The heavy losses suffered by the British at Sobraon, were mainly owing to the strong works which the centre and right divisions of the army so gallantly stormed. Had the attack upon those points been delayed until the enemy's weaker parts on his right had been carried, (the Sikh entrenchments being then taken in reverse,) his batteries would have been rendered unserviceable, whilst our horse artillery might, with the sappers' assistance, have been brought into the area of the works, to act against the disordered masses. Under such circumstances, it appears likely that the action would have been sooner over, and Sir Harry Smith's and General Gilbert's divisions spared the storm in which they suffered so heavily. At the same time that the enemy would have been compelled to face his new assailants, being attacked by the reserve division, his retreat would have been completely intercepted, and his final and utter destruction been apparently inevitable.
As it happened, the Sikh losses were undoubtedly enormous. The entrenchments were defended by about thirty thousand troops, Aeen battalions and Bundookcheras, besides irregulars and cavalry, who retreated early from the scene of action. Of this army, fully one half were destroyed in the trenches, or in the passage of the river. During the battle, four boats, connecting the bridge of boats with the opposite shore, had been removed, which caused the whole fabric rapidly to give way when oppressed with the weight of the retreating multitude. This removal of the boats was generally understood to have been a pre-concerted arrangement with Ghoolab Singh, for the destruction of a force which caused him, as well as many others, considerable disquietude. I give this merely as a prevalent report, and one likely enough to be true, judging from the accomplishments in treachery which the Sikh history evinces, in common with other nations of Hindostan; but the secrets of the political department are necessarily maintained for a time, and have not yet become public.
The revelation would certainly be inconvenient to Ghoolab Singh; and its suppression, if founded in fact, is perhaps incumbent on those in authority.
Whilst the Sikhs were thus being effectually repelled from our north-western frontier, the force in Scinde, under Sir Charles Napier, was rapidly advancing, to co-operate with the British main column. That energetic warrior hastened towards the scene of warfare, in advance of his forces, but did not succeed in reaching the field of operations before the final act of the tragedy had been performed, and the curtain had fallen. Those who are acquainted with that chivalrous family may judge of the disappointment endured by a Napier arriving too late for a battle!
At the same time that the British army were concentrated at Kussoor, Brigadier Wheler's division at Loodiana crossed the Sutlej, opposite the fortress of Philoor, unopposed by the Sikhs, although a portion of the Khalsas made their appearance in the neighbourhood; but finding that the ground had been preoccupied, no attempt was made to molest the British general.
On the 11th, 12th, and 13th of February, the whole of the British army having been poured across the bridge of boats, advanced, and took post on the strong defensible ridge at Kussoor, where a picket of the enemy, which had occupied that position, fell back, and left them in undisputed possession of the strongest ground between the river and the metropolis.
The shattered remnant of the Sikh army, after the defeat at Sobraon, had fallen back, and bivouacked in the neighbourhood of Umritsir, where they remained irresolute, and awaiting the result of the deliberations going on at Lahore. The whole materiel of that army had been so utterly dismantled, that little apprehension was entertained of even such efforts as might be prompted by the influence of despair. Their guns,[56] in which the main confidence of the Sikh army had ever been placed, had been nearly all captured, and their artillerymen lay on the field of Sobraon. The Aeen battalions, who had readily and gallantly borne the brunt of battle in defence of the batteries and entrenchments, had suffered most severely, especially in the two last engagements. Under this combination of disasters, the Khalsa army was from that day forth no longer worthy of consideration; nor is there any probability that the Sikhs will ever again, during our time, arrive at the same military predominance which they once possessed.
Still, it appeared doubtful that our advance towards the capital would be effected without another struggle, for their mettle had been now too fully tested to be treated any longer with contempt; though any efforts which might be made when reinforced from Lahore must have been hopeless, as no time had been allowed them to entrench themselves. It was conjectured that the sirdars would willingly come forward to sue for terms, but their influence with the Punchayut was not reckoned on with much certainty.