327. Reality of remembered ‘system’ transferred to ‘system of judgment’.
328. Reality of the former ‘system’ other than vivacity of impressions.
329. It is constituted by relations, which are not impressions at all; and in this lies explanation of the inference from it to ‘system of judgment’.
330. Not seeing this, Hume has to explain inference to latter system as something forced upon us by habit.
331. But if so, ‘system of judgment’ must consist of feelings constantly experienced;
332. … which only differ from remembered feelings inasmuch as their liveliness has faded. But how can it have faded, if they have been constantly repeated?
333. Inference then can give no new knowledge.
334. Nor does this merely mean that it cannot constitute new phenomena, while it can prove relations, previously unknown, between phenomena. Such a distinction inadmissible with Hume.
335. His distinction of probability of causes from that of chances might seem to imply conception of nature, as determining inference.
336. But this distinction he only professes to adopt in order to explain it away.