The president of this assembly has spoken of the late session as having been not only long, but arduous; and, in some respects, it does deserve to be so regarded. I may indeed say, that, in an experience of twenty years of public life, I have never yet encountered labors or anxieties such as this session brought with it.

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With a short intermission in the autumn, so short as not to allow the more distant members to visit their homes, we have been in continual session from the early part of September to the 9th of July, a period of ten months.[114] On our part, during this whole time, we have been contending in minorities against majorities; majorities, indeed, not to be relied on for all measures, as the event has proved, but still acknowledged and avowed majorities, professing general attachment and support to the measures, and to the men, of the administration. My own object, and that of those with whom I have had the honor to act, has been steady and uniform. That object was, to resist new theories, new schemes, new and dangerous projects, until time could be gained for their consideration by the people. This was our great purpose, and its accomplishment required no slight effort. It was the commencement of a new Congress. The organization of the two houses showed clear and decisive administration majorities. The administration itself was new, and had come into its fresh power with something of the popularity of that which preceded it. It was no child’s play, therefore, to resist, successfully, its leading measures, for so long a period as should allow time for an effectual appeal to the people, pressed, as those measures were, with the utmost zeal and assiduity.

The president of the day has alluded in a very flattering manner to my own exertions and efforts, made at different times, in connection with the leading topics. But I claim no particular merit for myself. In what I have done, I have only acted with others. I have acted, especially, with my most estimable, able, and excellent colleague,[115] and with the experienced and distinguished men who form the delegation of Massachusetts in the House of Representatives, a delegation of which any State might be justly proud. We have acted together, as men holding, in almost all cases, common opinions, and laboring for a common end. It gives me great pleasure to have the honor of seeing so many of the Representatives of the State in Congress here to-day; but I must not be prevented, even by their presence, from bearing my humble but hearty testimony to the 419 fidelity and ability with which they have, in this arduous struggle, performed their public duties. The crisis has, indeed, demanded the efforts of all; and we of Massachusetts, while we hope we have done our duty, have done it only in concurrence with other Whigs, whose zeal, ability, and exertions can never be too much commended.

This is not an occasion in which it is fit or practicable to discuss very minutely, and at length, the questions which have been chiefly agitated during this long and laborious session of Congress. Yet, so important is the great and general question, which, for the last twelve or fifteen months, has been presented to the consideration of the legislature, that I deem it proper, on this, as on all occasions, to state, at the risk of some repetition, perhaps, what is the nature of that important question, and briefly to advert to some of the circumstances in which it had its origin.

Whatever subordinate questions may have been raised touching a sub-treasury, or a constitutional treasury, or a treasury in one, or in another, or in yet a third form, I take the question, the plain, the paramount, the practical question, to be this; namely, whether it be among the powers and the duties of Congress to take any further care of the national currency than to regulate the coinage of gold and silver. That question lies at the foundation of all. Other questions, however multiplied or varied, have but grown out of that.

If government is bound to take care that there is a good currency for all the country, then, of course, it will have a good currency for itself, and need take no especial pains to provide for itself any thing peculiar. But if, on the other hand, government is at liberty to abandon the general currency to its fate, without concern and without remorse, then, from necessity, it must take care of itself; amidst the general wreck of currency and credit, it must have places of resort and a system of shelter; it must have a currency of its own, and modes of payment and disbursement peculiar to itself. It must burrow and hide itself in sub-treasury vaults. Scorning credit, and having trust in nobody, it must grasp metallic money, and act as if nothing represented, or could represent, property, which could not be counted, paid piece by piece, or weighed in the scales, and made to ring upon the table; or it must resort to special deposits in banks, 420 even in those banks whose conduct has been so loudly denounced as flagitious and criminal, treacherous to the government, and fraudulent towards the people. All these schemes and contrivances are but the consequences of the general doctrine which the administration has advanced, and attempted to recommend to the country; that is, that Congress has nothing to do with the currency, beyond the mere matter of coinage, except to provide for itself. How such a notion should come to be entertained, at this day, may well be a matter of wonder for the wise; since it is a truth capable of the clearest demonstration, that, from the first day of the existence of the Constitution, from the moment when a practical administration of government drew a first breath under its provisions, the superintendence and care over the currency of the country have been admitted to be among the clear and unquestioned powers and duties of Congress. This was the opinion in Washington’s time, and his administration acted upon it, vigorously and successfully. And in Mr. Madison’s time, when the peculiar circumstances of the country again brought up the subject, and gave it new importance, it was held to be the exclusive, or at least the paramount and unquestioned, right of Congress to take care of the currency; to restore it when depreciated; to see that there was a sound, convertible paper circulation, suited to the circumstances of the country, and having equal value, and the same credit, in all parts of it. This was Mr. Madison’s judgment. He acted upon it; and both houses of Congress concurred with him. But if we now quote Mr. Madison’s sentiments, we get no reply at all from the friends of the government system. We may read his messages of 1815 and 1816 as often as we please. No man answers them, and yet the party of the administration, professing to belong to Mr. Madison’s political school, acts upon directly opposite principles.

