[54] The Dhoon is a rich valley under the foot of the Himalayahs, and the head-quarters of the Sirmoor battalion.
THE BRITISH FORCES CROSS THE SUTLEJ, AND ARE CONCENTRATED AT KUSSOOR—VISIT OF GHOOLAB SINGH AND DHULEEP SINGH TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL—THE ARMY ADVANCE TO LAHORE—THE SIKH ARMY DISPERSE AND SURRENDER THEIR GUNS.
No action ever fought in the East was more decisive than that of Sobraon, and few battles of modern times have exhibited a greater loss in proportion to the numbers engaged.
It must appear that the enemy's intentions in building a bridge of boats across the river, in face of the British army, was to deter Sir Henry Hardinge from transferring the war to the opposite shore, where the Sikh soldiery were well aware that they had much to apprehend from national dissension as well as private intrigue amongst the sirdars.
As the British army, after its concentration, subsequent to the battle of Ferozeshuhur, remained some time inactive, awaiting the arrival of the siege train, the enemy began to regain confidence. It appears probable that the Sikhs would, ere long, have commenced active hostile measures, otherwise the attitude assumed at Sobraon must be quite inexplicable.
It is almost superfluous to notice the error committed by the Sikhs in neglecting to complete their entrenchments, (for which they had ample time,) and in weakly garrisoning the weakest part of their works. To that cause, and fighting with a river in their rear, which offered a main obstacle to their retreat, must be attributed the enormous losses suffered by the enemy, from which a hasty retirement had saved them on former occasions.
In each action, the Sikhs had lost nearly all their cannon, and the greater part of their artillerymen; and as these could not be replaced by raw levies, each defeat had been more serious than at the first glance it may have been considered. Indian history offers no parallel to the resolution displayed by the enemy in preparing for a renewal of active measures immediately after each defeat.[55] It had long been a favourite saying with military men in India, that the Sikhs would certainly fight one good battle when hostilities ensued, and that the remainder of the war would amount to no more than the reduction of their forts. This established maxim, however, did not prove that we were very thoroughly acquainted with the Sikh disposition—and after Ferozeshuhur, it lost all its advocates. The military theorists were compelled to trace a new line of operations, which proved, even after Sobraon, tolerably indefinite, for there were few officers in the army who did not expect a smart action on the opposite shore.