296. Is Hume entitled to retain ‘philosophical’ relations as distinct from ‘natural’?
297. Examination of Hume’s language about them.
298. Philosophical relation consists in a comparison, but no comparison between cause and effect.
299. The comparison is between present and past experience of succession of objects.
300. Observation of succession already goes beyond sense.
301. As also does the ‘observation concerning identity,’ which the comparison involves.
302. Identity of objects an unavoidable crux for Hume. His account of it.
303. Properly with him it is a fiction, in the sense that we have no such idea. Yet he implies that we have such idea, in saying that we mistake something else for it.
304. Succession of like feelings mistaken for an identical object: but the feelings, as described, are already such objects.
305. Fiction of identity thus implied as source of the propensity which is to account for it.