[254] i.e. that Spurinna was in league with Caecina, and meant to hand them over to him.
[255] He was making 'a reconnaissance in force westwards along the river bank to discover, if he could, the strength and intentions of the enemy' (B.W. Henderson, Civil War, &c.). But Mr. E.G. Hardy points out that, as he had only 4,000 men and Caecina's 30,000 were in the immediate neighbourhood, this would have been foolish. It seems better to believe Tacitus' suggestion that his insubordinate troops forced Spurinna to march out.
[256] Considered Gallic and effeminate.
[257] Mr. Henderson (Civil War, &c.) argues that it was imperative for Caecina to take the fortress at Placentia, since it threatened his sole line of communication with Valens' column. Tacitus, as usual, gives a practical rather than a strategic motive. His interests are purely human.
[258] Familiar devices for sheltering troops against missiles from a town wall. They were generally made of hurdles covered with raw hides. The vinea was a shelter on poles, so named from its resemblance to a pergola of vines.
[259] In i. [61] only legion XXI is mentioned. But Caecina may have formed the detachments into another legion.
[260] Civilis' nephew and bitter enemy. See iv. [70], v. [21].
[261] Spurinna's colleague in the command of the advanced guard from Rome. He was now probably at Mantua.
[262] At the meeting of two high roads leading to Cremona, the one from Hostilia and the other from Mantua. It was near here that Vitellius defeated Otho, and here that his power fell before Vespasian (cp. iii. [15].