GunsGunsGuns
Bourbon64Fort60Content64
Monarque90Henri64Souverain84
Aimable68Ambitieux96Illustre70
Saint Louis60Couronne76Modéré52
Diamant60Maure52Excellent60
Gaillard68Serieux68Prince60
Terrible76Courageux58Magnifique76
Merveilleux94Perle56Laurier64
Tonnant76Glorieux64Brave58
Saint-Michel60Conquerant84Entend60
Sans-Pareil62Soleil Royal104Triomphant76
Foudroyant82Saint-Philippe84Orgueilleux94
Brilliant68Admirable90

It will be seen that the force of the two fleets was extremely unequal; the allies being in fact more than twice as strong as their enemy. If this was a surprise to the French, the information supplied to Louis XIV. by the Jacobites in England, and by his agents in the Low Countries, must have been far less accurate than is commonly supposed. If, on the other hand, he really did believe that the grumblers in the English fleet, and that Russell the admiral, who was undoubtedly in communication with the exiled court at St. Germain, would betray their country to its hereditary enemy on the field of battle, and under the eyes of all the world, he must have been singularly impervious to experience. Tourville received peremptory orders, dated the 26th March, and worded in a style insulting to him. He was told to go near enough to the enemy to see them for himself, and not to be misled into believing that merchant-ships were men-of-war, as he was accused of doing during the off-shore cruise of 1691. If on reaching La Hougue he found the allies already there, he was to attack them whatever their numbers might be. If victorious, he was to cover the passage of the army to England. If defeated, he was to save his fleet as he best could. Should the allies not be near La Hougue when he arrived, he was to transport the army without waste of time. If the allies attacked him during the passage, he was to fight with obstinacy, so as to give the army time to land. In case the allies appeared after the landing, he might avoid a battle if they exceeded in number by ten ships.

When the French were signalled by the guns of the look-out ships at three o’clock on the morning of the 19th, the weather was foggy. Fearing that the enemy might stretch past him to northward, Russell signalled to the rear to tack and close the space between him and the coast of England. At four o’clock the mist lifted and the enemy were seen to the westward with their heads pointing to the south. As this showed that they had no intention of attempting to turn him on the north side Russell countermanded the order to the Rear or Blue Division. The allied fleet was not in order of battle but scattered some ahead, some to windward, and some to leeward of the admiral. The wind was blowing from the S.W., and the French therefore had the weather-gage. The line was formed at eight o’clock with the Dutch or White Squadron in the van, and to the south of the Red Squadron which formed the centre, then came the Blue Squadron farthest to the north. There must have been a distance of many miles between the first and last ship of this great fleet of ninety-nine sail, and the Blue Squadron was still to leeward. Having made his simple disposition to meet the attack Russell lay with his topsail to the mast waiting for the enemy to come on. With a resolution of character which shows his innate superiority to Herbert, Tourville charged home. He directed his attack on the centre of the allied line, telling off a few ships in his van and rear to watch the van and rear of the allies, and prevent them from doubling on his own fleet.

The battle began about ten o’clock, and lasted till about five in the afternoon. The French ships engaged with the Red Division made no attempt to break through the English line. The battle was conducted entirely by cannonading at short ranges, and the English claimed that their fire was more rapid than the French. When the enemy’s attack was fully developed Russell ordered the van to tack for the purpose of getting to windward of the French, and putting them between two fires, and at the same time signalled to the Blue Division to come closer to the centre. Neither order could be obeyed, for the wind was very light so that the ships were unable to manœuvre. The real battle was always between the Red Squadron and the ships immediately around Tourville. About two o’clock in the afternoon the wind, after falling altogether, rose again, but from the N.W., thus giving the weather-gage to the allies, and by five o’clock Tourville began to draw off. He doubtless felt that enough had been done for honour, and he hoped that the Red Squadron had been sufficiently mauled to cripple it from pursuing him. The wind was light and variable. As the French ships drew away to the westward it fell calm and the mist arose again; then there was a short squall from the east. Sir Cloudesley Shovell with the rear division of the Red Squadron broke through the French in the interval between the centre and the ships which had been stretched out to observe the rear of the allies. Captain Hastings of the Sandwich was killed at this phase of the action. The two fleets became mingled in the fog, and drifted to the westward with the ebb-tide. Both anchored at the flood, but at this moment a portion of the Blue Squadron which had worked to the westward of the French drifted back through them in the mist and darkness. They were fired on as they came through, and Rear-Admiral Carter, whose division made this movement, was killed. The sound of the cannonading was heard by the rest of the allied fleet, but it could take no part in the action. When he saw that the enemy was in retreat Russell had ordered a general chase, that is to say he left each ship free to go at its utmost speed. But no great rapidity of movement was possible. The wind had fallen, and the fog made it impossible to see.

