102. In which he equivocates between body as unknown opposite of mind and body as a ‘nominal essence’.
103. Rationale of these contradictions.
104. What knowledge can feeling, even as referred to a ‘solid’ body, convey?
105. Only the knowledge that something is, not what it is.
106. How it is that the real essence of things, according to Locke, perishes with them, yet is immutable.
107. Only about qualities of matter, as distinct from matter itself, that Locke feels any difficulty.
108. These, as knowable, must be our ideas, and therefore not a ‘real essence’.
109. Are the ‘primary qualities’ then, a ‘nominal essence’?
110. According to Locke’s account they are relations, and thus inventions of the mind.
111. Body is the complex in which they are found. Do we derive the idea of body from primary qualities, or the primary qualities from idea of body?