the three per cent stock a year’s postponement of a demand for payment after notice should be given by the Government. “This effort to thwart the Government in the payment of the public debt,” he said, “that it might retain the public money to be used for their private interests, palliated by pretenses notoriously unfounded and insincere, would have justified the instant withdrawal of the public deposits.”
Since the congressional report in favor of the Bank, other things had occurred that would surely alter the opinion of the lawmakers. “The fact that the Bank controls, and in some cases substantially owns, and by its money supports, some of the leading presses of the country, is now more clearly established.” Extravagant sums had been loaned to editors on unusual time and nominal security in 1831 and 1832. And the proceedings and management of the Bank had been unusual and indefensible. The terms of the charter had been violated; and when Government directors undertook to restore methods in conformity with the terms of the charter, they had been disregarded. Worse still: the most important transactions involving the credit of the Bank had been turned over to Biddle, and the committees left in utter ignorance of what he was doing. He had been given unlimited authority in the use of the Bank’s money for propaganda purposes. Thousands of dollars had been squandered in the printing of speeches and pamphlets, not only defending the Bank, but attacking the chosen representatives of the people. If, as claimed, the Bank could bring distress and chaos in retaliation, all the more reason for breaking the power of the tyrannical institution. And he closed by fixing October 1st as the day for action.
As the members of the Cabinet sat in the White House that day under conflicting emotions, all appreciating the seriousness of the step, and some contemplating the closing of a career, there could have been none unmindful of the fact that the Paper was intended less for them than for the public. It was characteristic of Jackson in preparing his ground for a fight to speak over the heads of both Cabinet and Congress to the people. That Kendall and Blair were in large part responsible for the original draft which reached Taney for revision, there can be no doubt.
Knowing the real purpose of the Paper, Duane requested a postponement of publication until he could definitely decide. While the Paper was being put in type at the “Globe” office, McLane and Cass threatened to resign rather than accept any responsibility for the act, and Lewis suggested that they be publicly relieved of responsibility. When Blair hastened to Jackson with Lewis’s suggestion, the grim man of iron added the concluding paragraph assuming full personal responsibility—much to the chagrin and disgust of Taney.[652]
The crisis had now been reached, and the action of Duane was awaited by the Kitchen Cabinet with the keenest interest, not unmixed with fear lest Taney decline to take the vacant place and face the bitter fight. Taking counsel of his fears, Kendall rushed to the Attorney-General and was reassured. Confessing his fear that his acceptance would mean the end of his lifelong hopes for a place on the Supreme Bench, Taney declared himself in the fight to the end.[653]