Now, what has brought about this state of things? What has caused this attempt, now made, at the end of half a century, to change a great principle of administration, and to surrender a most important power of the government? Gentlemen, it has been a crisis of party, not of the country, which has given birth to these new sentiments. The tortuous windings of party policy have conducted us, and nothing else could well have conducted us, to such a point. Nothing but party pledges, nothing 421 but courses of political conduct entered upon for party purposes, and pursued from necessary regard to personal and party consistency, could so far have pushed the government out of its clear and well-trodden path of constitutional duty. From General Washington’s presidency to the last hour of the late President’s, both the government and the country have supposed Congress to be clothed with the general duty of protecting the currency, either as an inference from the coinage power or from the obvious and incontestable truth, that the regulation of the currency is naturally and plainly a branch of the commercial power. General Jackson himself was behind no one of his predecessors in asserting this power, and in acknowledging the corresponding duty. We all know that his very first complaint against the late Bank of the United States was, that it had not fulfilled the expectation of the country, by furnishing for the use of the people a sound and uniform currency. There were many persons, certainly, who did not agree with him in his opinions respecting the bank and the effects of its agency on the country; but it was expressly on the ground of this alleged failure of the bank, that he undertook what was called the great reform. There are those, again, who think that of this attempted reform he made a very poor and sorry business; but still the truth is, that he undertook this reform for the very purpose professed and avowed, that he might fulfil better than it had yet been fulfilled the duty of government in furnishing the people with a good currency. The President thought that the currency, in 1832 and 1833, was not good enough; that the people had a right to expect a better; and to meet this expectation, he began what he himself called his experiment. He said the currency was not so sound, and so uniform, as it was the duty of government to make it; and he therefore undertook to give us a currency more sound and more uniform. And now, Gentlemen, let us recur shortly to what followed; for there we shall find the origin of the present constitutional notions and dogmas. Let us see what has changed the Constitution in this particular.

In 1833, the public deposits were removed, by an act of the President himself, from the Bank of the United States, and placed in certain State banks, under regulations prescribed by the executive alone. This was the experiment. The utmost confidence, indeed, an arrogant and intolerant confidence, was 422 entertained and expressed of its success; and all who doubted were regarded as blind bigots to a national bank. When the experiment was put into operation, it was proclaimed that its success was found to be complete. Down to the very close of General Jackson’s administration, we heard of nothing but the wonderful success of the experiment. It was declared, from the highest official sources, that the State banks, used as banks of deposit, had not only shown themselves perfectly competent to fulfil the duties of fiscal agents to government, but also that they had sustained the currency, and facilitated the great business of internal exchanges, with the most singular and gratifying success, and better than the same thing had been done before. In all this glow and fervor of self-commendation, the late administration went out of office, having bequeathed the experiment, with all its blushing honors and rising glories, to its successor. But a frost, a nipping frost, was at hand. Two months after General Jackson had retired, the banks suspended specie payments, deposit banks and all; a universal embarrassment smote down the business and industry of the country; the treasury was left without a dollar, and the brilliant glory of the experiment disappeared in gloom and thick darkness! And now, Gentlemen, came the change of sentiments, now came the new reading of the Constitution. A national bank had already been declared by the party to be unconstitutional, the State bank system had failed, and what more could be done? What other plan was to be devised? How could the duty of government over the currency be now performed? The administration had decried a national bank, and it now felt bound to denounce all State institutions; and what, therefore, could it do? The whole party had laid out its entire strength, in an effort to render the late Bank of the United States, and any bank of the United States, unpopular and odious. It had pronounced all such institutions to be dangerous, anti-republican and monarchical. It had, especially, declared a national bank to be plainly and clearly unconstitutional. Now, Gentlemen, I have nothing to say of the diffidence and modesty of men, who without hesitation or blushing, set up their own favorite opinions on a question of this kind against the judgment of the government and the judgment of the country, maintained for fifty years. I will only remark, that, if we were to find men acting 423 thus in their own affairs, if we should find them disposing of their own interests, or making arrangements for their own property, in contempt of rules which they knew the legislative and the judicial authorities had all sanctioned for half a century, we should be very likely to think them out of their heads. Yet this ground had been taken against the late bank, and against all national banks; and it could not be surrendered without apparent and gross inconsistency. What, then, I ask again, was the administration to do? You may say, it should have retracted its error, it should have seen the necessity of a national institution, and yielded to the general judgment of the country.

But that would have required an effort of candor and magnanimity, of which all men are not capable. Besides, there were open, solemn, public pledges in the way. This commitment of the party against a national bank, and the disastrous results of its experiment on the State institutions, brought the party into a difficulty, from which it seemed to have no escape, but in shifting off, altogether, the duty of taking care of the currency. I was at Wheeling, in Virginia, in May of last year, when the banks suspended payment; and, at the risk of some imputation of bad taste, I will refer to observations of mine made then, to the citizens of that town, and published, in regard to the questions which that event would necessarily bring before the country.[116] I saw at once that we were at the commencement of a new era, and that a controversy must arise, which would greatly excite the community.