This was the end of what strictly speaking is called the battle of La Hogue, from the old spelling of La Hougue. The name is improperly used, for the actual battle was fought off Cape Barfleur. The battle of Barfleur was in fact the title commonly given by our ancestors, but it has been displaced by the name of the place which was the last scene of the four days’ pursuit following on the action. The pursuit began like a nightmare, in strenuous effort to act without the power to move. Both fleets had anchored during the night. When daylight came there was a thick haze and the French were invisible to the allied fleet. What little wind there was, was from the N.N.E. At about eight o’clock some of the Dutch ships caught sight of the enemy to the W.S.W. The pursuit was resumed, but, as the ships could not move more quickly than they were carried by the tide, the progress was very slow. At four o’clock in the afternoon the ebb-tide ceased, and both fleets again anchored, the French in order to avoid the risk of being carried among their pursuers, and the allies so that they should not lose ground. They had moved so little during the ebb-tide that they were still off Cape Barfleur, and at no great distance from the scene of the battle. As long as the tide was flowing it was useless to move, but at ten in the evening, when it turned, both fleets again got under way and began to drift to the west. About this time the fore-topmast of the Britannia, which had been seriously injured in the action, came down, and as Russell did not transfer his flag to another vessel, this delayed the Red Squadron under his immediate command. Many of them must have suffered in the action. Whether because they felt bound to remain about their admiral, or because they could not move any faster, the ships of the Red Squadron fell somewhat behind in the pursuit while the Blue and White pressed on ahead. At four in the morning of the 21st both fleets anchored again. They had now tided so far that they were almost off Cape La Hague. Both were much scattered. A part of the French had passed the Cape, the others had not. Among those which had failed to get beyond the headland was the Soleil Royal, Tourville’s flagship. She had suffered very severely in the action from the fire of the Britannia and the ships just ahead and astern. It has been said with some appearance of truth that if Tourville had had the resolution to set her on fire he might have brought the whole of his fleet round Cape La Hague. But she was the pride of the French Navy, and had been named from the king himself who was the royal sun of France, and the admiral could not make his mind up to sacrifice her. He had, however, transferred his flag to another ship the Ambitieux.

When the fleets were ordered to anchor, only a portion of the French was able to obey. Whether it was because they had slipped their cables on the previous night, and therefore could not anchor, or whether their anchors would not hold, it is certain that they were unable to stop themselves from being carried to the eastward towards the allies. The position then in the early hours of the 21st was this, one part of the French fleet was ahead, to the west another part was drifting eastward between the land and the allies. The best sailing ships of the White and Blue Squadrons were well ahead of Russell, who with the Red Squadron was furthest of all to the east. The inability of the ships immediately about him to anchor showed Tourville that it was useless to endeavour to keep his now divided fleet acting as one body any longer. If he summoned the ships to the west to his assistance he would bring the whole fleet into a trap between the land and the enemy, who was in overwhelming numbers. Since he could no longer exercise his powers as commander to any advantage there remained nothing for him but to abdicate. He therefore hauled down his flag of command from the main-topmast-head, as a signal that every captain was free to act as he thought best for the safety of his ship. The French fleet now split into fragments. One part, under the Chef d’escadre Pannetier made a push for the Channel between the coast of France and the island of Alderney. The easterly current of the flood-tide splits at Cape La Hague. While the main body flows up Channel a branch turns off, and runs with great speed between the west side of the Côtentin and the island of Alderney. This makes what we call the Race of Alderney, and the French the Raz Blanchard. The navigation is dangerous, and would, under ordinary circumstances, have been avoided by the heavy ships, but circumstances only left the French a choice of evils, and they ran through the Race to seek refuge under the guns of St. Malo.

