No sooner had the State banks suspended specie payments, and among the rest those which were depositories of the government, than a cry of fraud and treachery was raised against them, with no better reason, perhaps, than existed for that loud, and boisterous, and boastful confidence, with which the late administration had spoken of their capacity of usefulness, and had assured the country that its experiment could not fail. But whether the suspension by the banks was a matter of necessity with them, or not, the administration, after it had happened, seeing itself now shut out from the use of all banks by its own declared opinions and the results of its own policy, and seeing 424 no means at hand for making another attempt at reforming the currency, turned a short corner, and in all due form denied that the government had any duty of the kind to discharge. From the time of the veto of the bank charter, in 1832, the administration had been like a man who had voluntarily deserted a safe bottom, on deep waters, and, having in vain sought to support himself by laying hold on one and another piece of floating timber, chooses rather to go down than to seek safety in returning to what he has abandoned.
Seeing that it had deprived itself of the common means of regulating the currency, it now denied its obligation to do so; declared it had nothing to do with the currency beyond coinage; that it would take care of the revenues of the government, and as for the rest, the people must look out for themselves. This decision thus evidently grew out of party necessity. Having deprived themselves of the ordinary and constitutional means of performing their duty, they sought to avoid the responsibility by declaring that there was no such duty to perform. They have looked further into the Constitution, and examined it by daylight and by moonlight, and cannot find any such duty or obligation. Though General Jackson saw it very plainly, during the whole course of his presidency, it has now vanished, and the new commentators can nowhere discern a vestige of it. The present administration, indeed, stood pledged to tread in the steps of its predecessor; but here was one footprint which it could not, or would not, occupy, or one stride too long for it to take. The message, I had almost said the fatal message, communicated to Congress in September, contained a formal disavowal, by the administration, of all power under the Constitution to regulate the general actual currency of the country.
The President says, in that message, that if he refrains from suggesting to Congress any specific plan for regulating the exchanges, relieving mercantile embarrassments, or interfering with the ordinary operations of foreign or domestic commerce, it is from the conviction that such measures are not within the constitutional provision of government.
How all this could be said, when the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to regulate commerce, both foreign and domestic, I cannot conceive. But the Constitution was not to be trifled with, and the people are not to be trifled 425 with. The country, I believe, by a great majority, is of opinion that this duty does belong to government, and ought to be exercised. All the new expounders have not been able to erase this general power over commerce, and all that belongs to commerce. Their fate, in this respect, is like that of him in ancient story. While endeavoring to tear up and rend asunder the Constitution, its strong fibres have recoiled, and caught them in the cleft. They experience
“Milo’s fearful end,
Wedged in the timber which they strove to rend.”
Gentlemen, this constitutional power can never be surrendered. We may as well give up the whole commercial power at once, and throw every thing connected with it back upon the States. If Congress surrender the power, to whom shall it pass, or where shall it be lodged? Shall it be left to six-and-twenty different legislatures? To eight hundred or a thousand unconnected State banks? No, Gentlemen, to allow that authority to be surrendered would be to abandon the vessel of state, without pilot or helm, and to suffer her to roll, darkling, down the current of her fate.
For the sake of avoiding all misapprehensions on this most important subject, I wish to state my own opinion, clearly, and in few words. I have never said, that it is an indispensable duty in Congress, under all circumstances, to establish a national bank. No such duty, certainly, is created by the Constitution, in express terms. I did not say what particular measures are enjoined by the Constitution, in this respect. Congress has its discretion, and is left to its own judgment, as to the means most proper to be employed. But I say the general duty does exist.
I maintain that Congress is bound to take care, by some proper means, to secure a good currency for the people; and that, while this duty remains unperformed, one great object of the Constitution is not attained. If we are to have as many different currencies as there are States, and these currencies are to be liable to perpetual fluctuation, it would be folly to say that we had reached that security and uniformity in commercial regulation, which we know it was the purpose of the Constitution to establish.