Russell, seeing that the division of the French and the distress of the vessels drifting towards him made it no longer necessary to keep his fleet together, signalled to Ashby, and the Dutch to pursue Pannetier. Meanwhile he, with the Red Division and the laggards of the White and Blue, prepared to deal with those of Tourville’s ships which had failed to round La Hague. Ashby could not reach the enemy. Pannetier had time to get his ships over the bar of the Rance, and take refuge under the guns of the corsair town of St. Malo, before his pursuers reached him. Ashby returned next day and joined Sir Ralph Delaval, who, in the meantime, had done a good stroke of work at Cherbourg. When it became clear that they were trapped the ships of Tourville had no resource but to endeavour to fly to the eastward between Russell and the land, to round Cape Barfleur and to take refuge at La Hougue. Three of them were too crippled for further flight. These were the famous Soleil Royal, for whose sake so much had been risked, the Admirable, and the Triomphant. All three were run ashore at Cherbourg, and the others fled eastward. Russell left Sir Ralph Delaval to deal with the stranded ships, and followed the rest. Delaval could do nothing on the evening of the 21st, but on the following morning he sent in the boats and fireships, under the command of Captain Heath, Captain Greenaway, and Captain Foulis. The Admirable and Triomphant were burnt. But the fireship with which Captain Foulis endeavoured to burn the Soleil Royal was sunk by the Frenchmen’s fire. Hereupon, Delaval hauled in as close as he could and opened fire on the great stranded flagship. When he had battered her for some time, and found that no further resistance was made, he took his boats and boarded her. Sir Ralph Delaval’s report contains a detail which is discreditable to King Louis’s navy. He says he found many men and wounded men in the Soleil Royal, but no officers. She was burnt by the English. When the work was done Sir Ralph was disturbed by thirty sail approaching him from the west. This, however, turned out to be Sir John Ashby’s squadron, and the two officers united their forces, and followed the admiral to the east. A few of the French ships under command of Nesmond escaped by sailing round the British Isles.

Russell pursued Tourville round Cape Barfleur. The French admiral ran as close as he could to La Hougue, with the thirteen vessels still about him. It was not until the evening of the 22nd, so light was the wind and so slow were the ships of that time amid tides and variable breezes, that Russell was able to anchor in the neighbourhood of the fugitives. On the 23rd he sent in the boats and fireships under Rooke, who burnt six of the enemy. On the 24th the work was completed by the destruction of the other seven. The French indeed were panic-stricken, and the resistance was trifling. Not more than ten men were killed in this piece of service, which if attempted against an alert and resolute enemy must needs have been very costly.

The battle pursuit and destruction spread over these five days, and included under the name of “La Hogue” make nearly the last passage of naval warfare of a brilliant decisive character which we shall meet for three-quarters of a century. The navy had work of vital importance to do, and a function of unusual importance to fulfil. But it was no longer to meet equal fleets at sea, except on rare occasions, and when it did its own method of fighting was dull. The French fleet very soon ceased to contend with the allies in the ocean and channel altogether, and in the Mediterranean its efforts were spasmodic. The great change has been attributed to the disaster of La Hogue, without sufficient reason. We have seen that the operations of the French in previous years had been very languid. Their weakness during the rest of the war was to be mainly attributed to the French king’s want of money. His resources were overburdened by the war on land against the League of Augsburg, and he could not afford to fit out great fleets. But to our ancestors the importance of the battle of La Hogue was naturally a subject of high gratification. The material loss inflicted on King Louis was considerable, and the blow to his prestige greater still. They could feel that the Channel was now safe, not indeed from privateers, but from great fleets sent out to cover an invasion of England. Besides, after the spiritless straggling operations of the last three years, the resolution of Russell and the vigour of his pursuit were an immense change for the better.

The decline of the French navy was not immediately visible. An attempt to attack St. Malo at the close of 1692 was given up as hopeless, and the ships under Pannetier’s command were able to make their way to Brest undisturbed. In 1693 the French even achieved a considerable measure of success, partly through their own good management, and partly by the help of mistakes of the English Government. Russell was no longer at sea. The shifting politics of the time, and his own position as one of the leaders of the Whig party, combined with the king’s discovery of his intrigues with St. Germain to remove him from command. His place was taken by Killigrew, Delaval, and Shovell, who were combined in a joint commission as admiral. The practice of giving the command at sea to a committee was once more revived because the Government distrusted a single command. The result was to discredit for ever the appointment of several men to do work which most especially requires unity of will and authority.